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A bstract
This thesis examines the exercise of market power by oligopolistic firms.
The first part deals with a phenomenon that has important implications for 
market power: horizontal mergers. I seek to uncover why the pattern of equilibria 
in sequential merger games of a certain type is similar across a fairly wide class of 
models studied in the literature. By developing general conditions characterising 
each element of the set of possible equilibria, I show that the solution to models 
that satisfy a certain sufficient condition will be restricted to the same subset of 
equilibria. This result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of equilibria 
obtained for this class of models is associated with mergers happening, not in 
isolation, but rather in bunches. I extend the results to the analysis of cross- 
border mergers, studying two standard models that satisfy my sufficient condition: 
Sutton’s (1991) vertically-differentiated oligopoly and Perry and Porter’s (1985) 
fixed-supply-of-capital model.
The second part is concerned with the structural inference of market power, a 
central theme in empirical Industrial Organisation. I demonstrate that when an 
industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, 
cost and conduct cannot be identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. 
In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique 
of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to distinguish empirically between 
alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement indus­
try, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical 
illustration. In particular, price-cost margins estimated using this established tech­
nique are biased heavily downwards, underestimating the degree of market power. 
I propose a test of conduct, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests 
that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.
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Robustness of this result is verified along several dimensions: by considering simple 
dynamic multimarket games which in equilibrium give rise to market division; by 
reviewing the spatial competition literature; and by resorting to a gravity model 
to statistically analyse shipments.
Keywords: Mergers; Sequential mergers; Cross-border investment; Technology 
transfer; Conduct; Multimarket competition; Market division; Limit pricing; Ce­
ment
JEL classification: D43, F14, F23, G34, L13, L41, L70
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Introduction
This thesis revolves around the exercise of market power by firms in an oligopolistic 
industry. Its chapters are of both an applied theoretical and an empirical nature, 
falling into either of two parts. The first part, Chapter 1 , deals with mergers 
between firms in a particular form of theoretic game, that where different groups 
of firms within an industry make merger decisions in sequence. It is well known 
among researchers and policymakers that mergers have important implications on 
the exercise of market power. The second part, contained in Chapters 2  and 3, 
is concerned with the measurement of market power. It analyses the performance 
of a well-established empirical methodology in a general setting where the ability 
of an industry to set prices is constrained by the threat of entry. This analysis is 
first presented theoretically and is then tested empirically by reference to a real- 
world industry, the Brazilian cement industry. While the first part takes the model 
of firm pricing behaviour -  or firm conduct -  as given to study the profitability 
and prevalence of mergers, the second part deals with the econometrician’s task of 
ascertaining the model of firm conduct from observable market data.
Following the somewhat puzzling result by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) 
that an exogenous merger in a homogeneous-goods Cournot oligopoly tends to be 
unprofitable, in view of the free-riding by firms not participating in the merger, sev­
eral papers were published showing that this “merger unprofitability” result was not 
robust to the relaxation of different assumptions in Salant et al’s model. By either 
introducing some differentiation among products, making marginal cost rise in out­
put, adding capacity constraints, or switching to price-setting firms with upward- 
sloping reaction functions, such free-riding by non-participants to the merger may 
be contained or eliminated (see, for example, Perry and Porter 1985, and Deneckere
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and Davidson 1985). More recently, a string of papers has shown that by allowing 
firms to merge in sequence, the profitability of mergers can be further enhanced 
(see, for example, Kamien and Zang 1993, and Fauli-Oller 2000).
As it happens, in a certain type of sequential merger game studied in the liter­
ature a similar pattern of equilibria is recurring under fairly broad industry condi­
tions, including different demand or cost setups, or different merger technologies. 
In this pattern of equilibria, only a strict subset of the set of possible equilibria is 
obtained and this subset is such that when a merger occurs along the equilibrium 
path of the game it occurs alongside other mergers. In other words, the equilibrium 
outcomes of the sequential merger game across different standard models is such 
that either all groups of firms that are allowed to merge choose to do so or that 
none of the groups of firms choose to merge. In particular, outcomes where only 
some groups of firms choose to merge while other groups choose not to are not 
supported in equilibrium. Chapter 1  seeks to uncover why this is so. I show that 
the solution to models that satisfy a certain sufficient condition will be restricted 
to the same subset of equilibria that characterises the “all-or-none” merger result. 
I motivate this sufficient condition by resorting to the way non-participating firms 
react to the merger of rival firms. In addition to examples of this type of sequen­
tial merger game already studied in the literature, I develop two other standard 
examples -  Sutton’s (1991) vertically-differentiated Cournot oligopoly and Perry 
and Porter’s (1985) quadratic-cost (fixed-supply-of-capital) model -  in which the 
sufficient condition holds. As such, the same pattern of equilibria obtains. I note 
that this “all-or-none” finding may be of empirical relevance in that mergers are 
commonly observed to “bunch” together, where periods of high merger activity are 
followed by periods of low activity.
Industrial organisation researchers and antitrust practitioners have long been 
concerned with measuring the degree of market power enjoyed by firms in an in­
dustry. When marginal cost is observed, market power -  or firm conduct -  can be 
inferred from the distance between price and cost, i.e. the price-cost margin. It is 
usually the case, however, that marginal cost is not observed. A standard method­
ology has evolved in the past decades that attempts to infer conduct, and cost,
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from the comparative statics of equilibrium (see, for example, Bresnahan 1989). 
Stated simply, the way equilibrium prices vary as demand conditions move exoge­
nously reveal the degree of market power. Consider two extreme examples by way 
of providing intuition. In a competitive industry, firms set output at the point 
where price equals marginal cost. At the other extreme, a collusive industry, or a 
cartel, changes prices such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
Chapter 2  revisits this standard methodology to show that in a more gen­
eral setting, where the threat of entry constrains the ability of an industry to set 
prices, the methodology does not work, in the sense of consistently estimating the 
true price-cost margins. One can motivate the threat of entry constraining pre­
entry prices by reference to a domestic industry facing potential competition from 
high-cost imports. (An alternative motivation, among others, can be a credible 
threat of investigation by an antitrust authority that imposes downward pressure, 
in unobserved ways, on an oligopoly’s prices.) Intuitively, the response of prices 
to fluctuations in demand is no longer distinct according to whether firms enjoy 
market power or not because the threat of imports, or entry more generally, acts 
to constrain the ability of firms with market power to equate marginal revenue 
to marginal cost. Why is this important? I show that a researcher attempting 
to infer the degree of market power who overlooks the threat of entry when this 
threat constrains market outcomes (on a non-trivial subset of his observations), 
will underestimate the degree of market power -  finding more competition when 
there is less. This is of high relevance to antitrust. It is also increasingly relevant 
in a world where trade barriers are being pulled down.
I illustrate by reference to the Brazilian cement industry, where potential (high- 
cost) imports restrain market outcomes. That is, imports impose a price ceiling 
which binds at the equilibrium, such that no or few imports are observed. I take 
on the role of this researcher and begin by overlooking the latent effect of imports, 
employing the standard methodology to estimate conduct and cost. The supply 
estimates I obtain are indicative of domestic competition, with estimated price- 
cost margins centred around zero. It turns out that one reason why I use the 
cement industry is that its simple technology allows me to observe marginal cost
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so that I can check these estimates. Cement is a given amount of limestone, a 
given amount of thermal energy to fire up the kiln, a given amount of electrical 
energy to grind the intermediate product and in my data I observe the flow of 
cement from each plant to each market, allowing me to calculate the cost of freight. 
I thus compute actual marginal cost from engineering coefficients, the observed 
flow of cement and observed factor prices. The true price-cost margins are far 
from competitive, amounting to around 50% of producer prices. This empirically 
confirms my theoretical proposition that the standard methodology in such settings 
yields biased estimates in the direction of more competition.
This result delivers a message of caution. That one must employ the standard 
methodology more cautiously than has arguably been done in the past. I then ad­
dress the following question. If the standard methodology fails in a setting where 
market outcomes are constrained, how can we then learn about conduct, even if 
we are prepared to require more information? I propose a test of conduct for such 
constrained settings against a standard oligopoly benchmark, the Cournot solu­
tion. I illustrate this test again by reference to the Brazilian cement industry. I 
find that outcomes in the industry are more collusive than the Cournot benchmark, 
and can be characterised by tacit market division. This is identified despite the 
threat of imports restraining prices. In addition to illustrating the proposed test of 
conduct, such an exercise reiterates the rejection of competitive domestic behav­
iour, as suggested by the standard methodology when the latent effect of entry is 
overlooked.
Chapter 3’s recurring theme is the testing of the robustness of the preceding 
chapter’s findings. I begin by considering, in light of the different local market 
structures observed in the Brazilian cement industry, simple dynamic multimarket 
games which in equilibrium give rise to the pattern of market division identified 
previously. The aim in providing examples of such dynamic games is to indicate 
the rationality of a strategy of market division in an industry where firms meet in 
different (geographic or product) markets. I then turn to the spatial competition 
literature to ensure the validity of the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 . The 
chapter then outlines several robustness and specification tests of the structural
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modelling estimates of Chapter 2. Finally, to complement the earlier structural 
estimation approach, I fit a gravity model to statistically analyse the flow of cement 
between plants and local markets. The distance from plants to markets, market 
size and plant ownership, among other variables, are highly correlated with -  or 
“explain” to a considerable degree -  the observed shipments of cement from plants 
to local markets. Yet there are interesting outliers, which I explore. One can 
tentatively attribute such residual variation to firm behaviour which differs from 
an “average” pattern of industry behaviour. Importantly, the exercise illustrates 
a point which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been made in the trade 
literature’s use of gravity models in explaining the flow of trade and investment 
between countries or regions: that estimated distance effects may also be proxying 
for firms’ strategies of dividing (geographic) markets, as is the case in the Brazilian 
cement industry. This is yet another manifestation of the classic identification 
problem in the estimation of supply: distinguishing firm costs from firm conduct.
The spatial dimension to price competition is present throughout both parts of 
the thesis. The analysis of sequential merger games in the first part is extended to 
the study of cross-border mergers, by way of two standard oligopoly models (which 
satisfy the sufficient condition of the chapter) that are cast in an international 
(or inter-regional) setting. In both, increasing horizontal product differentiation in 
the form of trade costs serves to limit the output expansion by non-participating 
firms that adversely affects the participants to a merger. The spatial dimension 
is again present in the second part by modelling the threat of entry facing the 
(domestic) oligopoly (whose conduct the econometrician wishes to infer) by way of 
the competitive supply of high-cost imported product, which sets a ceiling on the 
pricing outcomes of the industry, such that in equilibrium this ceiling binds and no 
foreign entry is observed. And in the structural estimation of the cement industry 
one must carefully control for the effects of distance, given that transportation 
and location are important components of the industry’s cost structure and the 
strategic interaction among firms.
Another topic common to both parts of the thesis relates to the implications for 
antitrust policy and how these cut across national (or regional) boundaries. The
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cross-border setting in which the two examples of Chapter 1  are framed highlights 
an aspect of “acquisition investment” which is not present in traditional studies 
of foreign investment in the “greenfield” form. The latter tend to highlight the 
tariff-jumping (or trade-cost avoidance) rationale of foreign investment as against 
foreign trade (exports). But on top of such a driving force, by merging or buying 
their way into foreign markets firms can reduce the number of rivals and enjoy 
muted competition, a feature which is absent in simple exports-versus-greenfield 
investment studies. As for the theoretical framework and the empirical illustration 
of the second part, the competitive threat of foreign supply impinges on domestic 
prices and consumer welfare, in addition to having important implications for the 
inference of the degree of market power, a core element of an antitrust practitioner’s 
toolkit. The way in which cement producers divide markets again illustrates that 
firms’ competitive strategies cut across geographic boundaries.
I postpone further remarks on the two parts of the thesis to each chapter individ­
ually -  these include thorough and self-contained introductory sections providing 
an overview and contributions of each chapter.
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Chapter 1
A  General A nalysis o f Sequential 
M erger Gam es, w ith  an  
A pplication to  Cross-Border 
M ergers
1.1 Introduction
Several papers have studied the interdependence of horizontal mergers by mod­
elling a particular type of sequential game of merger formation (Fauli-Oller 2000, 
Matsushima 2001, Motta and Vasconcelos 2003). In this type of game, merger 
decisions are made in sequence by different and exogenous groups of firms, ending 
in a product market competition stage. Despite employing different setups, such as 
different demand or cost conditions, or different merger technologies, the pattern 
of equilibria in the sequential game is similar across these models. As parameter 
values vary, only elements from the same subset of the set of possible equilibria is 
obtained. The equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the equilibria obtained in 
all of these papers is such that either all groups of firms that are allowed to merge 
choose to do so or that none of the groups of firms choose to merge. In particu­
lar, outcomes where only some groups of firms choose to merge while other groups 
choose not to are not supported in equilibrium. As will be noted, this “all-or-none”
20
finding may be of empirical relevance in that mergers are commonly observed to 
“bunch” together, where periods of high merger activity are followed by periods of 
low activity.
Fauli-Oller (2000) considers cost-asymmetric firms facing linear demand under 
Cournot competition. In the merger stages, prior to the final market competition 
stage, low-cost firms are allowed to bid in sequence for their high-cost counterparts. 
In a spatial context, Matsushima (2001) studies sequential mergers by placing firms 
symmetrically around a unit circle, with firms facing linear demand at each con­
sumer location and engaging in Cournot competition. Sequential pairwise mergers 
between firms located diametrically opposite one another are then allowed. Motta 
and Vasconcelos (2003) consider an industry with a fixed supply of capital distrib­
uted among its firms, with firms’ marginal costs being a decreasing function of the 
capital they own1. Exogenous groups of firms decide in sequence on whether to 
merge, leading up to a market competition stage. What is of interest to me in the 
current chapter is that, despite the different setups of each model, the equilibria 
obtained are of underlying similarity, in the sense that only a similar subset of the 
set of possible equilibria of the sequential merger game is obtained.
This chapter makes two contributions. The first aim is to uncover this un­
derlying similarity in the pattern of equilibria across these models studied in the 
literature. By writing conditions on firms’ reduced-form profit functions, I char­
acterise each possible equilibrium of the sequential merger game. I explain why 
only a similar subset of the set of possible equilibria is obtained in these models 
by reference to a sufficient condition which holds across these models. When this 
condition is satisfied, a common subset of the set of possible equilibria is ruled 
out, considerably simplifying the solution to the game. I motivate this sufficient 
condition by resorting to the way non-participating firms react to the merger of 
rival firms, as is well understood in the literature (see Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 
1983 in the case of Cournot competition, and Deneckere and Davidson 1985 in the 
case of Bertrand competition).
1This feature of their model is thus similar to the second example presented in this chapter, 
based on Perry and Porter (1985).
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The second aim is to illustrate that the class of models for which this similar 
pattern of equilibria is obtained is fairly broad. To this end, I develop two other 
standard examples -  Sutton’s (1991) vertically-differentiated Cournot oligopoly and 
Perry and Porter’s (1985) quadratic-cost (fixed-supply-of-capital) model -  in which 
the sufficient condition holds. As such, the same pattern of equilibria as that in, 
say, Fauli-Oller (2000) obtains. By introducing an additional parameter (namely 
a trade cost between two countries), I frame the sequential merger game in both 
examples in a cross-border context. I thus extend the results to the analysis of 
cross-border mergers.
Adapting a vertically-differentiated Cournot oligopoly model due to Sutton 
(1991) and later applied in a trade context by Motta (1992, 1994), I allow high- 
quality firms located in one country to merge with low-quality firms located in the 
second country. The merger technology is such that if a merger is undertaken, 
the level of quality offered by the merged (multinational) firm is the higher of the 
qualities offered by its constituent firms. Further, goods produced in one country 
but sold in another (exports) incur (linear) trade costs. Thus cross-border mergers 
enable firms to transfer technology.
The second example is an adaptation of Perry and Porter (1985)’s quadratic- 
cost model. This model is of particular interest for the following reason. The 
majority of models (with single-product firms) in the merger literature considers a 
merged firm to be “about” the same size (bar the presence of merger synergies) as 
each of its constituent firms and the non-participating firms; there is no notion of 
assets or firm size. In contrast, in the Perry and Porter model, a merger results in a 
“new firm that is ‘larger’ than the others” (pp. 219). They model this by assuming 
a fixed factor of production (say capital) whose total supply is fixed to the industry; 
what distinguishes firms is the amount they own of this factor2. In the adaptation, 
I again allow mergers between firms located in the different countries, where the 
capital stock of the merged (multinational) firm is the sum of the capital stock of
2In the Perry and Porter (1985) model, on which my example is based, marginal cost is linear 
in output; by increasing its capital stock, the firm reduces the slope of its marginal cost curve. 
In Motta and Vasconcelos (2003), marginal cost is flat in output; a higher capital stock lowers 
marginal cost, regardless of output.
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its constituents. Thus, the “larger” multinational firm has a lower marginal cost 
than either of its constituents at a given level of output.
This all-or-none merger result is of empirical relevance in that the pattern of 
equilibria found for this fairly wide -  as I claim -  class of models is associated 
with mergers happening, not in isolation, but rather in bunches. Empirical studies 
have tested for bunching, or wave-like behaviour, using aggregate industry data 
(see, for example, Town 1992, Golbe and White 1993, and Barkoulas et al 2001) 
while other authors have argued that this phenomenon is also observed within 
individual industries (Mueller 1989). Casual observation suggests, moreover, that 
this kind of bunching phenomenon appears to be of relevance also in the case of 
cross-border merger activity (UNCTAD 2000, Knickerbocker 1973). Caves (1991) 
offers two lines of reasoning to explain why mergers may bunch together. One line 
attributes this to an unprecedented shift in an exogenous industry- or economy- 
wide parameter suddenly making mergers profitable3. The other line looks at the 
strategic interaction between firms’ merger decisions within an industry: under 
certain conditions firms will merge only if rivals merge. It is the latter line of 
reasoning which sequential merger games have sought to address.
Using similar notation and structure to the sequential merger game laid out in 
Nilssen and Sprgard (1998), in the following section I spell out general conditions 
-  in terms of firms’ reduced-form profit functions -  characterising each possible 
equilibrium. I show that if a certain sufficient condition holds then a subset of the 
possible equilibria can be ruled out. I briefly illustrate the general analysis by refer­
ence to Fauli-Oller (2000). I then turn to this chapter’s application, developing two 
further standard examples in which the sufficient condition holds, and showing that 
the general analysis can be extended to the case of cross-border mergers. Section
1 . 3  lays out and solves the sequential merger game in the vertically-differentiated 
Cournot oligopoly. Results are discussed in fight of the international trade and 
investment literature, where foreign investment has been modelled mostly in the 
form of greenfield investment, as opposed to mergers and acquisitions. I argue that
3 On this first line of reasoning, Stigler (1950) and Bittlingmayer (1985) analyse the effects of 
changes in competition policy. Van Wegberg (1994) studies how the business cycle affects the 
profitability of mergers.
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modelling foreign investment in the form of cross-border mergers suggests just how 
widespread such activity may be. Considerations are also made on the robustness 
of results to the number of merger stages and on the specification of the extensive 
form of the merger game (i.e. sequential moves in counterpoint to merger decisions 
being made simultaneously). Section 1.4 considers the fixed-capital-stock model 
of Perry and Porter (1984), to show that similar results hold. In Section 1.5 I 
revisit the vertically-differentiated oligopoly model to introduce fixed costs associ­
ated with implementing a merger. In so doing I attempt to address an inherent 
weakness in the results of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 as to their usefulness in explaining 
the typically-observed flurry of merger activity as countries integrate their markets: 
if, as the results in these earlier sections suggest, cross-border mergers occur along 
the equilibrium path for a “large” region of parameter space, then why were these 
mergers not undertaken prior to market integration? Section 1 . 6  briefly concludes.
1.2 General conditions for equilibria in sequen­
tia l merger games
I begin by defining the structure of the sequential merger game, following Nilssen 
and Sprgard (1998)4. In brief, disjoint and exogenously-given groups of firms make 
sequential merger decisions, leading up to a final market competition stage, where 
payoffs of the merged and independent firms are conditional on market structure 
resulting from the earlier merger stages. Bearing in mind the later aim of extending 
the results to a cross-border context, I adapt the notation and structure to a two- 
country setting. (I also point out how the analysis easily collapses to the single­
country case.)
Consider two countries, I G {A, B }, each initially with nl firms, where nl > 2. 
Denote the set of firms located in country A as A  and the set of B-country firms 
as £; thus nA = \A \, nB =  \B\ and the global industry consists of n := nA -1- nB > 4
4 Where convenient, I use similar notation and structure to that in Nilssen and S0 rgard (1998)’s 
general discussion of sequential merger decisions. This is done for the benefit of the reader who is 
acquainted with their paper and also to point out how this section builds on their work. Notice 
that there is no repeated product market interaction as in Kamien and Zang (1990, 1993).
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firms. Now consider the following form of sequential (cross-border) merger games. 
Assume that two cross-border mergers5  can take place in sequence in this industry: 
label the set of firms that first decide whether to merge M i,  and the set of firms that 
subsequently decide whether to merge A l2. Label the merged firms possibly arising 
from the first and second merger decisions Mi and M2  respectively. The extensive 
form of the merger game in consideration satisfies the following assumptions:
• At least two firms take part in each merger decision, i.e. \Mi\ > 2 , i € { 1 . 2 }-
• At least one firm from each country takes part in each merger decision, i.e. 
A  fl M.i 7  ^0 and B fl M i  7  ^0 , i € {1 , 2 }.
• Each firm participates in at most one merger decision, Af 1  fl Af2  =  0 , so that 
I-Mi | + |.M2| < n.
An example is in order: country A  has three firms, labelled 1 , 2  and 3, while 
country B  has two firms, labelled 4 and 5. The sequential merger game given by 
firms 1 and 4 first deciding whether to merge, followed by firms 2 and 5 deciding 
whether to merge, would satisfy the above assumptions. If both mergers axe carried 
through, the market structure is given by two (multinational) merged firms Mi 
and M2, where M \  =  {1,4} and M 2 =  {2,5}, and an independent firm located in 
country A , firm 3.
Coming out of the merger stages, four situations (market structures) are possible 
(see Figure 1-1). Denote the situation where neither merger is undertaken by sq. If 
the firms in M \  do not merge but those in M 2 do, call this situation Si, in contrast, 
let situation s 2  depict a favourable merger decision by firms in M 1  followed by a no- 
merger decision by firms in A l2. Finally, situation S3  denotes the market structure 
arising from two favourable merger decisions6.
Finally, the firms which have merged or remained independent compete on the 
world market; goods produced in one country can be exported for consumption
5The choice of two mergers is done for ease of exposition, as in Nilssen and Sprgard (1998). In 
the application of Section 1.3 I consider a set-up where three mergers can take place, in addition 
to the case with two mergers, and discuss the implications of allowing greater numbers of mergers 
to take place.
6Note that situations si and s2 are reversed as compared to the use of notation by Nilssen 
and Sprgard (1998).
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in the other country. This completes the description of the type of sequential 
cross-border merger games being considered7.
Firms in M .\(decide whether to merge)
Merger No merger
Firms in A t  2Firms in A t  2 .
Merger No mergerNo merger Merger
Market structure: S3 S2 Sj SQ
UI
IV
Figure 1 - 1 : Sequential merger game and merger surplus functions
7As I comment in footnote 16, if there is no geographic dimension to the game and a single­
country setting is being considered, the second assumption, namely that at least one firm from 
each country takes part in each merger decision, is dropped. There is no longer a distinction 
between firms located in one country or the other and the relevant set of firms is I  := A  U B.
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1.2.1 Reduced-form profit functions and conditions
Denote the equilibrium payoff to firm i under market structure 5  by IIi)5, where 
s €  {so, Si,S2 , 5 3 } and i G S  C A U  BU  {Mi, M2}, with *S being the set of (merged 
and/or independent) firms competing under market structure s. Note that IIi)S is in 
reduced form, indexed by a vector of “primitives” of the specific model in question, 
such as demand and supply-side parameters8. The merger surplus functions are 
then defined in terms of these reduced-form profit functions. 9
Definition 1 . 1  (Merger surplus functions) Define six $  functions as follows:
- IWi nMo $ IV  • nMl)S2
^11 • nM2jS3 — ^2ii£M2 • nMl,S2 nilS0
• HjWi,«3— n ^ o  ® vi • Hmi,s3
Figure 1-1 illustrates the six merger surplus functions. To exemplify, $>/// is 
the difference between the profit of merged firm Mi under market structure S3  and 
the sum of profits of its constituent (independent) firms under market structure 
so- As shown below, these six functions capture the surplus behind all the relevant 
merger decisions by either firms in At 1 , in the first stage, or firms in jW2, in the 
second stage.
It follows from the consideration of two sequential merger stages that there 
are eight possible sets of Nash strategies by the players. These are illustrated in 
Figure 1-210. In sets (a), (b), (g) and (h), the early firms’ merger decision has no 
effect on the subsequent firms’ merger decision. By way of example, for set (a)
8 Formally, the reduced-form payoff function is IIi)a(0), where 9 €  V  is the vector of parameters 
capturing relevant features of the model and V  is the space of parameters. For ease of exposition, 
I suppress the argument 9 of the functions.
9 The notation here departs from that in Nilssen and Sprgard (1998) for the following reason. 
While I define six functions, for the purposes of their paper they define eight “profitability of 
merger” functions for merger participants, in addition to four such functions for non-participating 
parties to a merger. For the sake of comparability, note that $ 7 , $ 7 7 , $ 777 , $ 7v , and in 
this chapter are equivalent to A^, Aif, A f, Af, Aj and A f respectively, in their paper. To simplify 
the interpretation of results, I choose to refer the reader to Figure 1 -1  (and thus number the $  
functions in such a way) rather than ask him to recall the logic behind Nilssen and Sprgard’s use 
of subscripts and superscripts.
10To avoid clutter, I rely on Figure 1-2 to define each of the eight sets of Nash strategies, rather 
than doing so in words. In any case, this is standard. For example, set (c) would be defined as 
follows. jM i-firms: ‘merger’; A^-firms: ‘merger’ only if .Adi-firms merge, otherwise ‘no merger’.
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to be an equilibrium, firms in M 2 need to find it profitable to merge irrespective 
of jMi-firms’ decision whether to merge or not. Also, firms in M \  need to find it 
profitable to merge in anticipation of A^-firms’ subsequent merger decision.
In sets (of strategies) (c), (d), (e) and (f), on the other hand, the subsequent 
firms’ merger decision does depend on the early firms’ merger decision. If set (c) 
characterises an equilibrium, then firms in M .2 find it profitable to merge only if 
firms in Afi merge. (To complete the characterisation of this equilibrium, firms 
in All must find it profitable to merge, anticipating how the subsequent merger 
decision depends on their own decision.) As in set (a), mergers occur along the 
equilibrium path of the game yet here Ali-firms’ merger decision has a bearing on 
(and takes place anticipating) A ffirm s’ merger decision11.
Proposition 1.1 states necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these sets 
of strategies to form an equilibrium (unique for every combination of parameter 
values)12.
Proposition 1.1 (NSC for equilibria) Necessary and sufficient conditions for each 
of Nash-strategy sets (a) to (h), as depicted in Figure 1-2, to be supported as the 
unique equilibrium (for a given combination of parameter values) are:
Set (a) $ 1  > 0 , $ j/  > 0  and $ v i  > 0
Set (b) > 0, <f>/j > 0 and $ v i  < 0
Set (c) < 0 , $ // > 0 and $ 7 7 7  > 0
Set (d) $ 7  < 0 , $ //  > 0  and $ 7 7 7  < 0
Set (e) $ 7  >  0, $ 7 7  < 0 and $ iv  > 0
11 Some authors, such as Fauli-Oller (2000), have related results (c) and (d) to the merger-wave 
phenomenon, in the sense that an early decision to merge (either along the equilibrium path of 
the game, as in (c), or as a deviation from it, as in (d)) triggers subsequent mergers.
12Proposition 1.1 is consistent with Proposition 1 in Nilssen and Sdrgard (1998; pp.1689). 
One must be careful, however, in comparing the conditions in their Propostion 2 and Table 1 
(pp.1690-1) with mine. For example, they state that “the occurrence of a Fat Cat strategy implies 
a sequence of two decisions to merge” (pp. 1691) yet this stands at odds with my conditions (and 
their Proposition 1) for a sequence of two mergers to be supported as an equilibrium outcome. 
They refer to a “Fat Cat” strategy as A2 <  0 <  A 2 and A i 2 > 0. Yet these same conditions 
could also lead to a sequence of two decisions not to merge as long as Af is sufficiently negative 
such that Aj =  Aj +  A l 2 < 0 - If A 2 <  0 < A2 (i.e. <$7 < 0 <  $ 7 7  in my Proposition 1 .1 ) then 
A? > 0  (i.e. $ 7 7 7  >  0 ) is the necessary and sufficient condition supporting “a sequence of two 
decisions to merge”.
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Firms in M.\
Merger No merger Merger No merger
Firms in .M2Firms in M
Set (a) Set (b)
Merger No merger
Set (c)
Merger No merger
Set (d)
No mergerMerger
Set (e)
Merger No merger
Set (fl
No mergerMerger
Set (g)
Merger No merger
Set (h)
Figure 1-2: Possible equilibrium sets of Nash strategies. From each node, left 
depicts “merger” and right depicts “no merger”
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Set (f) $>/ > 0, $ u  < 0  and $ iv  < 0
Set (g) $ i < 0, $ a  < 0 and $ v  > 0
Set (h) < 0, $ a  < 0 and $ v  < 0
Proof. This follows by backward induction. Begin by the conditions for set 
(a) to be the equilibrium. In the second stage, following a decision by .Mi-firms 
not to merge, Ad2 -firms will find it profitable to merge if and only if $ j  =  IIm2 ,si — 
Yli£M2 n i ) S 0  ^  0. Conditional on a favourable merger decision by Ati-firms, that 
A^-firms find it profitable to merge requires $ u  =  IIm2 )s3  — J2ieM2 ^ > , * 2  ^  0- 
In the first stage, anticipating A^-firms’ subsequent merger regardless of their 
merger decision, Adi-firms will find it profitable to merge if and only if $ v i  =  
IImi,s3 — T 1 1 1 1 1 th® conditions for (b). As in (a), A^-firms’
strategy is optimal if and only if $ i > 0 and $ jj > 0. Yet for firms in. M i  choosing 
not to merge to be optimal implies $ v i  < 0 . For (c) to be the equilibrium, A f ­
firms finding it profitable to merge in the second stage only if A^i-firms choose to 
merge earlier requires < 0 and $ u  > 0. In the first stage, anticipating how 
Ad 2 -firms’ merger decision depends on their own decision, Adi-firms will merge if 
and only if $ IU =  UMl,S3 ~  Ei<=Ati o ^  In (d), as in (c), Ad2 -firms’ strategy 
is optimal if and only if $ i < 0  and $ u  > 0 . Yet firms in Adi will find it optimal 
not to merge if and only if $ m  < 0. Proofs of conditions for sets of strategies (e) 
through (h) to be equilibria follow similarly and are omitted. ■
1.2.2 Special case: Sym m etry
When the sets of firms Adi and M 2 are “symmetric”, a common case in mod­
els studied in the literature, the general conditions characterising each possible 
equilibrium can be simplified. What I mean by symmetry here needs to be made 
precise:
Definition 1.2 (Symmetry) There is symmetry about the sets of firms Adi and 
M 2 when for all admissible parameter values:
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* iIm  ^= nM2)S1
* njv/2 ,s3
* l i l ie M i U ^ o  ~  ^2i€M 2  n Mo
In words, the sum of payoffs of (independent) firms in A4i under market struc­
ture si (where only M 2 -firms have merged) equals the sum of payoffs of (indepen­
dent) firms in Ad 2  under market structure S2  (where only Ad 1 -firms have merged). 
The payoff to (merged) firm M\ under market structure S2  equals the payoff to 
(merged) firm M2 under market structure si. When the two mergers have taken 
place (market structure s3), the payoff to (merged) firm M\ equals the payoff to 
(merged) firm M2 . When no merger has been carried through (market structure 
So), the sum of payoffs of (independent) firms in Adi equals the sum of payoffs of 
(independent) firms in M 2 ™
Recall the above example, where firms 1 , 2 and 3 are located in country A , firms
4 and 5 are located in country B  and the sequential merger game specifies firms 1 
and 4 first deciding whether to merge (if so forming Mi), followed by firms 2  and
5 deciding whether to merge (if so forming M2). Symmetry would require that: (i) 
the sum of payoffs to firms 1 and 4 under market structure Si =  {M2 ,1,3,4} equals 
the sum of payoffs to firms 2 and 5 under market structure s2 =  {Mi, 2,3,5}; (ii) 
the payoff to Mi under market structure S2  =  {Mi, 2,3,5} equals the payoff to 
M2  under market structure si =  {M2 , 1 ,3,4}; (iii) under market structure 5 3  = 
{Mi, M2 ,3}, the payoff to Mi equals the payoff to M2 ; and finally, (iv) under 
fragmented market structure so =  {1 , 2 ,3,4,5}, the sum of payoffs to firms 1  and 
4 equals the sum of payoffs to firms 2 and 5.
By symmetry, it follows from Definition 1 . 1  that 4>/ =  and 4>// =  4>y/. Only 
four merger surplus functions need now be computed. The number of possible 
sets of strategies by the players that can be supported in equilibrium collapses to
13Notice that this notion of symmetry, defined around the set of firms M \  and M 2 , is weaker 
that a concept of symmetry couched directly in terms of the firms themselves, allowing for some 
asymmetry among firms.
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six: sets (b) and (g) are no longer possible14. The conditions for each to form an 
equilibrium are simplified somewhat, as stated in the following proposition (see 
Figure 1-3):
P roposition  1.2 (NSC for equilibria in the case of symmetry) In the special case 
of symmetry, Nash-strategy sets (b) and (g) cannot be supported in equilibrium. 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for each of the six remaining sets to be supported 
as the unique equilibrium (for a given combination of parameter values) are:
Set (a) & IV 0  and $ // > 0
Set (b) This cannot be supported in equilibrium
Set (c) < 0 , $ //  > 0  and > 0
Set (d) < 0 ; *&ii ^  0  and < 0
Set (e) > 0  and $ jy > 0
Set (f) > 0 , $ //  < 0  and $ jy < 0
Set (9) This cannot be supported in equilibrium
Set (h) < 0 and <&ji < 0
Proof. This follows from the definition of symmetry, the definition of the $ 
functions and Proposition 1.1. ■
A simple corollary to Proposition 1.2 states a sufficient condition that rules 
out each of sets (d), (e) and (f) as candidate equilibria. A model that satisfies 
this sufficient condition for every admissible combination of parameter values can 
only have sets (a), (c) and (h) among its equilibria. That is, of the eight possible 
equilibria in Figure 1-2, only the three equilibria highlighted in Figure 1-3 remain 
in the case of any symmetric model that satisfies the corollary’s sufficient condition. 
This is the case for several models considered in the literature, in addition to the 
two models considered in this chapter’s subsequent application.
14This is intuitive. For example, consider set (b). If it is optimal for M.2-firms to merge 
regardless of Adi-firms’ earlier decision, including when .Ad i-firms decide to merge (this requires 
$ u  >  0), then it cannot be optimal for Af i-firms to decide not to merge, knowing that M.2-firms 
will subsequently decide to merge regardless of their decision (by symmetry, this would require 
$ v i  =  $ / j  <  0 , in contradiction).
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Firms in M.
Merger No merger
Firms in A4 Firms in .M2
Set (a)
No mergerMerger
Set (c)
Merger No merger
Set (e)
Merger No merger
Set (d)
Merger No merger
Set (f)
Merger No merger
C orollary 1 . 1  (Sufficient condition to rule out sets (d), (e) and (]) as candidate 
equilibria, in the case of symmetry) Consider that symmetry holds in the sense 
defined above. I f  for all admissible parameter values, it holds that (i) whenever 
> 0  it happens that 4>n > 0 , and (ii) whenever $ // > 0  it happens that $ /// > 0 , 
then Nash-strategy sets (d), (e) and (f) cannot be supported in equilibrium. 
Formally, this sufficient condition can be stated as
{0 I $/(0) > 0} c  {0 I $ n (9) > 0} C {0 I * i n (e) > 0} 
where 0 is a vector of admissible parameter values (see footnote 8).
Proof of the corollary follows by inspection of Proposition 1.215. A comment is 
in order. The corollary states only a sufficient condition that rules out sets (d), (e) 
and (f) as candidate equilibria for symmetric models. As I argue, this condition 
is satisfied for a fairly wide class of models. (And in the subsequent application I 
provide intuition as to why this is so.) However, other sufficient conditions can be 
written that rule out each of sets (d), (e) and (f), as I show in Appendix A.I.
A n illustra tion : Fauli-Oller (2000) I briefly illustrate the sufficient condition 
of Corollary 1.1 by reference to Fauli-Oller’s (2000) (symmetric) model16. There 
are four firms in a homogeneous-good Cournot industry: firms 1  and 2  have zero 
marginal cost, while firms 3 and 4 have constant marginal cost c > 0. Demand 
is linear, where the price intercept is given by a  (and the slope is normalised to 
—1). As such, the parameters 0 of the model axe given by a  and c, and Fauli-Oller
15See Appendix A.I. The sufficient condition of the corollary can be phrased as follows: (i) 
whenever it is profitable to merge in isolation, it happens that it is profitable to merge conditional 
on the merger of the rival set of firms; (ii) whenever it is profitable to merge conditional on the 
merger of the rival set of firms, it happens that each set of firms (i.e. M.\ and M 2 ) prefers that 
the two mergers axe undertaken over no merger being undertaken.
16 When there is no geographic dimension to the sequential merger game -  as in Nilssen and 
Sprgard (1998) or in this illustration -  the setup of the general analysis just presented requires 
one minor simplification. Since there is no longer a distinction between firms located in one 
country or the other, the assumption that at least one firm from each country takes part in each 
merger decision no longer holds. The two other assumptions remain, that at least two firms take 
part in each merger decision and that each firm participates in at most one merger decision. The 
set A  U B can be replaced by X , defined as the initial set of (independent) firms, containing n 
elements. The necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibria are as in Proposition 1.1 and, in 
the special case of symmetry, Proposition 1.2.
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admits parameters in the range given by a > 3c. A slightly simplified version of the 
sequential merger game considered by the author has firms 1 and 3 first deciding 
whether to merge (i.e. M \ — {1,3}), followed by firms 2  and 4 who then decide 
whether to merge (i.e. M 2 =  {2,4}); a final market competition stage ensues. 
The merger technology is such that a merged entity produces with zero cost (the 
cost of its lower-cost constituent). From the reduced-form payoff functions for this 
standard Cournot model (stated by the author in equation 1 ), the relevant merger
surplus functions of Corollary 1 . 1  can then be computed: 4>j =  (^J 5 ) 2  — ( 2 ^ ) 2  —
is easy to show that the sufficient condition of the corollary holds: (i) for all (a, c) 
such that > 0  it happens that $ // > 0 , and (ii) for all (a, c) such that $ //  > 0  
it happens that 4>//j > 0 . Consequently, only Nash-strategy sets (a), (c) and (h) 
can obtain in equilibrium as parameter values vary. (It is easy to show from these 
three merger surplus functions that all three sets indeed are supported as unique 
equilibria at different ranges of parameters.) Two comments are in order. First, 
notice that the solution to the merger game once the merger surplus functions 
have been computed, and the sufficient condition has been verified, is immediate. 
Otherwise the solution can be somewhat more lengthy, as in Fauli-Oller (2000) 
and Motta and Vasconcelos (2003). This further illustrates the usefulness of the 
general analysis of this section. Second, notice from Figure 1-3 that the outcomes 
associated with these equilibria are such that mergers do not occur in isolation 
but rather bunch together. In other words, whenever a merger happens along the 
equilibrium path of the game it is undertaken alongside other mergers. I postpone 
discussion of this result -  which hinges on the way non-participating firms react to 
the merger of rival firms, as is well understood in the literature -  to the application.
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1.3 Example 1: Cross-border mergers in Sut­
ton’s (1991) vertically-differentiated indus­
try
The first example explores the profitability of sequential cross-border mergers in a 
Cournot oligopoly with vertical product differentiation. I use a partial equilibrium 
model with differentiated goods due to Sutton (1991) and later applied in a trade 
context by Motta (1992, 1994).
Before carefully laying out the setup, a brief description is in order. I embed 
the two countries, a large country and a small country, each with three firms, where 
firms in the large country offer a product of quality at least as high as that offered by 
firms in the small country. While product quality varies between the firms located in 
different countries, it does not (initially) vary across firms located within the same 
country. The structure of the sequential cross-border merger game in Section 1 .2 , 
where two cross-border mergers were allowed to take place in sequence, is extended 
here to three merger stages: in each stage a large-country high-quality firm and 
a small-country low-quality firm decide whether to merge or not. If the merger 
takes place, the level of quality offered by the merged (and multinational) firm is 
the higher of the qualities offered by its constituent firms (i.e. the quality offered 
previously by the large-country constituent). Thus cross-border mergers enable 
firms to transfer technology. Consistent with the type of sequential cross-border 
merger game spelled out in Section 1 .2 , in a final stage, firms which have merged 
or remained independent engage in Cournot competition on the world market.
D em and setup  Consider two countries, I 6  {A ,B }, with mi consumers each. 
Consumers in both countries have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over 
a quality (differentiated) good and an outside good, indexed by quantities x  and y 
respectively, where u denotes the quality level of the quality good:
U =  {uxYyl~P 0 < (3 < 1
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Total expenditure on the quality good in economy I, Si, is:
Tlj 771J
Si =  Y^PiXi =  (1 .1 )
i=l fc=l
where ni is the number of firms selling in country I (ni > 2 ), Xi and pi are respec­
tively the quantity and price of the (single) quality good sold by firm i (referred to 
as variety i), and Zk is the income of consumer k. Assume Sa > Sq due either to 
a larger population or a higher per capita income in (large) country A  relative to 
(small) country B.
Given any vector of qualities and associated prices, the consumer chooses a 
variety i that maximises the quality/price ratio ^ 17. All varieties that command 
positive sales at equilibrium must therefore have prices proportional to qualities:
— =  A Vi
Ui
where A is a constant. From equation (1.1), we can then write S  = Y!i=iPixi =  
A Ui%i (momentarily dropping the country subscript I for simplicity), express­
ing the price-to-quality ratio A as:
A =  ™ -----   (1.2)UiXi
The inverse demand function for variety i is also obtained:
Pi v-^ n Pi V^n uj_ (1-3)
2-jj=i Pi xj Z^j=i m xj
By assumption each variety i is sold to the nth part of the population.
Supply and historical m otivation for en try  and  quality  Firms are assumed 
to have the same constant marginal cost of production c > 0 . Goods produced in 
one country but sold in another (exports) incur an additional unit trade cost t > 0 .
17 Consumer k chooses to consume quantity Xik of variety i such that U{Xik is maximised subject 
to his budget constraint piXik =  fizk] i.e. he solves max* by selecting a variety i such that
r1 is maximised across i.Pi
37
As mentioned above, each country is initially embedded with three (indepen­
dent) firms, where a firm from country I offers a good of quality Ui > 1. By 
construction, ua > ub and define the quality ratio (or gap) v as the ratio of the 
quality offered by large-country firms to that offered by their small-country coun­
terparts, v 1 ).
The number of firms in each country and their respective (asymmetric) qualities 
can be motivated by considering the following long-term entry and investment 
game (Motta 1992). Countries axe initially closed to foreign trade and investment 
and in this autarkic setting, without forseeing any changes, firms make entry and 
investment decisions. In each country, the following two-stage game is played. In 
a first stage, firms simultaneously decide whether to enter and, if so, with which 
quality. In a second stage, they engage in Cournot competition. In order to offer 
a good of quality u, firms must incur a fixed and sunk cost F(u) =  u7, u > 1.
Consistent with models of this type, in equilibrium the same number of firms 
enters in each country, with the large-country firms making larger investments in 
quality than the small-country firms, ua > Ub - The convexity of the fixed cost 
function is chosen so that three firms enter in each country18.
By this historical motivation, market integration then unexpectedly occurs. 
Firms are “locked in” with their previous (autaxky-based) quality levels, reflecting 
the long-term nature of their investment decisions (capability-building) as opposed 
to the short-run process of market integration and market competition. Firms 
located in each country axe now allowed to export to the other maxket (due to 
trade integration) and/or can merge with a (now) rival firm located in the other 
maxket (due to investment integration), as set out below.
18See Appendix A.2 for a derivation. The number of firms (in each country), n =  3, depends 
on the choice of parameter, 7  =  3, of the fixed cost function, F(u) =  u 1. By making the cost 
function more convex, i.e. making (R&D, say) spending less effective in raising quality, the larger 
is the number of firms entering in equilibrium. For example, for 7  =  5, n =  4 firms enter in 
equilibrium. We may write n =  71(7 ), where n' >  0. Notice that n does not depend on market 
size: this “non-convergence” result is consistent with the finiteness property of many vertical 
product differentiation models (Shaked and Sutton 1983, Sutton 1991). For 7  =  3, the three
firms entering in country I offer a common quality given by u\ =  |  It follows from the
assumption that Sa > Sb that the quality offering of a large-country firm exceeds that of a 
small-country firm: u a > u b .
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The experience of some Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, which 
during the 1990s underwent a relatively unplanned process of trade and investment 
liberalisation, with the ensuing high volume of cross-border mergers and acquisi­
tions, comes to mind. It is in this historical setting that the cross-border merger 
game is set.
Sequential cross-border m erger game In sequence, each of the three firms 
located in country A -  producing with quality ua -  is allowed to merge with 
each of the three firms located in country 5  -  producing with quality ub- With 
no loss of generality, the first A-country firm and the first 5-country firm which 
decide whether to merge (stage 1) are labelled 1 and 4 respectively, the second 
A-country firm and the second 5-country firm which decide whether to merge 
(stage 2 ) are labelled 2  and 5 respectively, and the third A-country firm and the 
third 5-country firm which decide whether to merge (stage 3) are labelled 3 and 6  
respectively. Keeping with the notation of Section 1.2, M i  =  {1,4}, M 2 =  {2,5} 
and M z — {3,6 } and the merged (multinational) firms which may come to form axe 
labelled M1? M2  and M3 . As mentioned above, the merger-technology assumption 
is that full transfer of technology takes place, the merged firm being able to produce 
at the high level of quality ua not only at its A-country facilities but also at its 
5-country facilities19. In the fourth and final stage, merged or independent firms 
compete & la Cournot on the world market.
The sequence of merger decisions is depicted in Figure 1-4, as are the possible 
market structures coming out of the merger stages. The market structure where no 
cross-border merger occurs, {1 , 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 , 6 }, is denoted ro, while that where three 
cross-border mergers are carried through, {Mi, M2 , M3 }, is labelled r3 . Given that 
symmetry holds (in the sense defined in Section 1 .2 ), market structures where one
19This full-transfer-of-tedmology assumption is also made in Fauli-Oller (2000), for example. 
It is one extreme case of a more general assumption where, by merging with a high-quality 
foreign firm, a 5-country firm can produce at an “average” level of quality given by, for example, 
the convex combination 5ua +  (1  — $)u b , where 0  <  S < 1 is the technology transfer coefficient. 
While a low-quality firm located in a developing country will not necessarily achieve “world class” 
quality by merging with a high-quality developed-country counterpart (indeed one can conceive 
of world class being easier to achieve through the setting up of a “greenfield” operation, rather 
than acquiring existing assets), this assumption allows us to examine sequential mergers in the 
context of international trade and quality asymmetries in a simple way.
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cross-border merger is undertaken are denoted 7 * 1 and those where two cross-border 
mergers occur are denoted r2. For example, r 2  comprises structures {Mi, M2 , 3 , 6 }, 
{Mi, M3 ,2,5} and {M2, M 3 ,1,4}, where there are two multinational firms and one 
independent firm producing in each country20.
1.3.1 Equilibria as a function of the quality gap and the  
trade cost
The reduced-form profits for each firm, as a function of the parameters in the model, 
for every possible market structure are derived in Appendix A.2. The notation 
introduced in Section 1 . 2  needs to be complemented: let subscript a denote an 
independent A-country firm, subscript b denote an independent B-country firm 
and subscript m  denote a merged (multinational) firm. Thus n aj7.2, for instance, 
denotes the payoff to an independent firm located in country A  under market 
structure r2. Reduced-form profits are a function of the quality gap v, the trade 
cost normalised by the marginal cost of production t := ~ and the market sizes Sa 
and Sb -
I assume that ( 1  <)v < |  (the quality ratio is low enough) and (0 <)t <
(the trade cost is low enough) so that in equilibrium low-quality firms command 
positive sales in both countries, i.e. there is two-way (intra-industry) trade between 
countries under any market structure where at least two firms remain independent 
(clearly trade ceases if all firms merge across borders, in situation 7 3 ). This space 
of parameter values is labelled V, as before. (Such an assumption is made for 
simplicity of exposition; extending the space of parameter values outside V, i.e. 
to include {(v,t) € 1Z2 | v > 1 and t > 0 } \  V, does not add to the results, as 
discussed in Appendix A.2 .)
Given that there are three merger stages, merger surplus functions are now 
denoted (cf in Section 1 .2 ). Coupled with the fact that symmetry holds, eight
20For the sake of simplicity, now that there axe three merger stages, the r-notation here takes 
into account that symmetry holds (cf the s-notation in Section 1 .2 , introduced for the general 
case, as in Nilssen and Sprgard 1998).
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Initial setup
Country A Country B
Firms 4
Firms 5>
Firms 6
Firms 1
Firms 2
Firms 3
Merger game and market structures 
Finns 1 and 4 (decide whether to merge)
M erger M ] No merger. 1,4
Firms 2 and 5Firms 2 and 5
No merger 2,52,5Merger M-
and 6Firms 3 and 6 Firms 3 and 6
3,6 No merger 3,6Merger M-
Merger surplus functions
Market structure:
Merger surplus 
functions:
* %
r
*V7
'PVIII v^z/
Figure 1-4: (Example 1) Sequential cross-border merger game and merger surplus 
functions. (The notation is adapted to reflect three merger stages and considers 
the symmetry of the model.)
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merger surplus functions are relevant21, defined as follows (see Figure 1-4 for an 
illustration):
Definition 1.3 (Merger surplus functions) Define eight \F functions as follows:
• —  f l m . r i  I I a , r o  
^ I I  •—  IIm ,r2  n a ,r i  n & ,r i
^ i n  •— na,T2 n b,T2
^ I V  -—  I im ,r 2  f ia ,r o tq
*=  n?n,r3 na,ri n&,ri 
^ V I  • f f m , r 3  I f a . r o  T I b , r o  
^ V I I  n m , r i  f i a j T - i  H b j r i
^ V I I I  • n m ,r 2  I I a , r 2  n
The sufficient condition of Corollary 1 . 1  holds Along the lines of Propo­
sition 1.2 and Figure 1-3, how the signs of these merger surplus functions change 
as parameter values vary pins down the equilibria of the merger game. One can 
show that in general there are twenty possible equilibria in a symmetric three-stage 
game, and conditions supporting each can be written. However, the verification 
that the model satisfies the sufficient condition of Corollary 1 . 1  simplifies matters 
considerably: the set of candidate equilibria is reduced from twenty to four ele­
ments. This is captured in the following lemma, which is the natural extension of 
the sufficient condition of Corollary 1.1 to a game with three merger stages.
Lem m a 1 . 1  For (v,t) 6  V:
(i) ^ i(v , i) > 0  = >  'Fu (v ,t ) > 0  = >  ^ m (v ,t )  > 0
(ii) ^ ji(v ,t)  > 0  ==> > 0
\Fj/j(v,£) > 0 =>  \Fy(v,t) > 0 => tyvi(v,t) > 0
While proof that the lemma holds is provided in Appendix A.2, the intuition 
is straightforward. Consider part (i). A merged firm produces less than the pre­
merger sum of outputs of its constituents since each constituent now internalises
21 While in Section 1.2, with two merger stages and symmetry the number of relevant merger 
surplus functions was four, here it is eight. In general, if there are T  merger stages, T  >  1, and 
there is symmetry, the number of relevant merger surplus functions is given by T  — 1 +  Yli=i *• 
If there are T  merger stages but symmetry does not hold, then the number of relevant merger
2 T — 1surplus functions increases to 5 Zi= 1  i-
Parameters v , t ,  Sa and Sb  are suppressed as arguments of the functions here for simplicity. 
When I do include arguments, subsequently, I ignore S a and Sb since Proposition 1.3 holds 
irrespective of market sizes (these enter the profit functions multiplicatively).
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the externality it confers upon the other constituent when making its output de­
cision22. Since quantities axe strategic substitutes, firms not participating in the 
merger (“outsiders”) respond by increasing output, which may render a merger 
unprofitable for its participants (“insiders”). (Such “accommodation” was high­
lighted by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds 1983 in a Cournot model with symmetric 
firms.) Now, whenever firms in M i do not find it profitable to merge when two 
other cross-border mergers are taking place (i.e. \k//j < 0 ) and consequently there 
are less outsiders to free ride on the merger, then they would not find it profitable 
to merge were only one other merger (i.e. \F/j < 0 ), let alone none (i.e. \kj < 0 ), 
taking place, as there would be more free-riders to expand output following M i-  
firms’ merger23. As for part (ii) of the lemma, consider > 0  = >  \k/y > 0 , for 
example. The decision to merge captured by merger surplus function entails an 
opportunity cost given by the sum of the profits of an independent A-country firm 
and an independent 5-country firm under market structure r\. This opportunity 
cost is larger than the opportunity cost in the decision to merge captured by ^ /y , 
which amounts to the profits of the same two independent firms but under ro, a 
more “fragmented” market structure (in the sense that while in r\ there are five 
firms selling into each country, in ro there are six firms)24.
The set of remaining candidate equilibria, containing four elements, is illus­
trated in Figure 1-5, alongside the conditions on the reduced-form functions in the 
right-hand margin. The equilibria are labelled (a), (cl), (c2) and (h), in a manner 
consistent with the labelling of equilibria in Section 1.2. In view of Lemma 1 .1 , 
only three merger surplus functions need be computed in parameter space V: \k/,
22In this model, for (v, t )  € V,  this occurs despite the quality jump from ub to ua enjoyed by 
the 5-country constituent. More generally, note that if a quality increase (or, isomorphously, a 
marginal cost reduction) through merger were very large, insiders to the merger could actually 
expand output. A merger, by lowering prices, would then be detrimental to outsiders, who would 
respond by lowering output (under quantity competition).
23Fauli-011er (2000) interprets a similar result as “previous takeovers stimulate takeover prof­
itability” (pp. 197).
24In this model, in the space V  of parameter values, it can be shown that despite merging 
parties having the advantage of producing with high quality in both countries and no longer 
cross-hauling product between them, non-participants always gain in the event of a merger, be 
they multinational firms or independent firms. Part (ii) of the lemma follows from noting this. 
Outside V, for example, for t  high enough (and v >  1 ) that not even high-quality A-country 
firms command positive sales in country 5  (i.e. trade flows in neither direction), a merger has a 
detrimental effect on outside (independent 5-country) firms.
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'ton and 'toh i- By inspecting the signs of these functions in V, the game can be 
solved.
The solution to the game is stated in the next proposition. It states that all 
four remaining candidate equilibria occur in space V. Figure 1 - 6  partitions the 
space into four disjoint zones, each labelled after the equilibrium which can be sup­
ported for the combinations of parameters defining the zone. Thus, for low enough 
values of both the quality gap v and the (normalised) trade cost £, in zone (h), the 
“unprofitability of mergers” result common to models with quantity competition 
and in the absence of merger “synergies” (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983) is 
obtained. Here, along the equilibrium path, as well as in subgames hanging from 
nodes off the equilibrium path, no cross-border merger occurs. At the other end, 
for high enough values of v and/or £, in zone (a), mergers are always profitable: 
along the equilibrium path, as well as off it, cross-border mergers always occur. 
For intermediate values of v and/or f, in zones (cl) and (c2), mergers again occur 
along the equilibrium path. Here, however, the merger decisions in the early stages 
of the merger game have a bearing on the merger decisions in the later stages.
Proposition 1.3 Space V  can be partitioned into Jour disjoint zones, as depicted 
in Figure 1-6. A straight line segment drawn from (v,t) =  (1,0) to any point on 
t =  2 = 2 2  begins in zone (h), crossing into zone (c2), followed by zone (cl) and 
ending in zone (a). In each zone, the unique equilibrium is given in Figure 1-5, 
labelled after the zone. The boundaries between zones (h) and (c2), between zones 
(c2) and (cl), and between zones (cl) and (a), are continuous and downward- 
sloping, joining a point (v , 0 ), 1  < v < on thev-aais to a point (1 , i), 0  < t < \ ,  
on the t-axis. The boundary between zones (h) and (c2) lies strictly below the 
boundary between zones (c2) and (cl), which in turn lies strictly below the boundary 
between zones (cl) and (a).
In tu ition  and decom position analysis (A decomposition analysis of the prof­
it ability of a merger provides intuition on the results of Proposition 1.3. The reader
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Firms 1 and 4
Firms 2 and
Firms 3 and 6
Zone (h) 
equilibrium 
Mergers 
unprofitable
low V
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Firms 1 and 4
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Figure 1-5: (Example 1) Equilibrium of sequential merger game in each zone; v 
quality gap, t  (normalised) trade cost
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Figure 1-6: (Example 1) Zones in V  space
may wish to skip to Section 1.3.2 without loss of continuity. Proof of the propo­
sition is set out in Appendix A.2.) How the total effect of a single cross-border 
merger (say, a stand-alone first merger that shifts market structure from r 0  to r i25) 
on the profit of insiders changes as v and t vary can be broken down in a simple way 
into three effects. The first effect, labelled the “insider output contraction” effect, 
is calculated assuming a merger technology where there is no quality upgrade in 
the production facilities located in country B  as a result of the merger, and further 
that outsiders do not react to the merger by increasing output, but rather maintain 
their pre-merger output levels. This profit effect is unambiguously positive2 6  for
25 By “stand-alone” I am considering the profitability of a first merger in isolation, abstracting 
from whether it is followed by further mergers and therefore from whether r \  is an equilibrium 
market structure.
26Insider profits rise on sales in both countries. Under this modified merger technology, it can 
be shown that when v > l +  t the merged firm discontinues production operations in country B, 
shipping high-quality product produced in country A to country B. When v <  l+ t, the merged
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{v,t) £ V. A merger internalises the externality each constituent insider confers 
upon the other when making an output decision (the insiders’ reaction function 
shifts inward); as a result, the (quality-adjusted27) combined output of insiders 
falls, prices of high and low-quality goods rise in both countries and insider profits 
rise.
The second profit effect, labelled the “technology transfer” effect, still assumes 
that outsiders’ output remains unchanged upon merger, but now the merger tech­
nology assumed in the model, that quality of 5-country production facilities jumps 
from uB to ua through merger, is re-established. This effect is also unambiguously 
positive: insider profits on sales in country B  rise as a result of the transfer of 
technology28. By this effect, insiders expand the (quality-adjusted) quantity sold 
in country B  (with prices in country B  falling), yet this increase in sales in country 
B  does not offset the output contraction in country B  as a result of the first effect 
(the net effect on country B  prices is positive).
The positive “insider output contraction” and “technology transfer” effects on 
the profit of insiders are countervailed by a negative “outsider output expansion” 
effect. This third effect captures the impact on the profit of insiders of allowing 
outsiders to respond to the merger. Since quantities are strategic substitutes, 
outsiders to a merger free ride on insiders’ output contraction (the equilibrium 
moves out along the outsiders’ reaction function as the insiders’ reaction function 
shifts inward). As outsiders’ (quality-adjusted) output increases, insiders react by 
further contracting output, to which outsiders further expand output, and so on, 
until equilibrium is reached. This third effect on insiders’ profit is unambiguously
firm no longer cross-ships, producing low-quality product in country B  for domestic consumption.
27Quality-adjusted output is defined as output multiplied by the quality gap v  =  for product 
of high quality ua when in competition with product of low quality uB, and output multiplied 
by 1 otherwise. This measure of output is natural in view of the inverse demand functions (e.g. 
see equation (1.3)).
28 Clearly, there is no effect on sales, prices and profit on sales in country A. As in the model, 
the merged firm now produces high-quality product in country B  for domestic consumption. 
This effect could alternatively be called the “(insider) trade cost elimination” effect. The upgrade 
in quality of 5-country facilities has an equivalent effect to the elimination of trade costs on 
cross-hauling by insiders: by eliminating trade costs insiders would produce only high-quality 
product in country A, which is equivalent to producing high-quality product in both countries for 
domestic consumption when trade costs are present. Indeed this is an example of the symmetry 
of the model with respect to v  and t.
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negative.
The overall impact of the cross-border merger on the profit of insiders turns 
on the relative magnitude of the countervailing effects. Intuitively, the “outsider 
output expansion” effect is increasingly negative (outsiders’ output expansion in­
creasingly high) as v and/or t falls: for (u, t) sufficiently close to (1 , 0 ), this negative 
effect on the profit of insiders dominates the two positive effects and the stand-alone 
merger is unprofitable. To see this, note that at (v,t) =  (1,0), with no quality 
asymmetries and no trade costs, with six firms competing in each country on an 
equal footing29, output expansion by outsiders is at its most severe, rendering a 
merger at its most unprofitable for insiders.
The different equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game as the parameter take 
on different values can then be understood by reference to these effects. In zone 
(h), where v and t are both low, the output expansion by outsiders in response to 
a merger would be significant, while the advantage enjoyed by the multinational of 
producing with high quality in both countries and no longer cross-hauling product 
between them would be limited. Being an outsider in the event of a merger is 
highly profitable. As a result, no cross-border merger occurs along the equilibrium 
path.
At the other end, for high enough values of v and/or t, in zone (a), mergers are 
always profitable: along the equilibrium path, as well as off it, cross-border mergers 
always occur. Under high v and/or t, the output expansion by outsiders to a merger 
is limited. To see why this is so for sufficiently high v even when t  is close to zero, 
note that starting from a market structure with no cross-border merger, there are 
effectively only three (high-quality, A-country) firms selling in each country. If only 
one cross-border merger is now allowed to occur, the number of firms effectively 
selling in each country remains unchanged, hence the limited output expansion by 
outsiders. To see why there is limited output expansion by outsiders for sufficiently 
high t even when v is close to 1 , note that again a cross-border merger leaves the 
number of firms effectively selling in each market unchanged (three A-country firms
29Recall that I am analysing the profitability of a stand-alone first cross-border merger for the 
purpose of motivating intuition.
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selling in country A and three B-country firms selling in country B). When v and t 
are greater than 1  and 0  respectively, the technology transfer effect is present: there 
is the added gain from merging arising from upgrading the production facilities 
located in country B  to the higher level of quality.
For intermediate values of v and/or t, mergers again occur along the equilibrium 
path. Here, however, early mergers induce subsequent mergers. In zone (c2 ), along 
the equilibrium path, firms 1 and 4’s merger is decisive for firms 2 and 5 to merge, 
and both mergers are in turn decisive for firms 3 and 6  to merge. Stated loosely, 
more mergers mean less free riding by outsiders in the market competition stage. 
Notice that if, say, firms 1 and 4 were not to anticipate the effect their merger has 
on subsequent merger decisions, but viewed their merger in isolation, they would 
not merge since \£j < 0 in zone (c2)30. In zone (cl), earlier mergers are still decisive 
for later mergers. However, due to higher v and/or t compared to zone (c2), and 
hence lower output expansion by outsiders, only one previous decision to merge 
suffices for firms 3 and 6  to find it profitable to choose likewise.
1.3.2 Discussion: Foreign investm ent literature and robust­
ness
In this subsection results axe discussed in fight of the international trade and invest­
ment literature. Considerations axe also made on the specification of the extensive 
form of the merger game and the number of merger stages.
The trade literature has modelled foreign direct investment (FDI) mostly in 
the form of greenfield investment, where firms choose between exporting to a mar­
ket and setting up production facilities in that market; see for example Mott a 
(1994), who studies greenfield investment in a similar vertically-differentiated global 
oligopoly. The literature has emphasised the tariff-jumping (more precisely, trade- 
cost-jumping) rationale behind FDI: unless trade costs axe sufficiently low, runs the
30 In an international oligopoly in the presence of technological innovation, Graham (1985) 
suggests that a firm’s motivation for foreign direct investment may be “to respond to or anticipate 
the action of a rival... creating a clustering of DFI (foreign direct investment) in the industry” 
(pp. 69; parenthesis added).
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argument, it may be rational for a firm to set up foreign production operations. On 
the one hand, greenfield investment requires a fixed setup cost but, on the other 
hand, it enables firms to reduce variable (trade) cost.
Yet empirically, the major channel by which foreign investment is made is that 
of mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2000). By analysing investment in this 
mode, in counterpoint to greenfield investment, my model points out that cross- 
border mergers allow firms not only to save on trade costs and transfer technology 
but also, by reducing the number of rivals, to enjoy muted competition. It explores 
a different mechanism to the tariff-jumping rationale of why foreign investment 
may not occur when trade costs (and the quality gap) are low: one where the 
profitability of investment turns on the response of non-participating firms in a 
Cournot oligopoly. In such situations where there is low product differentiation 
along both horizontal (t) and vertical (v) dimensions, any cross-border merger 
would be met with a fierce output response by those producers not party to the 
merger.
An example is in order. Analysing the substitution-of-exports-for-greenfield- 
investment decision, Motta (1994) finds that a decrease in the value of the exporting 
cost, ceteris paribus, results “in an enlargement of the regions (in parameter space) 
where exports, rather than investments, prevail” (pp. 191). This is supported in 
my model of acquisition investment (in Figure 1-6 the boundary between zones (h) 
and (c2) is downward-sloping), yet owing to a different mechanism. Motta’s result 
derives from tariff-jumping: the lower is the trade cost, ceteris paribus, the lower 
are the gains from (greenfield) investment. In my model, the lower is the trade cost, 
ceteris paribus, the greater is the intensity of competition and the higher are the 
gains to the industry from (acquisition) investment (see below). Yet it is precisely 
when the trade cost is low that free riding on other mergers is so profitable that in 
equilibrium no (acquisition) investment occurs.
Clearly, for parameter values in all zones including zone (h), the “grand cross- 
border coalition” -  where three cross-border mergers occur and there are no in­
dependent firms -  is the structure under which industry profits are maximal31.
31 When (v, t) =  ( | ,  0) or (1, ^), the grand cross-border coalition is weakly dominant. Otherwise
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In fact, it is in zone (h), where both v and t are low enough, that the industry 
gains from merging3 2  are greatest: intuitively, the lower is v or the lower is f, the 
greater is the intensity of competition resulting in lower industry profits under ro, 
and therefore the higher are the gains to be reaped from eliminating competitors 
through merger. Despite this, in zone (h) free riding on a merger is “far too” prof­
itable and intense. Due to this prisoner’s dilemma character of the game in this 
zone, the three-merger outcome cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Modelling foreign investment in the form of cross-border mergers suggests just 
how widespread such activity may be. While it is difficult to rationalise greenfield 
investment when there are no trade costs (t =  0 ), since location of production 
does not matter, cross-border mergers will occur when the quality gap is high 
enough: there exist (v ,t) E V  in zones (a), (cl) and (c2 ) when t =  0  and v 
exceeds certain thresholds. Thus the existence of a (large enough) quality gap is 
a sufficient condition for mergers to occur, unlike the case of a simple greenfield 
investment model, where t > 0  is also necessary. As with mergers in general, via 
cross-border mergers firms can dampen competition. My model further predicts 
the phenomenon of investment-bunching. When cross-border mergers occur they 
do not happen in isolation: (Merger, Merger, Merger) 3 3  is the unique equilibrium 
outcome for most parameter values with the exception of low values for both the 
quality gap and the trade cost.
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game 
with those of a different game, where the three merger decisions are made simul­
taneously in a first stage followed by a market competition stage, as before. As 
seen above, in the sequential-move game, (Merger, Merger, Merger) is the unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome for parameter values in zones 
(a), (cl) and (c2), while (No Merger, No Merger, No Merger) is the unique SPNE 
outcome in zone (h). Consider now the simultaneous-move game. In each zone
it is strictly dominant for (v, t) € V.
32 Note that the industry gains from merging is the difference between profits under market 
structure r3 and profits under ro, i.e. , t). That these are monotonically decreasing in t,
for a given v, and monotonically decreasing in v, for a given t, is intuitive and can be shown.
33 By this representation I mean that all three cross-border mergers are carried out: firms 1 and 
4 merge, firms 2 and 5 merge and firms 3 and 6  merge.
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the same outcome as that in the sequential game can be supported in equilibrium. 
Yet in zones (cl) and (c2), this equilibrium outcome is no longer unique: in addi­
tion to (Merger, Merger, Merger), (No Merger, No Merger, No Merger) is also a 
pur e-strategy Nash equilibrium outcome.
The set of equilibrium outcomes in the simultaneous-move game is thus a (strict, 
in zones (cl) and (c2 )) superset of the set of equilibrium outcomes in the sequential 
game. By modelling the merger decisions sequentially, the no-merger outcome 
which could be supported as a second equilibrium outcome in zones (cl) and (c2 ) 
were the merger decisions to be modelled simultaneously, no longer survives. The 
sequential nature of moves acts as a coordination device, and may help explain the 
empirical observation of widespread, and bunched together in time, cross-border 
mergers34.
Some final remarks pertaining to the number of merger stages. One may ask 
how robust is the result of widespread cross-border mergers in equilibrium to the 
number of merger stages (for a game with T  merger stages, modifying the setup by, 
say, embedding each country initially with T  independent firms). Consider first the 
game with two merger stages (and two firms in each country), i.e. T  — 2 . Similar 
results to those of Figure 1-5 (where T  =  3) obtain, with one exception. A zone 
like (h) in Figure 1-5, where mergers axe unprofitable and do not occur along the 
equilibrium path, is no longer obtained. For v and t as low as 1 and 0 respectively, 
mergers already occur along the equilibrium path; specifically, for (v, t) =  (1 , 0 ), 
a merger wave (in the sense of set (c) in Figure 1-3) obtains35. Intuitively, there 
are at most two non-participating firms to each merger (as opposed to four when
34 In the specification of the sequential game, I could have explicitly modelled each merger stage 
as two separate stages, a bidding stage by one of the two constituent firms, the “bidder”, followed 
by an acceptance stage by the other constituent firm, the “target”. (This is done by Fauli-Oller 
(2000), for example, who equips low-cost firms with the ability to place “take-it-or-leave-it” bids 
to merge with high-cost firms.) Had I done this, the same merger outcomes would be obtained 
in equilibrium, with the observation that the surplus from merger would be captured by the 
bidder. In this case, one can show that the sequential nature of the merger game, for parameter 
values in zone (c2), lowers the average bid accepted in equilibrium by the target firms vis-a-vis 
the game where all three merger decisions are made simultaneously (see also Kamien and Zang 
1990, 1993). Merging sequentially can thus lower the cost of setting up multinational firms and 
reducing competition.
35 This contrasts with the result in Fauli-Oller (2000) that a “takeover wave” occurs only for a 
sufficiently large (cost) difference among firms.
52
T  =  3) and thus the “outsider output expansion” effect is never negative enough 
to “undo” the profitability of merging for participating parties.
As for solving the game when the number of merger stages T  > 4, Appendix 
A . 2  provides expressions for the reduced-form profit functions of the different firms, 
under the different possible market structures, in a game with T  merger stages: 
from these the merger surplus functions are computed. As T  increases, the space 
V  of parameters (v,t) shrinks: the downward-sloping boundary at which two- 
way trade is just feasible shifts inward towards the “origin” (1,0). One can show 
that the unprofitability-of-mergers result for parameter values close enough to, and 
including, (1,0) (similar to equilibrium (h) in Figure 1-5), and the profitability-of- 
mergers result for parameter values close enough to, and including, the two-way- 
trade boundary (similar to equilibrium (a) in Figure 1-5) carry through for this 
general case. As with the case where T  =  3, it can further be shown that for 
all parameter combinations outside V  (where trade may flow only from country 
A  to country B, or not at all), mergers are profitable; a similar equilibrium to 
(a) in Figure 1-5 obtains. In sum, the main results of the particular T  =  3 game 
analysed carry through more generally, namely that (i) cross-border mergers may 
be unprofitable only when both the quality gap and the trade cost are low, and (ii) 
the profitability of cross-border mergers is widespread, with such mergers bunching 
together.
1.4 Example 2: Cross-border mergers in the Perry  
and Porter (1985) m odel
I now analyse cross-border merger profitability in another standard model that 
satisfies the sufficient condition of Corollary 1 .1 , yet where the motive for merger 
is different in kind. Perry and Porter (1985) introduce a notion of “firm size” by 
considering a fixed factor of production (say capital) whose total supply is fixed 
to the industry; what distinguishes one firm from another is the stock of capital 
it owns. Thus, a “larger” firm arising from the merger of two firms owning the 
same amount of capital has a lower marginal cost than either of its constituents at
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a given level of output (to be made precise below).
Perry and Porter (1985) setup Let k > 0 denote the amount of the fixed factor 
of production whose total supply is fixed to an industry producing a homogeneous 
good. Firm z’s cost function is given by C(x{, ki), where X{ denotes its output of this 
good and k\ is the amount of the fixed factor it owns. The cost function is taken 
to be homogeneous of degree one in output and capital, implying constant returns 
to scale and that the marginal cost function, Ci(x, k) := , is homogeneous
of degree zero in x and k. Because of the presence of a fixed factor of production, 
it is assumed that marginal costs axe decreasing in k , Cu(x, k) := < 0  and
hence, by Euler’s theorem, marginal costs are increasing in output, Cn(x, k)
> 0- Firms compete a la Cournot.
Perry and Porter (1985) specify particular functional forms for demand and 
cost. Both price and marginal cost are assumed to be linear functions of output. 
The industry inverse demand function is given by P (X ) = a — X , where P  is price 
and X  := Yli x% industry output. (I adapt this to the two-country setting by 
taking P l(X l) = a — X 1, where Pl and X 1 are respectively the price and sales in 
country I € {A ,B}.) A firm’s cost function is quadratic (and convex) in output, 
C (x ,k ) =  gk + dx + ^ x 2, where industry fixed costs g ki are distributed in 
proportion to capital ownership. Coefficients d, e and g are (weakly) positive and 
a > d. (In this two-country setting, I again assume a linear trade technology: 
exports incur a unit trade cost t > 0 .)
Sequential cross-border merger game I take the simplest structure of the 
sequential merger game considered in Section 1.2. The (global) industry, with 
capital stock 4k, consists of four symmetric firms, each owning one-quarter of this 
stock, ki =  k , each country hosting two firms, nA = nB = 2. With no loss 
of generality, firms in country A  are labelled 1  and 2 , their B-country rivals are 
labelled 3 and 4, the first set of firms that decide whether to merge is M.\ = {1,3} 
and the set of firms that subsequently decide whether to merge is M .2 =  {2,4}. The 
merger technology is such that the capital stock of a merged (multinational) firm
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is the sum of the capital stock of its constituent firms. Notice that the assumptions 
rule out economies of scale as a motive for merger.
1.4.1 Equilibria as a function of the rate of change of mar­
ginal cost and the trade cost
In view of the symmetry (in the sense of Definition 1.2), I resort to Proposition 1.2 
in order to solve the game. The reduced-form profit functions for an independent 
firm and merged firm under every possible market structure, necessary to compute 
the merger surplus functions, are derived in Appendix A.3. The merger surplus 
functions $  are a function of (i) the demand intercept less the marginal cost when 
output is zero, (a — d), (ii) the trade cost t, and (iii) the rate of change of the 
marginal cost of a firm with capital stock k , C n ( x ,  k) =  | .  Nevertheless, the $- 
functions can be unambiguously signed, pinning down the equilibria of the game, 
by e := |  and t := which I will refer to, respectively, as the rate of change of 
the marginal cost and the (normalised) trade cost.
Clearly, the space of parameter values of interest is that where trade between 
countries is feasible. (Otherwise there is zero surplus from merger.) Again I label 
this space V, defined by e > 0 and (0 <)t <
T he sufficient condition of Corollary 1.1 holds It is easy to show that the 
model satisfies the sufficient condition of Corollary 1.1, implying that of the six 
possible equilibria depicted in Figure 1-3 for a symmetric game with two merger 
stages, only three equilibria can obtain: sets of strategies (a), (c) and (h). Inspec­
tion of (the sign of) the merger surplus functions d>/ and $ //  in parameter space 
establishes that all three equilibria do obtain. Further, the way in which the equi- . 
librium changes as parameters vary is similar to Example 1 (Section 1.3). When 
the rate of change of the marginal cost e and the trade cost t are both low, no 
cross-border merger occurs along the equilibrium path of the game, as well as off 
it: set (h) is the equilibrium. At the other end, for high enough values of e and/or 
t, mergers are profitable, along the equilibrium path as well as off it: set (a) is the
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equilibrium. For intermediate values of e and/or t, mergers occur along the path 
yet the early merger by .Mi-firms induces the subsequent merger by A^-firms: set 
(c) is the equilibrium. The zones in which the different strategies are supported as 
equilibria are labelled accordingly as zones (a), (c) and (h). The complementary 
sets of strategies in Figure 1-3, namely (d), (e) and (f), cannot be supported as equi­
libria for any combination of parameters. The following proposition su m m arises 
the result.
Proposition  1.4 Space V  can be partitioned into three disjoint zones, as depicted 
in Figure 1-7. A straight line segment drawn from (e, t) — (0,0) to any point on 
t =  begins in zone (h), crossing into zone (c) and ending in zone (a). In 
each zone, the unique equilibrium is given in Figure 1-3, labelled after the zone. 
The boundaries between zones (h) and (c), and between zones (c) and (a), are 
continuous and downward-sloping, joining a point (e, 0), 0 < e < oo, on the e-axis 
to a point (0,t), 0 < t < on the t-axis. The boundary between zones (h) and (c) 
lies strictly below the boundary between zones (c) and (a).
The parallel to Proposition 1.3 is clear, both results being driven by a simi­
lar underlying mechanism -  the reaction of non-participating firms -  despite the 
motive for merger being different in kind: “growth in size” presently as opposed 
to “technology transfer” in Section 1.3, in addition to dam p en in g  competition and 
jumping tariffs, which both models share. That the response of non-participating 
firms again takes centre-stage in explaining the profitability of cross-border mergers 
is intuitive. When both the rate of increase of marginal cost and the trade cost 
are low, non-participating firms respond to a merger by significantly expanding 
output, rendering the merger unprofitable to its participants. As either the rate of 
increase of marginal cost or the trade cost increase from these low levels, the “out­
sider output expansion” effect (see the decomposition analysis in Section 1.3) falls 
in magnitude and merger profitability increases. As in Example 1, cross-border 
mergers are widespread and do not occur in isolation, but rather bunch together.
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1.5 R evisiting the vertically-differentiated-industry  
model: Investm ent integration and fixed costs 
of merger
The solutions to the two standard models above share the common phenomenon 
that cross-border mergers are undertaken and bunch together for a “large” region 
of parameter space. These results, however, beg the question: if the all-merger 
outcome indeed occurs along the equilibrium path for these parameter values, why 
is it that cross-border mergers are often empirically observed to occur from a sudden 
point in time onwards (and usually concentrated over a short period)? In other 
words, why were they not undertaken earlier?36
I revisit the vertically-differentiated-industry model in Section 1.3 to introduce 
the notion of a fixed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border merger. 
Borrowing from the historical motivation for the quality asymmetry in the model,
I ask why do cross-border mergers not take place even before countries undergo 
unexpected trade and investment integration37?
I argue that initially, before countries open up their industries to foreign in­
vestment, or lift curbs on the right of foreign firms to acquire shares in domestic 
firms, this fixed cost G of implementing a cross-border merger is very high, to the 
extent that cross-border mergers are not profitable and no merger occurs along 
the equilibrium path. Then, as countries open up to foreign investment, with the 
relaxation of these curbs on the right of foreign firms to merge with (or acquire) 
domestic firms, and the cost of doing business (such as acquiring information, or 
communicating) in a new environment declining as barriers are pulled down, G 
falls gradually38. In the historical context, the point in time at which G begins to 
fall corresponds to the moment at which unexpected integration takes place.
36In particular, one setting in which this flurry of investment activity has been seen to happen 
is that of countries undergoing integration, such as the European Union (EEC) from the 1980s, or 
several newly-industrialised countries undergoing trade and investment reform during the 1990s.
37 By the results of that section, mergers are profitable in autarky (outside V  for t  high enough) 
in the presence of a quality gap (v >  1 ).
38According to UNCTAD (2000), “over the period 1991-1999, 94% of the 1,035 changes world­
wide in the laws governing FDI created a more favourable framework for FDI. Complementing the 
more welcoming national FDI regimes, the number of bilateral investment treaties -  concluded
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I investigate how the solution to the model, for the different zones in (v, t) € V, 
changes as the fixed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border merger 
declines from an initial high level Go (at which mergers do not occur). Figure 1-8 
illustrates the solution for (v , t) in each of zones (a), (cl) and (c2) as G falls39. When 
G reaches a threshold given by ^ iii(v ,i) , the equilibrium outcome (Merger, Merger, 
Merger) is reestablished for (v, t) in each of zones (a), (cl) and (c2). Interestingly, 
when this threshold G =  ^ m (v ,t ) is reached, the equilibrium for (v,t) in each of 
zones (a), (cl) and (c2) (the second game tree from top to bottom in Figure 1-8) 
replicates the equilibrium for zone (c2) in the absence of fixed costs, depicted in 
Figure 1-5, which was referred to as a “merger wave”40 41.
1.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has sought to explain why the pattern of equilibria in sequential 
(horizontal) merger games of a certain type studied in the literature is similar 
across a fairly wide class of models. In this class of models typically only a similar 
subset of the possible set of equilibria is obtained. By developing general conditions 
characterising each possible equilibrium, I have shown that the solution to models 
that exhibit symmetry (in the sense defined earlier) and satisfy a certain sufficient 
condition will be restricted to this subset of equilibria. These models capture two 
(commonly) alternative types of situation: (i) one where firms are better off under
increasingly also between developing countries -  has risen from 181 at the end of 1980 to 1,856 
at the end of 1999. Double taxation treaties have also increased, from 719 in 1980 to 1,982 at 
the end of 1999. At the regional and interregional levels, an increasing number of agreements 
(most recently between the EC and Mexico) are helping create an investment environment more 
conducive to international investment flows” (pp.xv). See also Caves (1991).
39 The proof is in Appendix A.2. Clearly, in zone (h), no cross-border mergers occur along the 
equilibrium path for all values of G >  0: if this was the case in the absence of fixed costs of 
implementation (G =  0 ), it remains the case when these are introduced (G >  0 ).
40 A relevant question at this point is: if firms forsee that G  will fall further, why not wait 
for this to occur and thus guarantee a larger surplus from merger? Though this can be ruled 
out by making firms (sufficiently) impatient in a dynamic setting, or unable to forsee the future 
trajectory of G, the relevance of the question remains.
41 As G falls further, assuming no mergers have occurred, for \&/(u, t) <  G <  ^ //(u , t), the 
equilibria in zones (a) and (cl) (see the third tree in Figure 1-8) replicate the equilibrium for 
zone (cl) in the absence of fixed costs (the equilibrium in zone (c2 ) still replicates the equilibrium 
for zone (c2) in the absence of fixed costs). For 0 <  G <  assuming no mergers have
occurred, the equilibrium in zone (a) (see the fourth tree in Figure 1-8) replicates the equilibrium 
for zone (a) in the absence of fixed costs (the equilibria in zones (cl) and (c2 ) still replicate the 
equilibria for zones (cl) and (c2 ) respectively in the absence of fixed costs).
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Figure 1-8: (Example 1) Investment integration and sequential cross-border merg­
ers
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market structures where their rivals have merged as against market structures 
where rivals remain independent, or (ii) one where by merging firms may gain a 
competitive edge over their rivals. This result is of empirical relevance in that 
the pattern of equilibria found for this class of models is associated with mergers 
happening, not in isolation, but rather in bunches.
I have then employed the general analysis to solve two other standard models 
where the sufficient condition holds, illustrating that despite the motive for merger 
being different in kind -  one where mergers are a means of technology transfer, the 
other where mergers enable firms to grow their holdings of capital -  the pattern 
of equilibria is again similar. In so doing, I have utilised a two-country setting to 
show that the results can easily be extended to cross-border mergers. I argued that 
sequential games can be used to explore the profitability of cross-border mergers 
and can cast light on the phenomenon of bunching. Cross-border mergers are 
widespread and bunching occurs for “most” combinations of parameter values. 
The occurrence of mergers hinges critically on the magnitude of the reaction by 
non-participating firms being limited (e.g. when there is sufficient differentiation 
along either vertical or horizontal dimensions, as in the first model).
Much research to date on foreign investment has studied the export versus 
greenfield investment decision by firms as countries undergo market integration. 
Such models assume that as borders open up and there is increased competition, 
firms decide whether to enter new markets via exports or by setting up production 
operations, concentrate on existing markets or exit altogether. In reality, oligopolis­
tic firms have a larger action set which includes merging with one another. Mod­
elling foreign investment in the form of cross-border mergers -  in counterpoint to 
greenfield investment -  suggests just how widespread such activity may be. By 
merging or buying their way into foreign markets firms can dampen competition, a 
feature which is absent in simple exports-versus-greenfield investment studies. This 
helps explain the empirical predominance of mergers and acquisitions as a channel 
of investment by firms in foreign markets:
Finally, modelling mergers in the form of a sequential game as opposed to a 
game with simultaneous moves, captures the interdependence result -  where ear-
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Her mergers trigger subsequent mergers -  holding for certain regions in parameter 
space. In these regions the sequential nature of moves acts as a coordination device 
ensuring that the all-merger equihbrium outcome is unique. This may further help 
explain the empirical predominance and bunching of cross-border mergers.
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C hapter 2 
Inferring Conduct under th e  
Threat o f Entry: The Case o f the  
Brazilian Cem ent Industry
2.1 Introduction
Empirical industrial organisation has long been concerned with attempting to mea­
sure the degree of market power enjoyed by firms in an industry. Where marginal 
cost is observed, or can be constructed from known technological parameters, mar­
ket power can be inferred from the distance between price and cost, informing the 
researcher of the pattern of firm conduct in the industry. More often than not, 
marginal cost is not observed. In such cases, a well-established approach in the 
literature attempts to ascertain firm conduct, along with cost, from the compara­
tive statics of equihbrium. By this approach, a static structural model is specified, 
typically consisting of a parametric system of demand and firm pricing equations 
(first-order conditions). One then proceeds to jointly estimate demand, cost and a 
conduct parameter -  indexing the degree of market power -  from price and quan­
tity data, as these are moved around by observed exogenous shocks to supply and 
demand. Such a methodology for estimating cost and conduct, developed by Bres- 
nahan (1982) and Lau (1982), turns on the identifying assumption of orthogonality 
between the errors of the firm’s pricing equation and the excluded exogenous vari­
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ables which move the demand curve. Intuitively, shocks to demand allow one to 
observationally distinguish between the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive in­
dustry and the hypothesis of a low-cost collusive industry because the response of 
prices to these shocks is different according to the kind of firm behaviour in the 
industry: while price-taking firms set output at the point where price equals mar­
ginal cost as demand moves exogenously, firms with market power change prices 
to ensure that marginal revenue is equated to marginal cost.
In this chapter I examine the identification of supply (cost and conduct) in 
a more general dynamic setting where an industry faces potential entry and this 
threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices. I develop a structural model of a do­
mestic oligopoly which faces a competitive fringe of elastically-supplied high-cost 
imports. In equihbrium no imports are observed yet the threat of imports sets an 
upper limit on prices, equal to the marginal cost of imports. I show that when 
this price limit binds at the industry equihbrium, the identifying assumption of 
orthogonality between the error term of the conventional pricing equation and the 
excluded exogenous demand variables does not hold. Because the constraint posed 
by the threat of imports is unaccounted for, the standard pricing equation specifi­
cation does not identify cost and conduct from the comparative statics of demand. 
In this setting, the standard methodology does not allow one to empirically dis­
tinguish the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive industry from the hypothesis of 
a low-cost cartel where imports restrain prices at the equihbrium. Intuitively, the 
response of prices to fluctuations in demand is no longer distinct because the threat 
of imports acts to constrain the ability of the cartel to set marginal revenue equal 
to marginal cost. Viewed from a different angle, equihbrium market price elastic­
ities of demand are no longer informative since, irrespective of the hypothesis of 
conduct, the equihbrium remains at the kink of the residual demand curve facing 
the domestic oligopoly as demand fluctuates.
It is natural that upon not observing imports in equihbrium, or observing no 
more than a minimal amount, a researcher may come to overlook the restraining 
effect of imports, thereby misspecifying the structural model for the industry and 
estimating a static pricing equation imposing the regular moment conditions. It
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follows that if the industry enjoys market power, in the sense that equihbrium 
price-cost margins are positive, and yet the threat of high-cost imports constrains 
equihbrium prices, the lack of responsiveness of prices to fluctuations in demand 
will lead to the underestimation of the true degree of market power.
To illustrate, I turn to an industry in a country where potential imports restrain 
market outcomes: the Brazilian cement industry. Unlike its US counterpart, where 
the penetration of imports has ranged between 10 and 20% of domestic consump­
tion in the past decades, the Brazilian cement industry has historically managed to 
keep imports at bay1. This has been achieved thanks to a combination of domestic 
price controls, trade barriers, poor infrastructure and a depreciated local currency. 
At the turn of the 1990s, as price controls were lifted and Brazil began opening up 
to trade, the threat of imports began to develop “bite” on the industry, reinforced 
by an appreciating local currency. I consistently estimate demand in each local 
market (state of the Brazilian federation) and find very low market price elastic­
ities of demand in equilibrium, of the order of -0.5. Two main possibilities arise 
to rationalise why an industry facing such inelastic demand does not cut output 
to raise prices to a point where demand is more elastic: (i) there is weak pricing 
power (e.g. competition or low concentration), or (ii) some dynamic story is ap­
propriate, such as the threat of entry (imports) restraining pre-entry prices2. By 
way of an illustration, I begin by ignoring the restraining effect of imports and 
follow the standard methodology, estimating a pricing equation and instrumenting 
with exogenous demand. I obtain cost estimates that are close to prices, suggesting 
that outcomes in the Brazilian cement industry are competitive (and the standard 
conduct parameter is estimated to be close to zero). To check these estimates, I 
then construct actual marginal cost from observed factor prices, the simple fixed- 
coefficient nature of cement production technology, and the observed flow of cement 
from plants to markets. In contrast to the estimated price-cost margins that are
1The rise of international trade in cement, though puzzling to some, is a fairly recent phe­
nomenon and has been documented carefully by Dumez and Jeunemaitre (2000). Despite high 
inland transportation costs, cement can travel -  and does travel -  quite cheaply from afar by sea 
via specialised equipment.
2 A third possibility hinges on a very special class of models of spatial competition, where a 
firm is restricted to set only a “mill” price, with delivered prices to consumers who are distributed 
over space being equal to the sum of this mill price and the transportation cost.
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centred around zero, actual price-cost margins are large, amounting to 40-65% of 
producer prices (net of sales tax). Producers enjoy considerable market power de­
spite the binding high-cost imports constraint3. Thus the standard methodology 
fails to identify supply, severely underestimating the observed degree of market 
power4. This illustrates the theoretical result that when the threat of entry con­
strains prices, joint inference of cost and conduct will not be consistent because of 
the lack of responsiveness of prices to fluctuations in demand.
Given that cost and conduct cannot be jointly identified from the comparative 
statics of equihbrium in this constrained setting, the immediate question is: but 
what if the researcher observes marginal cost? Clearly, a direct comparison of mar­
ginal cost to price will provide a test of perfectly competitive behaviour against 
less competitive models of firm behaviour (and where imports restrain prices). 
But, other than perfect competition, how may one distinguish empirically between 
two alternative models of behaviour when aggregate (market) outcomes in both of 
these models are constrained by the threat of imports, and are thus equal? In the 
Brazilian cement industry, for example, where high-cost imports restrain equihb­
rium prices, one may wish to identify the model of firm behaviour supporting the 
constrained outcomes. I propose a test of conduct against a standard benchmark, 
the Cournot ohgopoly solution. The measure I develop uses firm-level quantity 
data to test the hypothesis of Cournot conduct against the alternative of “more 
collusive” firm behaviour. It is predicated on the notion that no Cournot firm can 
perceive that marginal revenue (taking rivals’ output as given on the margin) ex­
ceeds marginal cost, otherwise the firm would optimally expand output, and this 
notion holds regardless of whether the imports constraint binds or not in equi­
hbrium5. The requirements on the data are large, but the value of the test hes
3That the high price ceiling set by the high-cost imports binds is then a consequence of the 
steepness of the demand curve and this strong price discipline in the industry.
4The estimated coefficients on factor prices and other supply-shifters are mostly of the expected 
sign and significant, which could again mislead a researcher into thinking that the econometric 
model is appropriately specified. But this owes only to the fact that the estimated coefficients 
are picking up the expected correlation between cement prices and factor prices.
5The reverse notion, that a Cournot firm optimally cuts output when its perceived marginal 
revenue (were imports not to exist) falls short of marginal cost, no longer holds when the price 
ceiling imposed by imports binds in equihbrium: cutting output in an attempt to raise price 
above the price ceiling simply opens the door to imports.
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in uncovering firm-level behaviour when market outcomes are constrained by the 
threat of entry and thus the comparative statics of equilibrium are not informative.
I illustrate the proposed test of conduct by reference to the Brazilian cement 
industry. I find that conduct across local markets is considerably more collusive 
than the Cournot benchmark. Market outcomes are characteristic of (tacit) market 
division, and this can be identified despite the threat of imports restraining prices. 
A story where firm 1 tacitly agrees to give firm 2 the upper hand in market B in 
exchange for the latter staying away from market A -  with typically firm 1 (firm 
2) being located slightly closer to market A (market B) than the rival firm6 -  helps 
to explain the observed shipments. Plants ship to local markets located at their 
doorstep, while restricting supply to adjacent markets, despite supplying to these 
latter markets being highly profitable under the static Cournot conjecture7.
This chapter thus makes three contributions. First, it demonstrates that the 
standard pricing equation specification does not identify cost and conduct in indus­
tries where potential entry restrains pre-entry market outcomes, such as domestic 
oligopolies facing (underlying) competition from abroad8. The conventional iden­
tifying assumption is not satisfied; in particular the estimated degree of market 
power will be biased downwards. The implication of this latent effect of imports 
for antitrust authorities attempting to measure the competitiveness of conduct is 
increasingly relevant in a world where trade barriers are being pulled down9. Sec­
ond, I develop a test of conduct in such settings where potential entry may constrain 
equihbrium prices. By reference to this test, I show that market outcomes in the
6 “Slightly closer” is employed in the sense that the freight cost, while important to the cost 
structure of the industry, clearly does not explain the observed pattern of shipments.
7 Chapter 3 considers, in light of the different local market structures observed in the Brazilian 
cement industry, simple dynamic multimarket games which give rise to a pattern of market 
division in equilibrium..
8 In addition to potential entry, other “invisible” constraints may be conceived, such as pressure 
from antitrust authorities. Antitrust authorities are typically fond of “barking” at industries 
perceived to have market power in the hope of exerting downward pressure on prices. To the 
extent that some pressure is indeed exerted -  i.e. some of the bark having bite -  such a restraint 
provides another channel by which the standard methodology yields a downward-biased estimate 
of market power.
9The constraint of imports on market outcomes is not new, however. As I later comment, in a 
study of the US sugar industry at the turn of the 20th century, Genesove and Mullin (1998) state 
that “industry pricing was constrained by threats of (domestic) entry or of foreign imports” (p. 
367).
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Brazilian cement industry are indicative of (tacit) market division. The third con­
tribution has policy implications in relation to the cement industry, particularly in 
developing countries. In a developing country such as Brazil, with its huge housing 
deficit and infrastructure needs, the importance of the cement industry cannot be 
overstated. Cement is an essential input to construction and building activity for 
which there axe few substitutes. The industry regularly attracts attention from 
antitrust authorities, consumer associations and the financial media for its alleged 
pricing power. Yet to date no study has been undertaken to empirically ascertain 
the degree of competition in the industry by estimating a structural model using 
a rich original dataset. This study attempts to fill this void. A clear policy rec­
ommendation is that fostering imports can play an important role in curbing the 
ability of domestic producers to raise prices above marginal cost. In Brazil, recent 
policy experience has been the opposite; the government has succumbed to the 
industry’s “anti-dumping” lobby and raised the barriers to entry of imports, to the 
detriment of consumer welfare.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 I develop the theoretical 
framework and address identification. I then turn to institutional aspects of the 
cement industry, and present the data. Section 2.4 presents the application. (Ap­
pendix B provides a discussion of the sources and treatment of the data used, and 
robustness checks regarding the construction of marginal cost.) Finally, I conclude, 
reflecting on the policy implications of this chapter.
2.2 Theoretical framework: Towards a test o f 
conduct
In this section I develop a structural model of an oligopoly facing potential entry, 
where this threat of entry may limit pre-entry prices. Potential entry is modelled as 
a competitive fringe of foreign suppliers (imports) to the domestic oligopoly market. 
I then extend the analysis of identification of cost and conduct underlying the 
standard methodology from the static setting considered by Bresnahan (1982, 1989) 
to the present constrained setting, where the threat of imports may be constraining
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market outcomes. I show that the identifying assumption of orthogonality between 
the error term of the conventional pricing equation and the excluded exogenous 
demand variables does not hold. Estimates of cost and conduct parameters will be 
inconsistent; in particular, the degree of competition will be overestimated.
I then consider how a researcher may learn about conduct in an oligopoly fac­
ing potential competition from imports. I consider a situation where firms in the 
domestic oligopoly meet in different spatial (or product) markets and two data 
requirements on the part of the researcher are met: (i) direct measures of mar­
ginal cost are available, and (ii) firm-level quantity data is available (at the local 
market level). I specify a test of conduct based on Cournot behaviour adapted 
to the constrained setting. This test can reveal details regarding the pattern of 
conduct prevailing in the industry, despite aggregate outcomes being constrained 
in equihbrium by the presence of imports.
2.2.1 D om estic m onopoly facing com petition from imports
Consider a monopolist M  producing a homogeneous good at flat marginal cost 
Cm- The monopolist faces a competitive fringe of foreign suppliers (labelled I  for 
imports), with perfectly-elastic supply at marginal cost Cj > cm- In general, the 
equihbrium is given by either of two situations. If the marginal cost of imports is 
lower than the monopoly price in the absence of imports (denoted pM), the price 
in equihbrium will be equal to the marginal cost of imports, the monopolist will 
supply the entire domestic market, yet the foreign fringe exerts downward pressure 
on price. Alternatively, if the marginal cost of imports exceeds the monopoly 
price pM, imports have no “bite” and the equihbrium price will be pM, with the 
monopohst again supplying the entire market though in an unconstrained manner. 
Formahy, the equihbrium price p is given by
P= {
Ci if pM > Ci
pM otherwise
where pM =  p(gM), p(q) is the inverse demand function and qM is the quantity that 
equates the market marginal revenue MR(q) to the monopolist’s marginal cost cm-
69
Given the assumption that cj > cm (imports are high cost), the monopolist always 
supplies the entire market. Clearly, when pM > a ,  the extreme result of imports 
commanding zero sales rests on the assumption of perfectly-elastic supply from the 
foreign fringe10.
demand
MR(q)
v(q)
«
P (or rj)
p M = 1 0
\  Residual 
t?= K ^ \ demand
rj =-0.6
kmonopolist
Tl(q)
I
F igure 2-1: Monopolist facing a competitive fringe. Left panel: Imports have no 
“bite” (pM < cj). Right panel: Imports constrain price in equilibrium (pM > c/).
A n illustration  1 Assume demand is linear, given by p =  16 — -^q and cm =  
4. As shown in Figure 2-1, the monopoly price is pM =  10. If cj > 10 (left
10 As is typically the case with “limit price” models such as the one developed here, one needs 
to deal with the following question: why does the monopolist need to set a price as low as the 
limit price, in order to stave off entry (imports), if what is relevant to the entry decision is 
the post-entry price rather than the pre-entry one? In considering such a question, one could 
ponder why (in the situation of interest where imports do have bite, pM > cj) the monopolist 
would not set the monopoly price pM if it is able to cut its price to the importer’s cost cj 
immediately upon entry. When entry (and exit) is free and there is no entry lag, as is the case 
in the setting I am considering, where the entrant consists of opportunistic imports in a well- 
functioning international trading market, the monopolist will set the limit price. In this chapter’s 
application to the Brazilian cement industry, I later consider institutional aspects of the industry 
that further support the use of a limit-price model. More generally, it may also be argued that 
the threat of entry does constrain pre-entry prices, even if entry were not free, since pre-entry 
prices reveal information to the entrant about post-entry prices, such as the cost of the incumbent 
and/or its disposition to fight if faced with entry (i.e. a predation story of the reputational type). 
Finally, note that for the purpose of this thesis one need not strictly interpret c/ as the exact cost 
of imports, but more loosely as a price lower than that set by the monopolist were it to act in an 
unconstrained manner.
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panel), the equilibrium price is p =  10 and the monopolist supplies q = 60. Notice 
that the equihbrium market price elasticity of demand r](q) := ~  —1.67.
Now consider (4 <)c/ < 10, say C/ =  6 as illustrated in the right panel. The 
market equihbrium now hes at the kink in the residual demand curve faced by 
the monopolist: p =  6 and the monopolist supphes q =  100. At the equihbrium, 
while the price elasticity of demand faced by the monopohst is infinitely high 
in absolute value, the market price elasticity of demand is only 7 7 (1 0 0 ) =  —0.6. 
Around this latter equihbrium, fluctuations in the marginal cost of imports, say 
due to fluctuations in the exchange rate, ahow one to trace out the demand curve 
since the kinked equihbrium moves up and down along the market demand curve.
2.2.2 Econometric identification of conduct when costs are 
not observed
Market demand parameters may be identified from standard cost-shifters excluded 
from the demand function (left panel of Figure 2-1) or, in the case where imports 
restrain prices, from fluctuations in the marginal cost of imports, such as move­
ments in the exchange rate (right panel). But, in the absence of information on 
cost, will conduct (and thus cost) be identified from the comparative statics of 
demand?
In th e absence of potential entry, conduct is identified (Bresnahan 1982)
When imports do not constrain prices, as in the left panel of Figure 2-1, conduct is 
identified from fluctuations in the demand curve. Suppose we wish to distinguish 
between alternative behavioural hypotheses generating observed price and quantity 
data: on the one hand a low-cost monopoly or cartel (with cost cm), and on 
the other hand a high-cost competitive industry (with cost cc). When marginal 
cost is flat in quantity, mere shifts in the demand curve suffice to empirically 
distinguish the behaviour of a cartel from that of a competitive industry. Rotations 
of the demand curve will likewise identify conduct. (When marginal cost varies in 
quantity, only rotations of the demand curve will identify conduct.) Thus demand, 
cost and conduct parameters are jointly estimated from observed price and quantity
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data and observed exogenous demand and cost shifters. The reasoning is captured 
intuitively in Figure 2-2, where marginal cost is flat. The left panel indicates how 
a shift in the demand curve has different effects on the initial industry equihbrium 
Ei according to the hypothesis of conduct: the equihbrium shifts to E§  if pricing is 
competitive while shifting to E^1 if there is market power (output expands only to 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost). Similarly, the right panel illustrates 
how demand rotators identify conduct: there is no effect on the industry equihbrium 
if pricing is competitive (i.e. E\ — E%), yet the equihbrium shifts to E^1 under a 
cartel.
"Demand- 
shifters" Y,
MR,
"Demand- 
rotators" Y-
MR3
MR,
Figure 2-2: Identification in a static model. Left panel: Demand shifts. Right 
panel: Demand rotates.
W hen po ten tial en try  constrains p re-en try  prices, conduct is not iden­
tified Now modify the cartel hypothesis so that the domestic industry with low 
cost cm faces a competitive fringe of imports, with perfectly-elastic supply at high 
cost cc that constrains price, as in the model of Section 2.2.1 (with c/ =  cc)- In 
other words, under the hypothesis of a cartel, imports restrict the price to be cq 
and the equihbrium hes at the kink in the residual demand curve facing the domes­
tic industry (otherwise, for a high enough marginal cost of imports, we are back
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to the unconstrained situation considered in Bresnahan 1982). We wish to empir­
ically distinguish this constrained low-cost cartel hypothesis from the alternative 
hypothesis of a high-cost competitive (domestic) industry, with cost cc (and where 
the presence of imports becomes irrelevant). In Figure 2-3, the equihbrium is ini­
tially at Ei. In the left panel, a shift in the demand curve moves the equihbrium 
to E2 under both alternative hypotheses. In the right panel, a rotation of the de­
mand curve around the equihbrium point E\ does not move the equihbrium point 
under either hypothesis. Thus, in this dynamic setting, unless marginal costs are 
observed, there is no observable distinction between the hypothesis of a low-cost 
cartel (with imports restraining prices to be cc) and the hypothesis of high-cost 
(domestic) competition11.
"Demand- 
rotators" Y-
"Demand- 
shifters" Fj
p  c - p  M 
2 2
Residual demand 2
Residual 
demand 3Residual demand 1
MR
MR,
Figure 2-3: Conduct is no longer identified under the threat of entry. Left panel: 
Demand shifts. Right panel: Demand rotates.
Why is conduct no longer identified? Consider, say, rotations of the demand 
curve. Intuitively, in the absence of imports, such rotations identify conduct be­
11 Fluctuations in the demand curve can be broken down into rotations around the price inter­
cept and parallel shifts. When marginal cost is flat, identification is possible only from parallel 
inward shifts of the demand curve, when these shifts are sufficiently large (we are then back to 
the situation considered in Bresnahan 1982). Identification is not possible for rotations around 
the price intercept.
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cause firms with market power change prices when demand moves exogenously 
to ensure that marginal revenue is equated to marginal cost. Now, the threat 
of imports acts to constrain their ability to set (market) marginal revenue equal 
to marginal cost and therefore removes the source of price variation which allows 
conduct to be identified. Viewed from a different angle, equilibrium market price 
elasticities of demand are no longer informative since the equilibrium lies at the 
kink of the residual demand curve facing the domestic oligopoly (see below).
Thus, comparing figures 2-2 and 2-3, notice that while fluctuations in the de­
mand curve in the former figure lead to changes in prices under monopoly but 
not under competition, these same fluctuations in the latter figure leave prices un­
changed under both monopoly (facing imports) and competition. In the right panel 
of Figure 2-3, for example, a rotation of the demand curve around the initial equi­
librium point E\ does not change the equilibrium price (and quantity) under both 
hypotheses of competition and collusion. Overlooking the effect of imports and 
misspecifying the structural model to be that captured in the right panel of Figure 
2-2 (Bresnahan 1982), a researcher would interpret the stationarity of equilibrium 
prices as evidence to reject (low-cost) collusion in favour of (high-cost) competition, 
regardless of the true behavioural model generating the data. (Similarly, for a shift 
in the demand curve as depicted in the left panel of Figure 2-3, the equilibrium 
price would again remain unchanged under both hypotheses of competition and 
collusion. By misspecifying the structural model to be that captured in the left 
panel of Figure 2-2, one would mistakenly reject collusion in favour of competition, 
since no price change is observed following a shift in the demand curve.) The more 
general point is that by misspecifying the structural model and not accounting for 
the price-constraining effect of imports (or entry), a researcher could be misled 
into overestimating the extent of competition in the industry, further (residually) 
overestimating costs.
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E stim ation  of a  sta tic  pricing equation In the empirical literature on con­
duct, the following static pricing equation is typically specified on the supply side12:
(2.1)
where p is price, q is industry output, c is marginal cost and 9 is a conduct parame­
ter. One reason why specification (2 .1 ) may have become so popular is that it nests
where 7 7 (p) is the market price elasticity of demand. Clearly, such a specification
plemented by including a zero-mean error term e3 and proceeding to the estimation
12Examples include Gollop and Roberts (1979), Roberts (1983), Porter (1983), Suslow (1986), 
Bresnahan (1987), Brander and Zhang (1990), Nevo (2001) and Slade (2004). Note that here 
I abstract from a criticism that has been made regarding this approach on the grounds that 
oligopoly theory to date does not underpin a continuum of values for conduct that would support 
its free estimation (see, e.g., Reiss and Wolak 2002).
13Note that (2.1) can be specified at the industry or at the firm level. In the latter case one may 
include a subscript /  for the conduct and cost parameters, to denote the firm. An industry-level 
pricing equation can be viewed as the average across firms’ individual pricing equations (weighted 
or not by firms’ shares), in which case 8 has the interpretation of “the average collusiveness of 
conduct” (Bresnahan 1989). Note also that a common alternative to (2.1) in the literature consists 
of replacing the inframarginal revenue term 8 j q dp^  by 8 / q i.e. replacing industry output 
q by firm output q/ in firm / ’s pricing equation. From the first-order condition, the conduct 
parameter then corresponds to dq/dqf , which some have interpreted as a “conjectural variation”: 
by this view, upon expanding its output by dqj, firm /  would hold a “conjecture” dq with respect 
to the resulting aggregate output expansion.
14Notice that the vertical distance between the (inverse) demand function and the marginal 
revenue function is equal to —q dp^ -. Under the unconstrained monopoly equilibrium of Figure 
2-2 this distance is always equal to p — c. In contrast, in the constrained monopoly equilibrium 
of Figure 2-3 this distance will exceed p — c.
first-order conditions corresponding to the oligopoly models of monopoly or perfect 
collusion (where the firm internalises the aggregate inframarginal revenue change 
from a marginal change in output, so that 6 = 1) and perfect competition (where 
0 =  0 ), among other models (e.g. symmetric Cournot, 6 being the reciprocal of 
the number of firms in the industry)13. Pricing equation (2.1) can be rearranged 
to the familiar “elasticity-adjusted Lerner index” (or price-cost mark-up):
(2.2)
captures the supply decisions depicted in Figure 2-2, in the absence of imports, 
under the alternative hypotheses of conduct14. Econometrically, (2 .1 ) may be im-
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of
p = - g q^ l  + c + e’ (2.3)oq
where p and q are observed, has previously been consistently estimated, and 
one wishes to estimate 6 and c. Since q js endogenous, one needs to find 
excluded instruments from (2.3). In the absence of imports, exogenous demand 
variables Y  will serve as instruments, since they are correlated with the endogenous 
variable but uncorrelated with the error ss. This is clear from the exogenous 
fluctuations in demand pictured in Figure 2-2. Specification (2.3) is then estimated 
by IV or GMM and the identifying assumption is
E(Y 'es) =  0
The problem with the standard methodology arises in the presence of poten­
tial imports (entry), since to the extent that imports constrain market outcomes, 
fluctuations in the demand curve will be correlated with the error in the specified 
pricing equation. Due to the price ceiling set by imports, the true model -  the data 
generating process -  is given by15
p =  min +  c +  £s, c/^ (2.4)
The standard pricing equation which is taken to the data -  the estimated model -  
is, however:
<“ >
where the (mis)specified pricing equation error is denoted £s. The theoretical spec­
ification (2.1) that underlies the estimated model (2.5) fails to adequately capture 
the supply decisions (2.4) of an industry with pricing power facing the threat of 
high-cost imports. This is summarised in the following proposition.
15It is clear from (2.4) that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood that the imports constraint binds 
and thus p  =  ci is higher (i) the more collusive is conduct, i.e. the higher is 9; (ii) the steeper 
is the demand curve, i.e. the higher is — q{dp(q)/dq); (iii) the higher is the domestic industry’s 
marginal cost c; and (iv) the lower is the marginal cost of imports cj.
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Proposition 2.1 (Non-identification of conduct) When the threat of entry con­
strains prices set by an industry with market power, the residual £s in the standard 
pricing equation is negatively correlated with the excluded exogenous demand vari­
ables Y:
E (Y '? )  < 0
Consequently, IV  (or GMM) estimation using demand perturbations Y  will yield 
inconsistent estimates of conduct and cost. In particular, the true degree of market 
power 0 will be underestimated.
Proof. Let X \  := -q^&jp-- From (2.4) and (2.5), the DGP can be rewritten as 
p =  min (9Xi +  c +  £3, Cj) and the estimated model is p = OXi +  c + £s. We wish 
to determine E(Y'£3). The error of the estimated model is
— £s\\0X i +  c 4* s3 < Cj] +  (c/ — OXi — c)(l — 1\0X\ -f* c +  ss < C / ] ) (2.6) 
=  esx  +  (c/ — 0X\ — c)(l — x)
where the indicator function x  < c/ — 0X\ — c] =  1 when the market
equilibrium is unconstrained by the threat of entry (imports have no bite) and 
X =  0 when the equilibrium is constrained. (It is clear from (2.6) that the data 
generating process is a generalisation of the static model considered by Bresnahan 
(1982); this static model would correspond to a specific situation where x — 1 for 
all market outcomes, i.e. market outcomes are never constrained.) Assuming that 
the unobserved supply shock £s is orthogonal to the excluded exogenous demand 
variables Y, E (Y r£s) =  0, one may write
E ( Y 'n  =  E { Y ,£sx - ^Y ,(ci - 0 X 1 - c) { 1 - x ))
< E { Y ,£3x Jr Y ,£s{ l - x ) ) ^ E { Y ,£s)=Q
where the inequality follows from the fact that 1 — x =  1 when £3 > cj — OX\ — c 
(i.e. when the equilibrium is constrained) and 1 — x =  0 otherwise, along with the 
assumption that Y  > 0.
Further, let marginal cost be linear in X 2 , where X 2 is an N  x (K  — 1) matrix of
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observed variables, both exogenous (such as factor prices, including a constant) and 
endogenous (such as quantity): c =  X 2P2 ' Group the regressors of the estimated 
model into an N  x K  matrix, X  := (Xi, X 2 ), and the parameters to be estimated 
into a K  x 1 vector (3 := (0, j32)- The estimated model is then p =  X(3 -f £s. 
Denote as Z  the matrix of instruments, containing the exogenous elements of X 2 
and the excluded exogenous demand variables Y , and assume the rank condition 
for identification holds. The 2SLS estimator is given by
P
Noting that (i) E(X'Z)  and E(Z'Z)  are positive definite, and (ii) E(Z'£S) contains 
either 0 or negative elements (since E(Y'£S) < 0), the application of the law of 
large numbers to each term along with Slutsky’s theorem yields
plim f) < {3
In particular, plim 6 < 0. ■
The failure of the orthogonality condition can readily be seen in the linear 
demand example of Figure 2-3, as I show next.
Example: Shifts and rotations w ith  linear dem and Begin by considering 
a shift in the demand curve as depicted in the left panel of Figure 2-3. Say the 
inverse linear demand curve p — a — bq shifts outward to p =  a’ — bq, where 
a' — a = da > 0. Recall that under both alternative hypotheses of conduct -  
low-cost cartel constrained by imports, and high-cost competitive industry -  the 
equilibrium shifts from E\  to E2 , where dp =  0 and dq = y .  Plugging this into the 
total derivative of the static pricing equation (2.5)16 and noting that the demand 
slope remains unchanged at —6, one obtains 0 =  — Q ((—b ) ^ )  +  0) +  d£s. 
Thus
d f  =  -Oda
16This may be written dp =  —9 +  d (dp^  )q^ j -f d£3, considering 9 and c are constant.
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=  { X ,Z { Z ,Z ) - 1Z ’X ) - lX ,Z { Z ,Z ) - l Z ,p  
=  *3 +  ( ^ ' Z ^ Z ' Z ) - ^ Z ' X ) - ^ X ' Z ( ^ Z ' z r ^ Z ' ?
from which it is clear that shifts in the demand curve are correlated with the error 
in the pricing equation (unless, of course, there is competition: 9 =  0) . Now 
consider a rotation in the demand curve around E\ (right panel of Figure 2-3). Say 
the inverse demand curve p = a — bq rotates anticlockwise around E\ =  {qi,Pi) 
to p =  a! — b'q, where br — b =  db < 0 and thus a! — a — da — db.qi < 0. Under 
both alternative hypotheses of conduct, the equilibrium remains stationed at E\, 
and thus dp = dq = 0. Plugging this into the total derivative of the static pricing 
equation and noting that the change in the demand slope d(^§j^) =  —db, one 
obtains 0 =  — 9 (0 4 -  (—db)qi) 4 -  d£s. Recalling that da — q\db, this translates into
d£s =  —9qidb =  —9 da
so that rotations in the demand curve around the equilibrium are correlated with 
the error in the pricing equation.
The limit-price model considered in this chapter provides an example where 
joint estimation of conduct and costs from a static pricing equation will perform 
poorly. Another example is provided by Corts (1999) who considers a dynamic 
model of collusion in a simple linear-demand, homogeneous-good oligopoly with 
symmetric and flat marginal costs, in which punishment is characterised by Cournot 
behaviour forever17. He simulates market outcomes according to varying assump­
tions on the persistence of exogenous demand shocks and then shows that estima­
tion of a static pricing equation will in many instances underestimate the degree 
of market power, as measured by the elasticity-adjusted Lemer index (2.2). The 
thrust of his argument is that while the estimated conduct parameter is deter­
mined by the marginal responsiveness of equilibrium quantity (and thus price and 
the mark-up) to exogenous perturbations of demand, market power is defined by 
the level of the price-cost margin. The estimated conduct parameter will accurately 
capture market power “only if the true process underlying the observed equilibrium 
generates behaviour that is identical on the margin, and not just on average, to 
a conjectural variations game” (p. 234; by a “conjectural variations” model the
17Corts’ (1999) illustration is reminiscent of the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) supergame 
model of collusion with stochastic demand.
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author means a model nested in (2.1) -  see my footnote 13). This is clearly not the 
case for the imports-constrained oligopoly just outlined. As the above discussion 
makes clear, another way of putting Corts’ argument is by stating that the errors 
in the pricing equation (2.5) are correlated with the demand shocks Y  typically 
used as instruments.
The implication of Proposition 2.1 for empirical work is clear. Consider an 
industry where firms have market power (9 > 0 ) and the threat of high-cost imports 
constrains prices in equilibrium for at least a subset of the data. (In the notation 
of the proof of Proposition 2 .1 , this corresponds to Pr(x =  0) =Pr(£s > c/ — OXi — 
c) > 0  in the available sample.) Suppose a researcher, observing the negligible 
penetration of imports in equilibrium, fails to realise the price-restraining effect of 
imports and runs specification (2.5) on the data, thinking that the data generating 
process is (2.3), when it is actually (2.4)18. Thinking that he is imposing E ( Y fes) =  
0, when in fact he is incorrectly imposing E(Y'£S) =  0, the researcher would obtain 
inconsistent estimates of conduct and cost. The estimated conduct parameter 0 
will he below the “true” value 9 = as defined in (2.2), underestimating the
degree of market power. Intuitively, since prices do not respond to demand shocks 
as seen above, the coefficient on will be biased toward zero. The extent
to which potential imports (and entry in general) constrain market outcomes is 
an empirical question. I briefly illustrate the relevance of the restraining effect of 
imports by reference to a seminal study of the US sugar industry.
US sugar industry  (Genesove and M ullin 1998): constrained m arket ou t­
comes? Genesove and Muffin (1998) examine the US sugar industry at the turn 
of the 2 0 th  century to test the estimation of cost and conduct using the standard
18Note that were the researcher aware of the price-restraining effect of imports on a subset of 
the data, and were able to “separate the wheat from the chaff”, he could implement the standard 
methodology using the unconstrained outcomes only (i.e. where x  =  1), or in principle he could 
use switching regression techniques. Typically (i) the constraining effect of potential entry may be 
overlooked since entry is not observed in equilibrium; (ii) the level at which the constraint binds 
fluctuates and is unobserved (e.g. in the example of footnote 8, the level at which the antitrust 
bark has bite is by no means clear or stable over time); and (iii) though this is currently work in 
progress, it would seem that a necessary condition for identification using switching regression is 
the observation of independent variation in the exogenous variables, such as the marginal cost of 
imports and the marginal cost of the domestic industry.
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static pricing equation (2.3). Thanks to the simple production technology of the 
industry, marginal cost is observed and can be used to check the performance of the 
estimation methodology, which they find “performs reasonably well in estimating 
0” (p. 370). However, though the difference is small, the estimated conduct para­
meter 8 is lower than the direct measure of market power 0 obtained from (2 .2 ). 
Interestingly, the authors state that this direct measure of market power 9 would 
“suggest a more competitive environment than one would expect from an industry 
that averaged six firms and whose largest firm had an average market share of 63%” 
(p. 367), and that the “likely explanation is that industry pricing was constrained 
by threats of (domestic) entry or of foreign imports” (p. 367), despite ‘Very little” 
sugar actually being imported into the US19. Genesove and Mullin point out that: 
“Although we acknowledge the influence of these competitive fringes, they are not 
formally incorporated into our analysis” (p. 359). This section’s analysis suggests 
that to the extent that market outcomes in the sugar industry were constrained by 
the threat of entry, this would lead to a downward bias in the estimated degree of 
market power.
In Section 2.4 I develop an example using the Brazilian cement industry where 
market outcomes are constrained by the threat of imports. I illustrate how poorly 
the standard methodology may perform in such a setting: the estimated conduct 
parameter heavily understates the direct measure of market power (based on a 
direct measure of marginal cost). I then use firm-level data to delve deeper into 
the pattern of conduct in the industry. To this end, we need to consider other 
models of conduct in the imports-constrained oligopoly model, in addition to the 
model of monopoly seen at the beginning of this section.
19 Further evidence of the price-constraining effect of imports is provided: “Although very little 
refined sugar was ever imported into the United States, in the early years of the Sugar Trust (the 
largest firm) the threat of European imports affected U.S. prices. In 1888 and 1894, Havemeyer 
(the Sugar Trust’s president) acknowledged setting the price of refined sugar so that none would 
be imported from Europe” (p. 358; parentheses added). Note that the authors’ low direct measure 
of market power 9 stems from a low observed price-cost mark-up and a moderate elasticity 
7]{jp) (of around —1.05 for most part of the year).
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2.2.3 From monopoly to  oligopoly
The next question is: what are the equilibrium outcomes when there is a domestic 
oligopoly comprised of n > 2  firms, instead of a monopoly? Clearly this will depend 
on the conduct of the domestic firms facing the competitive fringe of imports. I 
will consider the non-trivial case of imports restraining prices pM > ci (right panel 
of Figure 2-1), since the complementary case where imports do not restrain even 
a monopolist pM < ci is standard (left panel of Figure 2-1). I now consider the 
benchmark models of collusion, Bertrand and Cournot.
Under the most collusive outcome, the equilibrium price is p =  C/ and the 
oligopoly’s joint output is q — p- 1 (c/), the same output as that of a monopolist 
(recall Section 2.2.1). In a non-cooperative framework with heterogeneous firms, 
where side payments are not allowed, output will need to be shared among the 
firms according to some rule or historical pattern20. In a spatial context, where 
the oligopoly consists of firms with multiple plants scattered across space, meeting 
each other in different local markets, one possibility is to have the most efficient 
firm in a given local market supply a large share of output. The most efficient 
(lower cost) firm in a local market could be the firm with the plant located closest 
to that market, thus incurring lower transport costs. To the extent that firms’ 
plant configurations are “sufficiently” symmetric, with different firms being the 
low-cost producer in different markets, the restriction of no side payments can 
be circumvented and aggregate industry profits can be increased21. I return to 
collusion under multimarket contact (as it applies to the Brazilian cement industry) 
in Section 3.222.
20 As before, assume flat marginal costs. With homogeneous firms, sharing output equally 
among the firms -  as well as any alternative allocation -  maximises joint profits. With heteroge­
neous firms, were side payments allowed, the optimal allocation rule is to have the low cost firm 
supply the entire market.
21Bemheim and Whinston (1990) explore the incentive constraints under multimarket contact. 
By pooling a firm’s incentive constraints across markets, its share in those markets where it enjoys 
a low cost (i.e. “on its own turf’) may be increased at the expense of its share in markets where 
it has a high cost. See Section 3.2.
22 Notice that the price limit set by the delivered cost of imports cj may provide a natural focal 
price for coordination. (I thank Margaret Slade for pointing out that this observation is consistent 
with the Eastman-Stykolt (1966) hypothesis, where by providing the domestic industry with a 
collusive focal point equal to the world price plus tariff, protection may facilitate oligopolistic 
coordination of the protected firms. See Harris (1984).)
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Under the other polar model of Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price is 
equal to the marginal cost of the second most efficient plant. Label firms 1 and 2  as 
the lowest-cost firm and the next lowest cost firm respectively, i.e. c\ < c^{< c/). 
The equilibrium price is then p  = C2 , with firm 1 supplying the entire market with 
qi — p_ 1 (c2). This situation is similar to that depicted in the right panel of Figure 
2 - 1 , where it is the next lowest cost firm 2  rather than imports that restrains prices.
Consider finally the standard case of Cournot behaviour among the n firms in 
the domestic oligopoly23. Consider the output decision of firm / .  In the absence of 
imports, denote firm / ’s reaction function qf =  Rf(q-f),  where q-f := Yhj^f qj ^  
the joint output of its (domestic) rivals. (This reaction function is derived from the 
firm’s Cournot first-order condition and is drawn as the steeper line in the left panel 
of Figure 2-4.) In the presence of imports, imports occur if p(qj -f q-f)  > cj, or 
equivalently if g/-f q~f < P_1 (cj), i.e. if domestic output is restricted to fall short of 
the quantity level at which the marginal cost of imports crosses the demand curve. 
In this case, where qj + q-f < p- 1 (c/), the quantity of imports is positive and equal 
to qimports = P~1(cI) ~  qf -  q - f , so that total supply is qf  + q-f  + qimports =  P~l (cj). 
Thus qf + q-f > p~l (cj) defines the “imports constraint”: its boundary is drawn as 
the less steep line, of slope —1 , in the left panel of Figure 2-4. Clearly, the perfectly- 
elastic supply of imports ensures that, given the joint output of its rivals q-f, 
Cournot firm /  will set its output such that price is at most equal to the marginal 
cost of imports, such that imports do not occur. Hence, in the presence of imports, 
firm / ’s best response to the joint output of its rivals q-f  will correspond to the 
outer envelope to its reaction function in the absence of imports, Rf(q-f) ,  and the 
boundary to the imports constraint, qf +  q-f =  p_1 (cj); denote this “constrained” 
reaction function as
Qf = C /) := max(i?/(g_/),p_ 1 (c/) -  q .{)
Rf{q-f\  Ci) is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2-4 as the thick curve. Notice 
that when Rf (0) < p- 1 (c/), as drawn, Rf(q-f)  will cross qf +  q-f  =  p- 1 (c/). For
23 For a model with a similar flavour where a Cournot oligopoly may deter entry by producing 
the limit output, see Gilbert and Vives (1986) (I thank Xavier Vives for pointing this out to me).
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high enough q-f  such that Rf ( q~f ; C / ) + g _ /  > p- 1 (c/), firm / ’s optimal reply in the 
presence of imports is to set the same quantity that it would set in the absence of 
imports (and the corresponding market price is lower than cj). This steeper upper 
segment of firm / ’s constrained reaction function Rf(q-f \  ci) is collinear with the 
reaction function in the absence of imports i?/(g_/), and the standard Cournot 
pricing equation holds:
where as before 7 7 (g) is the market price elasticity of demand and q =  g/+g_/. Now, 
for lower q- f  such that 7?/(g_/;c/) +  q- f  =  p- 1 (cj) (i.e. Rf ( q - f \ c i )  > Rf{q- f ) ) ,  
firm / ’s optimal reply in the presence of imports exceeds the quantity that it would 
set in the absence of imports, and price equals cj (since otherwise imports would 
occur and price would still be equal to cj). Here, along the flatter segment of firm 
/ ’s constrained reaction function Rf(q-f] c/), firm / ’s (perceived) marginal revenue 
falls short of marginal cost:
P t a ) + s S t  •= ( i 8 )
24.Conditions (2.7) and (2.8) combine to prove the following proposition
Proposition  2 . 2  ( “Constrained” Cournot first-order condition) In the presence 
of imports, if firm f  behaves as a Cournot player, it will be the case that
' M  +  S f f . s *  P  9)
This condition holds as a strict inequality when the “imports constraint” qf + q~f > 
p_ 1 (c/) binds, in which case price is equal to the marginal cost of imports cj.
The set of Cournot equilibria is found by similarly deriving the rival firms’ 
constrained joint reaction function q-f = R-f(qf \ci ), which is again the outer 
envelope of the joint reaction function in the absence of imports q-f  =  R-f(qf)  and
24 Condition (2.9) also holds as an inequality in the case of a corner solution (i.e. p(q~f) < Cf 
such that qf =  R f(q - f )  =  0), but this is standard so is omitted from the proposition.
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the boundary to the imports constraint, qf +  q-f  = p_1(cj). The set of equilibria is 
the intersection of qf =  Rf(q-f] c/) and q-f = R-f(qf ,  cj). For a low enough cost 
of imports (i.e. an imports boundary sufficiently far from the origin, as drawn in 
the right panel of Figure 2-4 for the next illustration), there are multiple equilibria 
and imports restrain prices at the Cournot equilibrium25.
<?-/ «-/
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100
(f f  — Rf ’»C/)
constrained Cournot 
reaction function
multiple constrained 
Cournot equilibria78.3
57.5 100 117.527.5
Figure 2-4: Cournot oligopoly facing a competitive fringe of imports. Left panel: 
Cournot firm / ’s reaction function, facing domestic rivals and imports. Right 
panel: Cournot equilibria. Drawn for linear demand and c/ =  6 as in the right 
panel of Figure 2-1.
A n illustra tion  2 This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 2-4, drawn 
assuming the linear demand function p — 16 — ^ q  and cj =  6 of the earlier 
illustration to the domestic monopoly case (see the right panel of Figure 2-1), 
and adding the assumption that there are n — 3 firms, that the marginal cost 
of the firm of interest /  is c/ =  4.5 and that Yhj^f cj ~  8.5.26 In the absence
25In the absence of imports, the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome (g^, Q-f) is defined 
implicitly by t =  Rf{R-f{q^))  and g ^  =  R - f { R f { q <Ef)). Formally, imports have bite under 
Cournot conduct if p{q^ 4 - q^f) > c/, or equivalently when qfj +  q2f <  p- 1 (c/).
26For example, if one of firm / ’s rivals has the same marginal cost as the earlier monopolist, of 
4, then the remaining rival has a marginal cost equal to that of firm / ,  of 4.5.
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of imports (or were c/ > p(87.5) =  7.25 instead of 6), joint output and price 
in the Cournot oligopoly would respectively be 87.5 and 7.25 in equilibrium. In 
the presence of imports, where cj =  6, joint output and price in the constrained 
Cournot equilibrium are respectively 100 and 6. This joint outcome is the same as 
the most collusive outcome of Illustration 1 in Section 2.2.1.
2.2.4 From theory to  application: inference of conduct in 
the presence of potential im ports (when costs are ob­
served)
I argued in Section 2.2.2 that, in the presence of potential imports, estimation of a 
static pricing equation imposing the regular moment conditions yields inconsistent 
estimates of conduct and cost parameters. The immediate question is then: But 
what if the researcher observes (domestic firms ’) marginal cost? In a setting where 
imports restrain prices at the industry equilibrium, how can one then identify firm 
conduct?
Clearly, a direct comparison of marginal cost to price will provide a test of com­
petitive behaviour against less competitive models of firm behaviour (and where 
imports may restrain prices). However, consider the following hypothetical situa­
tion. Suppose that prices exceed observed costs and that imports restrain prices 
were firms to behave a la Cournot, let alone restrain prices were firms to alterna­
tively engage in collusion. One wishes to identify, from the constrained prices and 
quantities and the observed costs, the underlying model of conduct in the indus­
try. It is not obvious how one can distinguish, say, collusive conduct from Cournot 
conduct when the equilibrium price under either alternative model of conduct is 
constrained to be the same and equal to the marginal cost of imports. This sit­
uation, for a domestic duopoly, is pictured in the left panel of Figure 2-5. The 
observed equilibrium outcome is marked with a “+ ” , where clearly the imports 
constraint binds (since lies on qf +  qg — p-1(c/), where the duopolists are 
labelled /  and g). From the observed constrained equilibrium, it is not possible 
to tell whether firms in the industry behave in Cournot fashion (in which case
aggregate equilibrium output in the absence of imports would equal +  q^) or 
whether firm behaviour is more collusive than the Cournot benchmark x(in which 
case the aggregate equilibrium output in the absence of imports would be lower 
than qf+qg).  The example provided by Illustrations 1 (monopoly) and 2 (Cournot) 
above should clarify. In the example, the cost of imports, in addition to demand 
and domestic cost conditions, are picked to be such that under either model of 
conduct the aggregate equilibrium outcome is constrained to be the same. Under 
either the hypothesis of collusion or firms behaving a la Cournot, aggregate in­
dustry output is 100 (imports are zero) and price is 6 (equal to the marginal cost 
of imports). Thus, industry outcomes under full collusion and under Cournot are 
observationally equivalent in this example in which p(qc ) > ci, where qc  is the 
“unconstrained” Cournot equilibrium industry output (recall q° > qM)27.
multiple constrained 
collusive equilibria
multiple constrained 
Cournot equilibria
Lultiple constrained 
ournot equilibria
* /(0)
Figure 2-5: Identifying collusion from Cournot when imports constrain equilib­
rium prices under both models of conduct. Left panel: The imports constraint binds 
at the industry equilibrium marked which is consistent with either Cournot 
conduct or more collusive firm conduct. Right panel: Rejection of Cournot behav­
iour for firm / :  <pf > 0.
Yet even in the case illustrated -  where imports constrain prices not only when
27Had I taken (pM >)ci >  p(qc ) in the example, imports would not have had bite under 
Cournot conduct and thus outcomes under full collusion and Cournot would be distinct.
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behaviour is collusive but also under Cournot -  it may be possible to distinguish 
between competing hypothesis of conduct, despite industry outcomes being equiv­
alent, if  firm-level quantity data is available (in addition to costs being observed). 
The point is to recognise that for a Cournot firm, the general (i.e. allowing for 
the constraining effect of imports) pricing condition (2.9) of Proposition 2.2 has 
to hold. That is, for no Cournot firm can (perceived) marginal revenue exceed 
marginal cost, otherwise the firm would optimally expand output, and this holds 
irrespective of whether the imports constraint binds or not (since the latter places 
a lower bound on aggregate domestic output). This pricing condition can be used 
with observed marginal cost and the estimated market price elasticity of demand 
to test for Cournot behaviour. Under the hypothesis of Cournot behaviour, one 
may well observe a firm choosing output to the right of its unconstrained reaction 
function, given the (joint) output of its rivals, since imports may be restraining 
price at the constrained Cournot equilibrium: here, the Cournot firm would not 
cut output in an attempt to raise price above Cj, as an unconstrained Cournot firm 
would do, since this would only open the door to imports. However, under the 
hypothesis of Cournot behaviour, one should not observe a firm choosing output to 
the left of its unconstrained reaction function. This is illustrated in the right panel 
of Figure 2-5. While firm g 's behaviour is consistent with Cournot (it does not 
cut output as a Cournot firm would do in an unconstrained equilibrium, since the 
imports constraint is binding), firm / ’s behaviour is not consistent with Cournot: 
firm /  is restricting output. This translates into the following test. Rewrite the 
Cournot pricing condition (2.9) as an equality:
+  =  (2 ' 10)
Proposition  2.3 (Sufficient statistic to reject Cournot behaviour) Under the null 
of Cournot behaviour, iff < 0 .  When the imports constraint binds, ipj < 0 is 
consistent with Cournot behaviour. The finding that ipj > 0 allows one to reject the 
hypothesis that firm f  is behaving in Cournot fashion, in favour of more collusive 
behaviour, regardless of whether the imports constraint binds or not
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As I will argue, there is strong evidence to suggest that outcomes across the 
different local markets in the Brazilian cement industry can be characterised as 
follows. The market price elasticities of demand are estimated to be very low, of the 
order of -0.5. Demand across local markets with widely differing market structures 
(i.e. concentration indices or number of firms) is consistently inelastic: elastically- 
supplied imports appear to restrain prices. Yet consumer prices considerably exceed 
the marginal cost of even the least efficient producers serving a given local market. 
I observe many instances in the data where the hypothesis of Cournot behaviour 
on the part of firms in local markets can be rejected in favour of what appears to 
be (tacit) market division. The right panel of Figure 2-5 depicts a typical local 
market: a firm with a plant located within this market will correspond to firm g. 
It ships more than what it would ship in any constrained or unconstrained Cournot 
equilibrium. Other firms with plants located within this given local market, or with 
plants located nearby, will correspond to firm /  in Figure 2-5, whose shipments to 
this local market fall short of their Cournot best responses. (In Chapter 3 I show 
how such a collusive arrangement may be sustained in equilibrium in a spatial 
dynamic model where firms meet in different markets.)
2.3 Industry and data
2.3.1 The cement industry
Cement is a homogeneous good produced largely from limestone and clay in weight 
proportion of roughly 5 to 1. Described simply, limestone and clay are ground and 
the mixture is burned at a very high temperature in a rotary kiln producing ce­
ment clinker. The clinker pellets -  once cooled -  are then ground and mixed with a 
retarding agent (gypsum) and varying types of additives to form different formula­
tions of cement28. Despite the relative simplicity of the product, the production of
28 The different formulations of cement are substitutes in most types of user applications. While 
clinker comprises around 96% of ordinary cement, this proportion can be considerably reduced in 
other formulations, such as (blast furnace) slag cement or pozzolanic cement. Usually the supply 
of these different formulations will depend on the availability of additives (i.e. slag or pozzolane) 
in the proximity of the cement plant, such as a steelworks in the case of slag cement. Each
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cement is capital intensive and is characterised by substantial economies of scale. 
Labour basically performs a supervisory role (Norman 1979). The process is also 
energy intensive, not only due to the operation of the kiln but also due to the 
grinding of raw material and clinker29.
The process exhibits a fixed factor production function since factor inputs are 
not substitutable. Yet marginal costs do vary across kilns and plants, according 
to the technology, capacity, age and fuel employed (Jans and Rosenbaum 1996). 
The last major innovation to the production process took place in the 1970s in 
response to the energy price shocks. The “wet” process kiln system was replaced 
by the “dry” process, which consumes less than half the respective energy (since 
no heat is needed to evaporate water). With the energy crisis in the foreground, 
firms invested in bigger, more energy-efficient kilns. Maximum kiln capacity in 
the four decades leading up to 2000 has increased six-fold to four million tonnes 
per annum (mtpa) (World Cement 2000)30. Although equipment suppliers and 
cement producers work closely together, most innovations seem to originate from 
the equipment suppliers, and technology can be purchased off-the-shelf31.
As cement is a low-value commodity relative to weight, transportation costs 
may assume a significant proportion of cost, leading to geographically segmented 
markets. Scherer et a! (1975, p. 429) list cement as having the second highest 
freight cost index for shipments out of 101 US industries. In order to meet dispersed 
demand, firms may trade in (production) scale economies for lower transport costs 
by scattering their plants across markets32.
type of cement usually needs to conform to legislation that specifies its (physical and chemical) 
properties. Thus differentiation based on formulation is limited.
29In many regions, such as in the Americas and Europe, the supply of limestone is ubiquitous; 
the raw material is thus usually extracted from a quarry located within the plant complex. The 
setup of a modem plant with capacity of 1.5 million tonnes per annum (mtpa), including the 
prospecting rights over limestone reserves, can require a capital outlay of up to US$300 million 
(US$200 per tonne of capacity).
30 See Rosenbaum (1989) and Johnson and Parkman (1983) on process and capacity changes in 
the US industry.
31 “Turn-key” plants may be ordered from suppliers. Research and development (R&D) spend­
ing by the cement producers themselves is limited: operating at the forefront of cement-production 
technology, the Japanese producer Taiheiyo (Chichibu Onoda prior to 1998) spends less than 1% 
of sales revenue on R&D.
32 See Scherer et al (1975) and Newmark (1998). Pre-empting entry may further reduce initial 
plant scale (Johnson and Parkman 1983).
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Demand for cement is essentially driven by the construction industry and is, 
similarly, cyclical. In developed markets, shipments are largely made in bulk to 
ready-mixed concrete firms and construction firms. By contrast, the lion’s share of 
the industry’s production in developing countries is dispatched in bags to resellers 
(retailers) who sell on to individuals (“do-it-yourself buyers”), reinforced by the 
fact that over the past decade or two many governments in such markets have 
been scaling down on infrastructure investments. The demand curve for cement is 
typically steep since cement makes up only a moderate part of most construction 
projects and there are few substitutes.
World demand, estimated at 1620 mt in 2000, has been growing at around 3% 
p.a. (International Cement Review 2001). Growth is concentrated in emerging 
markets while demand in North America and Western Europe has been growing 
slowly or is stagnant33. Over the past 15 years, a significant process of consolidation 
has been running its course in the global cement industry. While family-run and 
state-owned firms have been put on sale, a few multinational firms have been on a 
buying spree, aggressively moving into new markets or expanding in markets where 
they previously operated. The combined production share (excluding China) of the 
world’s six largest firms (C^) in 2000 was estimated at 35%, up from 23% in 1995 
and 14% in 1985.
2.3.2 The Brazilian cement industry in the 1990s
On the basis of output, Brazil ranks sixth in the league of cement-producing coun­
tries, with output of approximately 40 mtpa in the period 1998 to 2000 (SNIC 
200234). As shown in Figure 2-6, in 1999 57 active plants were scattered across a 
geographic area slightly smaller than that of the US35. This spatial distribution is 
not even, however, as consumer markets and thus plants are concentrated along 
the coastal states, in particular the relatively wealthy and populated states in the
33 Around 30% of consumption occurs in China, notoriously a producer of low-quality cement 
in energy-inefficient, environmentahy-unfriendly “backyard” mini cement plants.
34 Unless specified otherwise, facts from this section are drawn from reports of the Brazilian 
cement industry’s trade association (SNIC), backed up by other sources. See Appendix B.
35 With a population corresponding to two-thirds that of the US, cement consumption per capita 
in Brazil amounts to 232 kg as compared to 415 kg in the US (SNIC 2002).
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Southeast and South regions of the country36. States to the northwest of the centre 
of the country axe sparsely populated and are largely covered with jungle.
In 1999, as also depicted in Figure 2-6, these 57 plants were owned by 12 firms. 
The two largest firms, Votorantim and Grupo Joao Santos, respectively with na­
tionwide shipment shares of 41% and 12% in 1999, were both domestically-owned, 
traditional family-run businesses. The subsidiaries of the large multinational firms 
Holcim and Lafarge followed, with shipment shares of 9% and 8% respectively. 
As Figure 2-7 indicates, this national picture hides a lot of variation at the local, 
statewide level.
The 1990s saw two distinct periods in the history of the Brazilian cement in­
dustry. Up until mid 1994, a period of very high inflation and low macroeconomic 
growth, cement consumption was stagnant at around 25 mtpa. With the suc­
cessful implementation of the Real economic stabilisation plan in July 1994 (see 
below), cement consumption resumed its growth at a rate of 10% p.a., reaching 40 
mtpa by 1998-99, pulled by exogenous growth in the construction sector37. The 
post-stabilisation phase of the 1990s also saw a flurry of acquisition activity in the 
cement industry, with the expansion of incumbents and the entry of foreign firms 
which did not previously own assets in Brazil. Compared to the 12 firms that ran 
operations by 1999, the industry had consisted of 19 producers in 1991.
Given the short shelf fife of cement, firms produce for immediate consump­
tion. Stocks at producers amount to approximately one week of sales, with roughly 
another week of sales being stocked down the trade. Around 90% of shipments 
from producer plants to buyers in consumer markets is carried out by road -  as 
opposed to rail or water. In line with other developing countries, as mentioned 
above, around 80% of volume is shipped in bags to resellers who then sell on to 
small-scale consumers; only 20% is shipped in bulk by the industry directly to con­
sumers, usually ready-mixed concrete firms, large construction firms or producers 
of construction aggregates.
36The Federative Republic of Brazil is a federation of 27 states. The coastal states are those 
running clockwise from the north-most point of the country -  the state of Amapa {AP) — to the 
south-most state of Rio Grande do Sul (RS ).
37 As will be discussed shortly, real cement prices also fell in the early days post stabilisation.
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M em o:
Standard Total across
M ean D eviation  M axim um M inim um 27 states
C em ent consum ption  in  state (kt) 1,483 2,324 11,723 55 40,045
N um ber o f  (active) cem ent plants located w ith in  state0 2.1 2.6 11 0 57
N um ber o f  cem ent firms (producers) sh ip p in g  to state 5.7 2.8 11 1 12
O ne-firm  concentration index in  state1 57% 17% 100% 25% 41%
Tw o-firm  concentration index in  state1 83% 13% 100% 49% 52%
Four-firm  concentration index in  state1 97% 6% 100% 77% 70%
H irschm ann-H erfindahl index in  state1 4494 1823 10000 1830 2106
% sh ipm ents originating from  state destined  for that state2 60% 22% 100% 14%
% sh ipm ents origin, from  state destined for that and 92% 9% 100% 70%
bordering states2
V alue A d d ed  (volum e decom position) in  C onstruction Sector3 475 726 3,431 9 12,352
Land area (x 1000 square kilometres)4 315 370 1,571 6 8,515
P opulation  (m , m id  1999)4 6.1 7.3 35.8 0.3 163.9
P opulation  d ensity  ( / s q  km) 56.9 84.1 339.5 1.2 19.3
Per capita cem ent consum ption in  state (kg p.c.) 211 67 353 104 244
Per capita V alue A d d ed  in  Construction Sector3 61 26 108 16 75
0 Of the 57 plants, 7 were grinding-only operations (with clinker being shipped from a nearby plant with integrated facilities)
1 Based on shipments from producers located anywhere to buyers located in a given state
2 Applies only to states from which shipments originate (i.e. states where plants are located)
3 In rescaled constant monetary units
4 Source: Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IBGE)
Figure 2-7: Variation across 27 states of the Brazilian federation, Summary Sta­
tistics (time-varying figures refer to 1999)
I now provide a few comments on the 1994 economic stabilisation plan and on 
the role of imports in the cement industry, given their relevance to the present 
study.
T he Ju ly  1994 stabilisation plan The Real economic stabilisation plan, en­
acted in July 1994, successfully brought (very high) inflation under control. Be­
tween 1991 and June 1994, the first period covered in this study, inflation as mea­
sured by the change in the General Price Index averaged 26% per month (i.e. prices 
doubling every quarter). With the implementation of the stabilisation plan, infla­
tion fell to 22% per annum in the period July 1994 through December 1995, further 
falling to 10% per annum in the six years between 1996 and 2001.
One of the outcomes of the stabilisation plan was its large positive effect on the 
level of economic activity. The sharp slowdown in inflation, through the reduction
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in “inflationary tax” , represented a reduction in the transfers from the private sector 
to the government. In particular, the large mass of consumers among the lower- 
income groups who previously had no access to instruments of monetary protection, 
such as price-indexed savings accounts, saw a significant rise in real incomes. Given 
their high propensity to consume, this boosted the demand for consumer goods 
-  notably food, clothing and durables -  and the demand for housing. Coupled 
with commercial construction projects resulting from a more favourable investment 
climate, the demand for housing led to a significant increase in the activity of the 
construction sector of the Brazilian economy, and thus in the demand for cement.
The four years following stabilisation also saw the appreciation of the local 
currency, of direct relevance to the competitiveness of cement imports. This period 
of a strong local currency abruptly came to an end with the devaluation of January 
1999.
T he role of im ports in B razil Imported cement (including the intermediate 
product clinker) constitutes a small share of domestic consumption. As shown in 
Figure 2-8, in the period 1989 to 2003, this share has amounted to at most 2-3% of 
consumption across Brazil, though the trend appears to be rising since the trade 
liberalising reforms of the early 1990s (and despite a dip in 1999 and 2000 following 
the devaluation of the local currency -  see below). This low level stands in stark 
contrast to the penetration of imports in the US. Carlsson (2001) reports that 
“imports represent a substantial and increasing part of the market in the United 
States, ranging between 10 and 17 percent of domestic consumption since 1985” 
(p. 7). The share of imports in some coastal US markets is actually as high as 
30%38. The presence of imports in Brazil thus pales in comparison to the US, 
despite most of its markets being located along (or in proximity to) an extensive 
Atlantic coastline.
38 Despite the bulkiness of cement relative to its price, the development of specialised seaborne 
handling and transportation equipment from the 1970s enabled imports to make their presence 
felt in coastal markets. Dumez and Jeunemaitre (2000) provide a historical account of the rise 
of international trade in cement. On the other hand, in both the US and Brazil, exports account 
for less than 1% of domestic production (though in Brazil the current trend is upwards).
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Imports as a proportion of consumption
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Figure 2-8: (Official) Imports of cement and clinker as a proportion of domestic 
consumption. Source: SECEX, MDIC. Clinker quantities are adjusted by the 
author to reflect usage in the production of cement (assumes 80% of clinker imports 
used in production of slag cement, with a 40% clinker content).
As this study finds, however, the limited penetration of imports hides their 
welfare-enhancing role in restraining domestic prices, curbing the market power 
of domestic producers. The trade liberalising reforms of the early 1990s, coupled 
with the appreciation of the local currency in the four yeaxs following stabilisation 
in mid 1994, opened the door to the threat posed by the entry of imports. To 
provide a flavour, Figure 2-9 depicts the evolution of cement prices in the state of 
Rio Grande do Sul -  where one-firm and two-firm concentration ratios respectively 
amounted to 55% and 84% in 1999 -  both in current local currency (the real, R$) 
and in a currency of foreign trade, proxied by the US dollar. Domestic cement 
prices in local currency are highly correlated with the price of the US dollar in 
local currency (i.e. the exchange rate), to the extent that despite the occurrence of 
large variations in the exchange rate during the period, and thus in the domestic 
cement price in local currency, the domestic cement price converted into US dollars
96
is quite steady since 199539 40. In the cross-section of local markets, one would also 
expect cement prices to be increasing in the market’s distance from the coast. This 
is verified to be the case. It is important to add, however, that neither of these 
two observations -  regarding (i) the correlation of cement prices in local currency 
and the exchange rate, and (ii) that prices appear to be increasing in distance -  
are offered as proof of the claimed role of imports in restraining prices. While 
consistent with the claim, they are also consistent with alternative stories, such as 
factor prices being set in hard currency on the world market (fuel oil and diesel?), or 
with producers incurring higher transport costs to distribute cement in less densely 
populated areas. The estimation of a very low market price elasticity of demand in 
equilibrium, in Section 2.4.2, coupled with high price-cost margins and supported 
by interview evidence, will be the key element in support of my claim.
2.3.3 D ata available: Plant-to-market cem ent flows and the  
construction of marginal cost
A detailed account of the sources and treatment of the data is provided in Appendix 
B. Here I offer a short description and briefly discuss how I compute the marginal
39Until January 1999 Brazil had an exchange rate fixed by the government. The local currency 
(the real) was floated in January 1999 in the midst of the “Brazil currency crisis”, depreciating 
by 70% against the US dollar in one month, but later partially receding. Other periods of above- 
average exchange-rate instability took place in 2001 (commonly attributed to the Argentina crisis 
next door) and in the second half of 2 0 0 2 , with the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the 
presidential election late that year. The relatively flat evolution of domestic cement prices in 
US dollars is consistent with imports setting a price ceiling of between 6-7 US dollars per bag 
of cement (this would correspond to the US-doflar equivalent of cj, as defined in Section 2.2). 
The observation that it seems to take domestic producers between 6-12 months to raise domestic 
prices back to this ceiling in US dollars upon large unexpected devaluations in the local currency 
(i.e. in 1999, in 2001 and in 2002) suggests that raising domestic prices in local currency is not 
friction free (perhaps the industry is wary of attracting negative publicity).
40To provide an example, an equity analyst of an investment bank wrote that “(a)lthough 
imports accounted for only 1.6% of the Brazilian total consumption in 1995, reaching 451.3 
thousand tons, it represents a constant threat to domestic producers, pressing down domestic 
prices and imposing a price ceiling of US$ 70 per ton” (Zaghen 1997; pp. 24). The author 
refers to the price “at the coast” as the exporter’s FOB price plus international insurance and 
freight, excluding cost upon arrival in Brazil, such as inland freight, sales taxes and resellers’ 
markups. Further evidence suggesting concern by domestic producers as to the threat of imports 
is provided by their successful lobbying of government in passing antidumping measures -  namely 
a 23% import tariff -  against Venezuelan and Mexican cement producers in the late 1990s who 
were starting to make inroads into local markets particularly in the north and northeast of the 
country.
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Current cement prices (R$ per bag) — RS state
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Figure 2-9: Evolution of cement prices in RS  state since July 1994. In current 
local currency units (R$) per bag and US$ per bag
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cost of each plant in serving each local market.
On the demand side, I observe monthly cement consumption and consumer 
prices (i.e. prices set by retailers, also referred to as resellers) across the 27 states 
in the period 1991 to 2003. I take each state to represent a local market. As demand 
shifters, I observe alternative series of economic activity, either in the construction 
and building sector or aggregated across sectors of the economy, which I use as 
proxies for the exogenous demand for cement41.
The key ingredient on the supply side is the observed breakdown of shipments 
from each plant to each of the local markets (states), enabling me to map the 
flow of cement from the plant to the consumer. In addition to plant ownership, I 
observe plant characteristics -  e.g. capacity, number of kilns, type of fuel usage, 
proportion of shipments in bags as opposed to bulk42 -  and local factor prices, 
such as fuel oil, coal, electricity and wages. I do not observe freight prices paid 
by cement producers but I approximate these by using data on freight prices for 
agricultural goods collected over the period 1997 to 2003 for thousands of different 
routes across Brazil. The transportation of goods such as soyabean and maize are 
reportedly close substitutes in the supply of cement freight (Soares and Caixeta 
Filho 1996).
Considering that the technology of cement production is of the fixed coefficients 
type, I use engineering estimates, factor prices and plant characteristics to directly 
calculate the marginal cost of each plant in serving each market. As I argue in 
Appendix B, these marginal costs are indeed estimated upper bounds to the true 
marginal costs. (When I turn to the testing of conduct in Section 2.4.4, such a bias, 
however, reinforces the results.) In view of the fixed-coefficient technology and my 
understanding of the industry, I model plant marginal cost as flat in quantity up to
41 This follows from the fact that cement is an input to construction and yet accounts for a 
small share of construction budgets. Taking such construction activity to exogenously move the 
demand curve for cement is a typical assumption: see, for example, Syverson (2004) who uses 
construction sector employment as an exogenous measure of demand in ready-mixed concrete (an 
industry located downstream to cement).
42 Aggregating across all plants, between 1997 and 1999 81% of shipments were in bags. In terms 
of the means of transportation, 91% of shipments were by road. The breakdown of shipments 
among different buyer channels is also available, with resellers accounting for 76% and ready- 
mixed concrete firms accounting for 1 1 %, in this same period.
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capacity. Notice that I do not observe producer prices, only consumer prices. How­
ever, I back out producer prices assuming competition at the retail (reseller) level 
and taking into account the high proportional sales taxes. The assumption of com­
petition among resellers follows from several field interviews, including interviews 
with producers’ sales representatives and resellers. (I also check the robustness of 
this assumption by, for example, comparing observed producer prices that I was 
able to obtain from a subset of producers to the backed-out producer prices.) This 
study thus considers the entire supply chain from the producer of cement (and 
extractor of the raw material) to the retail consumer, encompassing the reseller: 
in addition to plant marginal cost, total plant-to-market marginal cost consists of 
plant-to-market freight, sales taxes and the reseller’s mark-up.
Figure 2-10 depicts cement prices (in units of local currency for the standard 50 
kg bag, at a constant December 1999 level43), cement consumption and exogenous 
demand (activity in the construction sector) from January 1991 through December 
2003 for the largest market, the state of Sao Paulo (<S'P). The month in which the 
stabilisation plan was implemented, July 1994, corresponds to observation (month) 
43 in the graphs (marked by dotted lines). Following the lifting of price controls 
in November 1991, prices approximately doubled in the first two years of the pre­
stabilisation period I cover, remaining in the high R$ 14 to R$ 16 /  bag range until 
1994. In the post-stabilisation period they gradually declined back to R$ 7 by 
late 1996, gradually rising thereafter. The sharp increase in consumption following 
stabilisation, from a level of 600 mt per month to 1000 mt per month within two 
years, pulled by a 20% jump in the level of construction activity, is evident from 
the graphs. Some factor prices are also portrayed. It is interesting to note that in 
the post-stabilisation phase the correlation between cement prices and the prices 
of fuel oil and diesel oil (the two major components of cost, used respectively in 
the kiln and in freight) is high44. This is expected in view of (i) my earlier claim
43This is done using an economy-wide General Price Index (GPI). Owing to the high levels of 
inflation prevailing in the first 42 months (out of 156) that I consider, particular attention has 
been paid to the conversion of current cement prices to constant prices -  see Appendix B. Factor 
prices are similarly converted. In contrast, Figure 2-9 presents current prices (albeit for another 
state).
44From July 1994, correlation coefficients (all highly significant) are as follows: 0.72 between 
cement prices and the (US dollar) exchange rate; 0.86 between cement prices and the price of fuel
1 0 0
(at this point) that imports set a price ceiling for cement and thus cement prices 
(in local currency) are highly correlated with the exchange rate, and (ii) oil is a 
global commodity and policy in the oil sector from the second half of the 1990s has 
prescribed domestic oil prices varying in line with the world price (and hence with 
the exchange rate). Though the picture varies across states, if only due to different 
changes in industry structure and demand conditions, the case for the state of Sao 
Paulo is broadly representative for Brazil as a whole, in addition to accounting for 
around one-third of the nation’s cement consumption.
A glance a t price-cost m argins and th e  robustness of constructed  m ar­
gined cost With respect to firm profitability, Figure 2-11 shows the evolution of 
average consumer prices, marginal cost and price-cost margins on the leading firm 
Votorantim’s actual sales across Brazil, in constant local currency units per bag. 
(Figure 5-2 in Appendix B breaks this figure down into figures for each of the 25 
states where Votorantim is present.) Prices and marginal cost have been increasing 
since late 1996, the latter owing chiefly to increases in the price of fuel oil and diesel 
(freight) and the fact that sales taxes are proportional to prices -  recall that cost 
relates to the entire supply chain, including freight, sales taxes and the reseller’s 
cost. The picture is similar across firms. In sum, the industry wields considerable 
market power, despite the threat of imports. Across producers, across states and 
over time, the price-cost margin as a proportion of the consumer price lies in the 
region of 25-45% (equivalent to 40-65% as a proportion of the producer price net 
of sales tax).
I conduct two robustness checks of the calculated marginal costs and the result­
ing price-cost margins (for further details, see Appendix B). The first check consists 
of comparing my measures of price-cost margins as a percentage of net producer 
sales (i.e. net of sales taxes) to reported EBITDA (earnings before income tax 
and depreciation allowance, also known as operating cash flow) as a percentage of 
net sales for the firm Cimpor, over the period 1998 to 2003. (This firm, which 
bought its way into Brazil in 1997, is listed on the Lisbon stock exchange, and
oil; 0.77 between the price of fuel oil and the exchange rate.
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Figure 2-10: Cement prices, consumption, exogenous demand and factor prices for 
the state of Sao Paulo. All prices are in constant December 1999 values. Monthly 
observations, observation 1 corresponding to January 1991. July 1994, the month 
in which the stabilisation plan was enacted, is marked by the dotted lines.
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Figure 2-11: Evolution of consumer prices, marginal costs and price-cost margins 
on Votorantim’s sales. Averaged across all states. In constant Reais per bag (at 
December 1999 values).
fortunately reports its financial results broken out by country of operation and line 
o f business. 1 T h e tim e series fit between const,rnct.ed and renorted fimires is
of Goods Sold does not include freight but it includes depreciation.)
A fined word on capacity  utilisation Throughout the time period, capacity 
considerably exceeds production, including the three years post stabilisation of 
steep consumption growth (1995 to 1997), although the slack is lower. Capacity 
utilisation hovers around an average 65%. The reader is referred to Appendix B 
for details (and a discussion of a strategic role for capacity is provided in 3.2).
2.4 Inferring demand and conduct in the Brazil­
ian cem ent industry
2.4.1 A  “road map”
Having laid out the theoretical framework and provided an outline of the industry 
and the data, this Section turns to the empirical application. Section 2.4.2 begins 
by estimating demand in each local market (state). The market price elasticities 
of demand are estimated to be very low, of the order of -0.5. Demand across 
local markets is consistently inelastic at the equilibrium, including local markets 
where the one-firm concentration ratio is as high as 80%. Recall that observed 
(constructed) price-cost margins are high in equilibrium. I argue that the reason 
why the industry, with its considerable pricing power, does not further raise prices 
(and further restrict output) is that the competitive fringe of imports sets a price 
ceiling which binds at the industry equilibrium. As such, while the market elasticity 
is low (-0.5), the price elasticity of the demand that the domestic industry faces 
is much higher: the equilibrium lies at the kink in the residual demand curve 
facing the domestic oligopoly (recall the right panel of Figure 2-1 in the theoretical 
framework developed earlier).
I have shown that when the threat of entry constrains prices, joint inference 
of conduct and cost from the estimation of a static pricing equation will not be 
consistent. The lack of price variation as demand moves exogenously will lead to
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the overestimation of competition; econometrically, the exogenous demand vari­
ables will be correlated with the error in the misspecified pricing equation. This 
is what Section 2.4.3 shows with regard to the industry at hand. I  assume costs 
are not known and proceed to estimating a market-level pricing equation, instru­
menting with exogenous demand. The conduct parameter is estimated to be close 
to zero and costs are estimated to be close to prices, wrongly suggesting that the 
outcomes in the Brazilian cement industry are competitive. The negative bias in 
the estimated price-cost margins is severe in light of the high price-cost margins I 
measure directly, as presented earlier in Section 2.3.3.
Having rejected competitive conduct based on the known price-cost margins, 
Section 2.4.4 delves deeper into the pattern of conduct in the industry, taking into 
account the constraint posed by imports on industry outcomes. I use the test of 
Proposition 2.3, which is based on direct measures of costs and the observed firm- 
level quantity data (i.e. the flow of cement from plants to local markets), to show 
that conduct is considerably more collusive than the Cournot benchmark. Market 
outcomes are characteristic of (tacit) market division, and this can be identified 
despite the threat of imports restraining prices.45
2.4.2 Dem and
There are L  (geographic) markets (identified with states of the Brazilian federa­
tion), indexed by I — 1,..., L. Scattered across these L markets are I  plants, indexed 
by i =  1,..., I.46 Let i — 0 index the aggregate fringe of foreign suppliers. The flow 
of cement for consumption can be summarised in a set of (I +1) x L matrices, one 
matrix for every time period t, where element qut denotes the quantity of cement 
shipped by plant i for consumption in market I in that time period. Let qu denote 
total shipments to market I in period t, i.e. consumption; then qu =  5Zi=o ftft* The
45 In Chapter 3 I show how such an arrangement may be sustained in equilibrium in a context 
where firms meet in different markets. Inspired by the Brazilian cement industry, I provide 
examples of simple dynamic games which give rise to such collusive behaviour in equilibrium.
46Not all plants are active (in the sense that cement is shipped from them) in each time period 
t; in a given time period, some plants may be yet to enter (or reenter), while others may have 
exited.
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demand function in each market I can then be written:
qit =  D(pu, Yit, ai, eft) (2.11)
where pit is the price of cement to the consumer, Yit are exogenous variables shifting 
demand (e.g. output in the construction and building sector), a/ are market-specific 
parameters to be estimated and eft is an econometric error term. (Demand function 
D(.) is the inverse of the inverse demand function p(.) considered in the theoretical 
framework, i.e. D(.) = p -1(.)•)
Estimation of (2.11) must deal with the (potential) endogeneity of prices. The 
choice of instruments will depend on whether imports restrain domestic prices at 
the industry equilibrium (i.e. whether the imports constraint binds, in which case 
prices are given by the marginal cost of imports Cj, as in Figure 2-5), which in turn 
depends on the behaviour of domestic firms47. There are therefore two situations 
to consider.
Identification 1: Im ports  restra in  dom estic prices a t th e  industry  equi­
librium  In practice, due to the presence of frictions, cement prices will not be 
exactly equal to cj. Prices and cj should be highly correlated however. As men­
tioned in Section 2.2 (recall the right panel of Figure 2-1), fluctuations in the 
marginal cost of imports allow one to trace out the demand curve (assuming Cj 
does not rise to the extent where imports no longer have bite). The marginal cost 
of imports is a function of factors such as the exchange rate, world fuel prices (used 
in the production of clinker abroad and in the international transport of cement), 
tariffs and port handling charges, and domestic freight to the consumer (the latter 
being highly correlated with the domestic price of diesel oil). Observed factors 
such as the exchange rate, world fuel prices and domestic diesel oil prices (all in 
local currency in constant terms) can then be used as instruments for prices in the
47Recall that in the case of full collusion and pM >  cj, as in the right panel of Figure 2-1, 
the equilibrium price is p =  cj. Likewise, in the case of Cournot, imports will have bite if the 
aggregate Cournot output in the absence of imports falls short of p- 1 (cj) -  see footnote 25 and 
the right panel of Figure 2-4.
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estimation of (2.11) (under the identifying assumption that these factors are not 
correlated with the unobserved market-specific demand shocks eft).
To the extent that the “frictions component” of cement prices -  i.e. the part 
of prices not determined by the marginal cost of imports c/ -  is orthogonal to the 
unobserved demand shocks across local markets, prices can be treated as predeter­
mined and (2.11) can be estimated by OLS48.
Identification 2: Im ports do not restrain dom estic prices at the industry  
equilibrium When imports do not restrain domestic prices, traditional cost- 
shifters may be used to instrument for cement prices. These include factor prices 
(i.e. prices of kiln fuel such as fuel oil and coal, electricity prices which determine 
the cost of grinding, the price of diesel oil which drives the cost of freight, and 
wages, the latter also impacting freight in addition to the cost of production) and 
other supply-shifters such as plant capacity, to the extent that changes to scale 
impact (flat) marginal cost49.
Dem and specification
I begin by specifying the market-level demand function (2.11) in loglinear form as:
log qtt =  a] +  ajYu +  of log plt +  afYlt log pit +  eft (2.12)
For each market there are 156 monthly observations, from January 1991 to De­
cember 2003. Given the quarterly seasonality of sales, three quarterly dummies -  
not shown in (2.12) -  are included. The inclusion of an interaction term between 
(log) price and the exogenous demand variable (construction and building activity),
48The model I have in mind when imports restrain domestic prices is as follows. Cement 
prices p  axe determined by the marginal cost of imports c/ and a frictions component i.e. 
p =  c/ +  £. As for cj, as the econometrician I observe some cost drivers V 1 but not others V 2, 
where cj =  V 1k +  V 2(f), and k and (p are parameters. Under the identifying assumption that 
E ( V 1ed) =  0, where ed captures the unobserved demand shocks in (2.11), V 1 (e.g. the exchange 
rate) can be used to instrument for prices in the estimation of (2.11). In addition, if E{C,e.d) =  0 
(and of course E ( V 2ed) =  0 as well), demand equation (2.11) can be estimated consistently by 
OLS.
49 Other instruments can be used as a robustness check, such as Hausmann-type instruments 
(prices of cement in other local markets) or lagged prices or first differences.
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Yu log  Pit, allows the demand curve in logs to rotate -  in addition to shift, through 
the level term Yu -  as exogenous demand varies.
By the earlier discussion, (2.12) is estimated, for each local market, by (I) OLS, 
(II) 2SLS using the exchange rate and other prices relevant to the marginal cost of 
imports (such as world oil prices and local diesel oil prices) as instruments (all in 
constant local currency), and (III) 2SLS using factor prices as instruments. These 
three sets of results are depicted in Figure 2-12 for the state of Sao Paulo (SP), 
denoted respectively as “OLS”, “IV imports bite” and “IV imports no bite”50. (I 
illustrate using results for the state of SP, as this is the largest market, account­
ing for 29% of national cement consumption in 1999; as shown below, however, 
results across states follows a common pattern.) Most estimated coefficients are 
significantly different from zero, many at the 1% level of significance. The inter­
action term is found to be negative and highly significant: the demand curve (in 
logs) rotates anticlockwise as exogenous demand expands51. Each fitted equation is 
evaluated at two different values for the exogenous demand variable: at the mean 
for the pre-stabilisation (high inflation) phase, YspjPre =  2883, from January 1991 
through June 1994 (42 observations), and at the mean for the post-stabilisation 
(low inflation) phase, YspiPOSt = 3338, from July 1994 through December 2003 
(114 observations). The (average) market price elasticity of demand during the 
pre-stabilisation phase amounts to (an inelastic) —0.17, rising to —0.33 during the 
post-stabilisation phase (see the respective coefficients on log price in column (II), 
respectively ct\p+ a\PYsp,pre and 6?Sp+ct\pYsptPost)- Thus, as prices in the economy 
stabilise and an average 16% exogenous increase in the demand for cement occurs, 
the price elasticity seems to double from around —0.2 to around —0.4. Clearly, a 
formal test that the price elasticity has increased is equivalent to verifying that the 
coefficient on the interaction term is significantly negative. This is so: the p-value 
for this (one-tailed) test is 1.5%. Importantly, to check the robustness of the low 
elasticity I repeat regressions (II) and (III) using only the 114 observations from
50Standard errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust (1-lag Newey-West errors). 
Estimates for the three quarterly dummies are not shown, but axe usually significantly negative in 
the first quarter, significantly negative or insignificant in the second quarter, and insignificantly 
negative, insignificant or significantly positive in the third quarter.
51Estimation of specification (2.11) excluding the interaction term renders a significantly posi­
tive coefficient on the level of exogenous demand, as expected (results are not shown).
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the post-stabilisation subsample (July 1994 on). This confirms a low elasticity of 
—0.4 (results are not shown). Figure 2-13 plots the fitted demand curve for the pre- 
and post-stabilisation phases (i.e. evaluated at the respective means Ysp,pre and 
Ysp,post) , indicating that as stabilisation took place and exogenous demand grew, 
the demand curve shifted out and rotated anticlockwise. In addition to the state 
of Sao Paulo (SP), similar plots are drawn for the three next largest markets, the 
states of Minas Gerais (MG), Rio de Janeiro (R J ) and Bahia (BA). These suggest 
that this pattern may be typical across states, as I argue after considering some 
specification tests.
Specification tes ts  I test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial cor­
relation using diagnostic tests such as Pagan and Hall (1983). While under OLS I 
can clearly reject homoskedasticity, I can no longer reject homoskedasticity under 
2SLS. In any case, I choose to allow for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
by calculating heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (1-lag 
Newey-West errors). As for the choice of instruments, I verify the overidentifying 
restrictions in specifications (II) and (III) using different tests such as those based 
on Hansen’s J statistic or variations of the Sargan statistic (see Wooldridge 2002, 
or Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003). In both specifications (II) and (III), I can 
reject the null that the set of instruments is orthogonal to the error term, casting 
doubt on the validity of the set of instruments, despite the finite sample properties 
of such statistics suggesting that the test results should be interpreted with caution. 
(Further, from the structural model one would not expect that market-specific de­
mand shocks be correlated with the instruments, such as the exchange rate and the 
price of diesel oil.) To check the extent to which overidentification may be driving 
efficiency in the estimation at the expense of consistency, I reestimate specifications 
(II) and (III) in each case using only a subset of the initial set of instruments such 
that the validity of instruments can no longer be rejected. This is shown in Figure 
2-12 as regressions (II B) and (III B) respectively. Comparing estimates for (II B) 
against those for (II), for example, the estimated elasticities are similar. I also test 
for the endogeneity of prices (and the interaction term) using endogeneity tests 
a la Durbin-Wu-Hausman (Wooldridge 2002). Under specifications (II) and (III),
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(I)
OLS
(n)
IV
imports bite
(III)
IV
imports no bite
(IIB)
TV subset 
imports bite
(MB)
IV subset 
imports no bite
No. obs. 
R2
156
0.840
156 156 156 156
Intercept coef
s.e.
2.241 * 
(1 .2 0 2 )
2.828
(1 .2 1 0 )
2.439 * 
(1.236)
0 .2 1 2
(1.357)
0.729
(1.333)
Exog. demand coef
s.e.
0.00159 *** 
(0.00038)
0.00141
(0.00039)
*** 0.00152 *** 
(0.00039)
0.00225
(0.00043)
*** 0.00203 *** 
(0.00042)
Log Price coef
s.e.
1.093 ** 
(0.498)
0.852
(0.504)
1.003 * 
(0.514)
1.954
(0.564)
*** 1.702 *** 
(0.554)
Interaction coef
s.e.
-0.000428 *** 
(0.000160)
-0.000355
(0.000163)
-0.000396 ** 
(0.000166)
-0.000709
(0.000181)
*** -0.000607 *** 
(0.000176)
Quarterly dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Evaluating at the 
2,883
mean of exogenous demand pre-stabilisation:
Intercept coef
s.e.
6.825 *** 
(0.143)
6.898
(0.144)
*** 6.815 *** 
(0.145)
6.699
(0.155)
*** 6.594 *** 
(0.167)
Log Price coef
s.e.
-0.142 ** 
(0.055)
-0.171
(0.056)
*** -0.138 ** 
(0.056)
-0.091
(0.060)
-0.048
(0.065)
Evaluating at the mean of exogenous demand post-stabilisation; 
3,338 16% growth versus pre-stabilisation phase
Intercept coef 7.549 *** 7.541 *** 7.507*** 7.724 *** 7.521 ***
s.e. (0.129) (0.136) (0.135) (0.142) (0.141)
Log Price coef -0.337 *** -0.333 *** -0.318 *** -0.414 *** -0.325 ***
s.e. (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062)
Test of overidentifying restrictions Fail Fail Pass Pass
Note: H eteroskedasticity  and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (N ew ey-W est 1 lag)
*** S ig n ifica n tly  d ifferent from  zero) at the 1% level; ** S ignificant at the 5% level; * S ign ificant at the 10% level 
D ep en d en t variable is  L og C onsum ption
Q uarterly d u m m y variables for quarters 1 ,2  and  3 are in clu d ed  b ut estim ates are n o t sh o w n
Figure 2-12: Demand estimates for the state of SP
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Figure 2-13: Fitted demand curves for the four largest markets. (Log) Price 
against (Log) Consumption. Evaluated at the respective means of exogenous de­
m and Y  fnr thp nrp- and nnst.-stahilisa+i'™  nViacoc
u_ii uouug, milieu oci ui nioui Luiiciito opcv.m^ cxunjii, i caimoo reject cue n
he hypothesis that prices are orthogonal to the error, lending some credibility to t
iii- OLS estimates, as explained earlier. However, repeating these tests under spec
he cations (II B) and (III B), using only a subset of the instruments, I can reject t
of null of orthogonality in some instances, but not all. Finally, given the efficiency
eir GMM under heteroskedasticity, I reestimate specifications (II) and (III) (and th
ng counterparts which use a subset of the initial number of moment conditions) usi
GMM. Results -  not shown -  are similar.
on Results by sta te  Figure 2-14 summarises results across states, from regressi
he (II) using the full sample (pre- and post-stabilisation phases). At first glance, t
IP. picture is mixed when compared to the results just described for the state of <
at The estimated price elasticity for 3 out of the 27 states is positive (evaluating
significantly so, suggesting that for these states the demand curve slopes upward! 
The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is positive for 9 out of the 27 
states (4 of which significantly so), suggesting that as exogenous demand expands 
in the post-stabilisation phase -  and indeed it does expand in every one of the 27 
states -  the demand curve for these states rotates clockwise. The estimates for these 
states stand in contrast to the results obtained for the state of SP, which I claimed 
represented a typical pattern across states. Upon closer inspection, however, one 
notices that these “outlier” states are mostly located to the northwest of the centre 
of the country, an area which is sparsely populated and largely covered in jungle. 
Together they account for 60% of Brazil’s land area but only 13% of its population 
and only 11% of its cement consumption in 1999 (see Figure 2-6). It is thus 
reasonable to believe that the measurement error associated with data collected 
for these states is large52. I thus choose to drop these 10 states from the analysis, 
segregating their estimates at the bottom of Figure 2-14.
For the remaining 17 states, the pattern is similar and consistent with the results 
reported for the state of SP. Evaluating exogenous demand at its mean annual value 
in the post-stabilisation phase, the price elasticity of demand is negative for all 17 
states, and significant at the 1% level in 15 states. Price elasticities in the post­
stabilisation phase vary from a minimum (in absolute) of —0.14 to a maximum 
of —0.72, with a mean of —0.41 and a standard deviation of 0.1453. It is worth
52Indeed the leading global market research and data collection firm, ACNielsen, well-known 
to marketing professionals in consumer goods industries, and with over 30 years of experience in 
Brazil, does not audit any of these “outlier” states, to the northwest of the centre, except for the 
Federal District (DF) and the state of Goids (GO).  I also choose to drop DF  because it consists 
essentially of a city, the federal capital Brasilia, with a large population of 2m and two cement 
plants, embedded at the corner of the state of GO, near to the borders of the states of MG and 
BA, over which product must flow which I do not observe. For this reason the measurement 
error associated with consumption figures for DF  may be large. I also drop GO on the basis of 
probable measurement error: in addition to its low population density, until 1988 the states of 
GO and TO comprised one single state, previously known as Goi&s, when in 1988 the northern 
half of the state broke away to form the state of Tocantins (TO).
53 Other studies of cement have found low market price elasticities in equilibrium. For example, 
Roller and Steen (2002) find an average —0.46 for Norway (treating it as a single market) using 
yearly observations between 1955 and 1968. Also using yearly observations, over 25 years up to 
1989, Jans and Rosenbaum (1996) report an average fitted elasticity of —0.81 across 25 regional US 
markets. It is conceivable that in these markets imports have also been restraining the prices set 
by the domestic oligopolies. The explanation commonly advanced behind such inelastic demand 
is that cement accounts for a low share of construction budgets and it has few substitutes (except 
in highway construction, where asphalt is a substitute). Yet while helping to explain the steepness 
of the inverse demand curve, this does not explain the steepness at the equilibrium. One must still
1 1 2
(n)
rV-imports bite
Cement  Log Price: Y  evaluated at______________
consumption_______ Interaction_______  m ean pre-stabilisation mean post-stabilisation
State in 1999 (kt) coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
20 SP 11,723 -0.000355 (0.000163) ** -0.171 (0.056) *** -0.333 (0.060) w
17 MG 5,090 -0.001067 (0.000235) -0.147 (0.063) ** -0.549 (0.059)
19 RJ 3,809 -0.002660 (0.000575) *** -0.137 (0.059) *» -0.481 (0.057) *•*
16 BA 2,461 -0.003048 (0.000815) *** -0.027 (0.065) -0.361 (0.079)
21 PR 2,321 -0.001015 (0.000647) -0.137 (0.087) -0.278 (0.088) ***
23 RS 2,221 -0.001057 (0.000762) -0.228 (0.037) -0.379 (0.097) ***
22 SC 1,648 -0.003488 (0.002647) 0.020 (0.091) -0.180 (0.095) *
13 PE 1,225 -0.003389 (0.001675) " -0.285 (0.093) *•* -0.469 (0.061) ***
10 CE 1,139 -0.005347 (0.001662) -0.142 (0.125) -0.562 (0.113) ***
18 ES 837 -0.003029 (0.002317) -0.370 (0.078) *** -0.480 (0.068) *•*
8 M A 765 -0.020114 (0.007056) *** -0.097 (0.187) -0.564 (0.126)
12 PB 565 -0.036712 (0.007397) ~* -0.123 (0.081) -0.715 (0.111) ***
11 R N 531 -0.005411 (0.004692) -0.145 (0.146) -0.300 (0.078) *•*
25 M S 454 0.000899 (0.004419) -0.431 (0.047) *•* -0.415 (0.071)
14 A L 384 0.080309 (0.030990) ** -0.475 (0.127) *** -0.351 (0.112) ~*
9 PI 379 0.015324 (0.012214) -0.657 (0.272) ** -0.330 (0.103) ***
15 SE 282 0.003937 (0.020794) -0.145 (0.136) -0.136 (0.099)
Memo: States to the northwest of the centre o f the country, m ostly sparsely populated
26 GO 1,152 0.002590 (0.002127) -0.163 (0.053) ~* -0.040 (0.079)
5 P A 802 0.000622 (0.004211) -0.369 (0.144) ~ -0.318 (0.246)
27  D P 694 -0.038925 (0.015687) ** 0.014 (0.074) -0.153 (0.078) *
24 MT 540 0.012129 (0.004524) -0.300 (0.100) *•* 0.210 (0.121) *
3 A M 327 -0.023351 (0.007191) *** 0.107 (0.101) -0.611 (0.166)
7  T O 282 0.000000 (0.000000) -1.052 (0.218) *** -1.052 (0.218)
1 R O 217 -0.028803 (0.020138) -0.152 (0.440) -1.194 (0.344)
6 A P 78 0.357032 (0.192129) * 0.126 (0315) 0.744 (0.215) —
4 RR 66 1.217022 (0.340927) *•* -1.366 (0.307) ~* 0.190 (0.305)
2 A C 55 -0.222964 (0.109062) ~ -1.406 (0.437) *** -2.673 (0.352) ***
N o te: H etero sk ed a st ic ity  a n d  a u to co rre la tio n -ro b u st s ta n d a rd  errors (N e w e y -W e st  1 la g )
*"* S ig n if ic a n t ly  d ifferen t fro m  z e ro )  a t  th e 1% lev e l;  ** S ig n ifica n t a t  th e 5%  le v e l;  * S ig n ifica n t a t  th e  10%  le v e l
Figure 2-14: Demand estimates by state, Summary
pointing out that elasticities are low even in states where the supply of cement is 
highly concentrated, such as the state of Santa Catarina (SC), where the one-firm 
concentration ratio is 78% (in 1999). Evaluating exogenous demand at its mean 
value in the pre-stabilisation phase, price elasticities are negative in 16 out of 17 
states, 9 of which are significant at the 10% level or higher. In the pre-stabilisation
explain why an industry, facing such inelastic demand at the market price, does not cut output 
in an attempt to raise prices and thus move up along the demand curve to a point where demand 
is more elastic. To rationalise why the industry seeing such inelastic demand does not restrict 
output, one would expect either weak pricing power (e.g. competition or low concentration, such 
that the elasticity facing individual producers is higher than the aggregate elasticity) or some 
dynamic story, such as the threat of entry restraining prices.
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phase the mean price elasticity is lower: — 0.22.54
Sum m ary of dem and and robustness checks (see C hap te r 3) Regardless 
of the type of price instruments employed (or using prices themselves, under OLS), 
which depends on whether one accepts that imports restrain domestic prices at the 
industry equilibrium, I estimate very low market price elasticities of demand, of 
the order of -0.5. In Section 3.4 I consider further robustness checks. The overall 
conclusion arising from these checks is that this section’s finding -  that demand is 
inelastic (of the order of -0.5) at the equilibrium in each local market -  is robust.
2.4.3 E stim ation of a static pricing equation: inconsistent 
cost and conduct estim ates
I now ignore the constraint posed by imports on the prices set by the domestic 
oligopoly. Based on the estimates of demand of Section 2.4.2, and assuming costs 
are not known, I proceed to estimating a pricing equation such as (2.3), as is stan­
dard in the empirical literature on market power55. I then compare the estimates 
for cost and conduct, summarised in the estimated elasticity-adjusted price-cost 
mark-ups (2.2), to the observed (constructed) values. I show that the estimation 
exercise considerably overestimates the degree of competition and the marginal 
cost, incorrectly suggesting that price-cost margins in the Brazilian cement indus­
try are centred around zero.
I begin by specifying the (standard) structural econometric model. Recall the 
market-level demand function (2.11) defined at the beginning of Section 2.4.2 and
54 Given that exogenous demand -  activity in the construction and building sector -  rises on 
average in every state concurrent with stabilisation, this finding that the price elasticity of demand 
also increases is equivalent to estimating a negative coefficient for the interaction term. Indeed 
the fitted interaction coefficient is negative in 13 out of the 17 states, in 8  of which at the 5% level 
of significance. See footnote 33 of Chapter 3 for one possible explanation behind the increase in 
elasticity upon stabilisation.
55 Since I ignore that the true model is (2.4) and that the estimated model is thus (2.5) with 
E(Y'£s) <  0, here I refer to the pricing equation error as e3 and not £5, as a researcher overlook­
ing the price-constraining effect of imports would do, thinking that he is specifying (2 .3 ) with 
E{Y'£3) =  0.
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write its inverse (D 1(.) =  p(.)) as
P i t = p ( q i t , Y lt, a i , e f t )
Define plant z’s costs as
Cit ~  C'i.Qiti Zn, P, Sft)
where qu := J2 f=i qut denotes plant z’s shipments aggregated across markets I 
(equal to production), Wu are the prices it pays for its factors, and Zu are other 
exogenous variables that shift supply. Note that costs by plant will not only depend 
on the plant’s total shipments qu but also on the destination of these shipments 
flit '= (qut, qi2t, —, qut), owing to market-specific factors such as freight, p  is a 
vector of common parameters to be estimated and eft is a plant-specific error. The 
I  plants are owned by F  firms, indexed by /  =  1,..., F. Define O ft as the set of 
plants owned by firm /  in month t. In period t firm /  solves
max >
qut\i€Oft,Vl p(qiu  •) [ qilti£Oft iZOft
In words, firm /  sets shipments from each plant it owns to each market to m axim ise 
its profits, which correspond to the difference between the sum of revenues across 
markets and the sum of costs across plants. Denote the derivatives of the (inverse) 
demand and cost functions with respect to qu and qut respectively as pi(.) and c(.). 
Following Bresnahan (1989), the first-order condition for multi-plant firm /  with 
regard to shipments from its plant i G Oft to market I, i.e. qut, yields a pricing 
equation for each plant i - market I pair:
Pit +  Pi(qit, Yu, otu 4)qitQfit < c{qiu qa, Wiu Zit, P, 4 )
The pricing equation can be written as an equality when qut > 0 (i.e. an interior 
solution). Recall from the earlier discussion of Section 2.2.2 that this specification 
encompasses alternative models of conduct. At the two extremes, 9fit = 1 captures 
full collusion while Qfit =  0 reflects price-taking behaviour (competition); a Qfu
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9*equal to firm / ’s market share, i.e. Ojn — s/u := —'e^ t corresponds to firm /  
behaving as a Cournot player. For qut > 0 and specifying an additive econometric 
pricing error, one may implement this pricing equation as
Pit — —Qfit~— H c(qu, q i^, Wu, Zu, (3) +  e\it (2.13)
Pit
(recall 7 7 is the market price elasticity of demand).
In what follows, I present estimation results corresponding to a market-level 
counterpart to the plant-level pricing equation (2.13). As mentioned in footnote 
13, the market-level equation should be viewed as an average across plants’ pricing 
equations56. In view of the fixed-coefficient technology of production, I specify 
average market marginal cost c as being linear in average market factor prices Wu 
(namely fuel oil, coal, electricity, labour and freight57) and flat in quantity (though 
in other specifications I have also allowed average market marginal cost to vary 
in quantity). I allow cost to shift according to the average size and age of the 
plants shipping into the market (weighted by shipments), Zu (e.g. marginal cost 
in a market served by high-capacity plants should be lower). (Finally, a dummy is 
included to account for price controls in the first ten months of 1991: this supply- 
shifter may be viewed as an additional element of Zit.) The market-level pricing 
equation is thus
Pit — —Qv~rL +  Wu/31 +  Zlt(32 +  1/1 +  eslt (2-14)
Pit
where 1/1 is a market-specific fixed effect and the market-specific conduct parameter 
61 is time-invariant (other specifications I have fitted allow 9i to vary over time,
56 Owing to the lack of firm-level data, most empirical 10 studies have no choice but to estimate 
a market-level equation. Though I have the luxury of observing plant-level data, I here choose to 
follow suit to simplify the exposition. Importantly, I have estimated a plant-level pricing equation 
and have ensured robustness of the conclusions I derive from what follows.
57The average factor price, say that of electricity, for a given market is calculated as the 
average price of that factor paid by the plants sourcing that market (weighted by the sourcing 
plants’ shipments to that market). The price effect of substitute kiln fuels (fuel oil and coal) are 
interactions of the average price of the fuel and the average use of that fuel in the production of 
cement shipped to the market (i.e. given the location of coal mines in the South of the country, 
coal prices have a larger effect on the cost of cement plants located in the South). A market’s 
average plant-to-market freight, price is modelled as the interaction of the average distance to 
market across the plants sourcing that market (again weighted by shipments) and a transport 
price index (based heavily on the price of diesel oil).
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such as upon stabilisation). Equation (2.14) is fitted using fixed-effects instrumen­
tal variables panel data estimation, where the endogenous regressor ^  is instru­
mented using excluded exogenous demand variables Yu, and thus the orthogonality 
condition E(Y'es) =  0 is imposed. Since the elasticity f]lt is an estimate based on the 
demand estimates from Section 2.4.2,1 compute bootstrapped (heteroskedasticity- 
robust) standard errors (with 1 0 0 0  repetitions, reestimating demand in the first 
stage for each bootstrap sample) for the fitted coefficients 9i and (and Vi). No­
tice that though knowledge of the nature of technology is used when specifying 
marginal cost to be linear in factor prices, marginal cost is assumed to be unknown: 
this is estimated from the observed supply-shifters {Wit, Zu) and the estimates of 
the fixed coefficients (/3, v) as Witp l +  Zitfi2 +  f>/.
Figure 2-15 reports estimation results. The comments that follow refer to esti­
mation (I), based on the entire period, though estimates based only on observations 
from the post-stabilisation period (i.e. from July 1994) are provided to demonstrate 
robustness of the conclusion that follows. The coefficients on the prices of fuel oil, 
coal, electricity and freight are all positive and significant. The coefficient on the 
average size (age) of plants is negative (positive), as expected, though not signifi­
cant. On the other hand, contrary to intuition, the price of labour is significantly 
negative58. The price-cost margins are estimated to be very low; these are pictured 
in Figure 2-16, along with 95% confidence intervals, for the state of Rio de Janeiro 
(RJ), for example. The dual to these cost estimates are the low estimated conduct 
parameters 9i, not significantly different from 0, suggesting competition59. For the 
state of RJ, a 9 of 0.0079 would correspond to the equilibrium price-cost margins 
of a static symmetric 130-firm Cournot industry (1/0.0079). Dividing 9r j  by the 
(negative of the) estimated elasticity f)RJ of —0.48 from Figure 2-14, the estimated
58 Interestingly, this counter-intuitive estimate is also obtained by Jans and Rosenbaum (1996), 
who estimate a market-level structural model of the US cement industry (it must be pointed 
out that, despite their penetration into US markets, a price-constraining role for imports is not 
considered in Jans and Rosenbaum’s model). In attempting to explain the negative coefficient on 
wages, the authors cite Clark (1980), who suggests that plants that pay higher wages may do so 
because their labour force is more productive (and possibly more unionised, as Clark finds the 
more productive US cement plants to be).
59It is worth mentioning that the estimated confidence intervals for 6i vary considerably accord­
ing to the specification (such as the functional form for demand), though low (absolute) values 
do seem to be a robust result.
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(average) price-cost margin as a proportion of price is only 0.0079/0.48 «  1.6% 
(recall expression (2.2)).
(I) IV (II) IV
Full sample Post-stabilisation subsample
coef_______ bootstrap s.e._______ coef_______ bootstrap s.e.
No. obs. 2652 1938
Market-specific conduct parameters 
20 SP 0.0167 
17 M G  0.0194 
19 RJ 0.0079 
16 BA 0.0004 
(Parameters for 13 other markets not shown)
(0.0194)
(0.0127)
(0.0206)
(0.0100)
0.0021 
-0.0049 
-0.0112 
-0.0268 *
(0.0152)
(0.0163)
(0.0120)
(0.0142)
Factor prices
Fuel oil (interacted with fuel use) 
Coal (interacted with fuel use) 
Electricity 
Labour
Freight (distance interacted with 
price of diesel oil)
18.1368 *** 
0.0906 *** 
0.0343 *** 
-7.7850 *** 
0.0065 **
(2.7773) 
(0.0343) 
• (0.0125) 
(1.2287) 
(0.0028)
20.1344 *** 
0.0447 
0.0494 *** 
-3.9898 *** 
0.0066 **
(2.7119)
(0.0430)
(0.0169)
(1.1363)
(0.0026)
Other supplv-shifters 
Size of sourcing plants 
Age of sourcing plants 
Price controls (Jan 91 to Oct 91)
-9.38E-08 
0.0191 
-4.4828 ***
(5.84E-07)
(0.0316)
(0.8479)
4.56E-08
0.0188
(6.64E-07)
(0.0321)
Intercept (SP) 12.1986*** (2.6814) 
(Other market-specific fixed effects included but not shown)
6.9360 ** (2.8436)
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors w ith bootstrapping to account for dem and estimation  
in the first stage. 1000 repetitions, clustered by month (e.g. in (I) a bootstrap sam ple consists of 
156 m onth draws, and for every month in the bootstrap sam ple there are 17 markets).
Demand estimates from the first stage of (II) also based on post-stabilisation subsample.
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
Dependent variable is the price of cement in units o f local currency per bag (at D ec 1999 prices)
Figure 2-15: Estimation of a static pricing equation, assuming cost is not known. 
Instrumented with exogenous demand variables.
It is clear from our knowledge of marginal cost and price-cost margins in the 
industry that these estimates are inconsistent. Figure 2-16 also depicts the (much 
higher) direct measures of (average) price-cost margins on sales to the state of RJ. 
What lies behind the market price elasticities of demand of the order of only -0.5 
in equilibrium, is not the prevalence of competition, as suggested by 6, but the con­
straining effect of imports on prices at the industry equilibrium. Econometrically, 
as argued in Section 2.2.2, this constrained equilibrium translates into the corre-
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Price-cost margins on sales to RJ market (R$ per bag): 
Fitted against Constructed
6
Actual
4
2
95%
C.L
0
-2
Estimated
-4
J u l-9 4  Ju l-9 5  J u l-9 6  J u l-9 7  Ju l-9 8  J u l-9 9  J u l-0 0  J u l-01  J u l-0 2  J u l-0 3
Figure 2-16: Estimated (average) price-cost margin on sales to R J  market, as 
estimated by the static pricing equation, against Actual (constructed) price-cost 
margin. In constant R$ per bag (December 1999 terms).
lation between the exogenous demand variables being used to instrument pricing 
equation (2.14) and its residual. The identifying assumption’s failure to hold re­
sults in the overestimation of the degree of competition. (Indeed, the p-values of 
overidentification tests a la Sargan and Hansen -  where the null is that the set 
of instruments is valid -  is 0.0000 for any overidentifying set.) The finding that 
the coefficients on factor prices and other supply-shifters are of the expected sign 
(bar wages) and mostly significant may lead one to misjudge that the econometric 
model is appropriately specified. But the estimated coefficients are only picking 
up the expected correlation between cement prices and factor prices. They are not 
consistent estimates of the structural cost parameters (3. The general point is that 
because the threat of entry is not observed, it is only natural that a researcher over­
look its role in restraining prices, inadvertently taking the lack of price variation 
to exogenous movements in demand as evidence in the direction of price-taking 
behaviour and zero price-cost margins60.
60 A comment on this particular industry where conditions (i.e. the steepness of the market 
demand curve and the marginal cost of imports) are such that demand is so inelastic at the 
equilibrium. Assume one does not realise that the imports constraint binds at the equilibrium and 
thus considers the class of behavioural models nested in the static pricing equation p +  9/  ^  — Cf 
(i.e. the theoretical counterpart to the firm-level pricing equation (2.13), suppressing the error 
and writing it in the form marginal revenue =  marginal cost). It is clear that a 77 of -0.5 is not 
consistent with cartel behaviour (9 =  1). Profit maximisation would lead the cartel to cut output 
until the cartel’s marginal revenue were equal (and thus positive) to marginal cost. Nor will such
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2.4.4 Inferring conduct in a constrained equilibrium
So far I have argued that what lies behind the very low market price elasticities of 
demand in equilibrium is the threat of imports restraining prices. As laid out in the 
theoretical framework of Section 2.2, the competitive supply of high-cost imports 
sets an upper limit to prices. That market demand is inelastic in equilibrium owes 
to demand, costs and firm conduct (i.e. the structural parameters of the data 
generating process) being such that this upper limit to prices binds. The evidence 
in support of this claim can be summarised as follows:
1. Demand is estimated to be inelastic in all 17 local markets. This is so ir­
respective of the number and concentration of sellers, ranging from states 
where the one-firm concentration (Ci) is around 25% to states where C\ is 
as high as 80%.
2. In attempting to unravel the low equilibrium elasticities, one must consider 
price-taking behaviour on the part of cement producers as an alternative ex­
planation to the binding presence of imports. By this alternative explanation 
-  plausible a priori -  an industry facing such inelastic demand would not be 
able to cut output to raise prices because competition among producers drives 
prices down toward marginal cost. However, I reject competition on the ba­
sis of the large observed price-cost margins. Producers enjoy considerable 
market power.
This dynamic story where the threat of entry restrains prices is further sup­
ported by a wealth of anecdotal and interview-based evidence. It is also consistent,
a low value of rj be consistent with a Cournot industry, unless all firms have small market shares. 
To see this, notice that if the largest firm has a market share of 50%, then m ax /{0 /}  =  0.5 and 
thus this firm’s marginal revenue, to be equated to its marginal cost, is zero. Small market shares 
across local markets are clearly not the case in the Brazilian cement industry. Any statistical 
model selection exercise a la Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1990, 1992) will thus result in, say, 
both the cartel model and the Cournot model being rejected in favour of price-taking behaviour 
by firms (9 =  0). Though misguided in the present case, the high correlation between factor 
prices and cement prices ensure that the OLS regression of cement prices on factor prices (and 
other supply-shifters, along with a set of market dummies) -  i.e. under the hypothesis of price- 
taking behaviour -  displays good fit: R2 =  54%. Again, by misspecifying the set of alternative 
models generating outcomes in the industry, a researcher would mistakenly conclude in favour of 
price-taking behaviour, not realising that his estimates are simply picking up correlation between 
cement prices and factor prices.
1 2 0
as argued in Section 2.3.2, with the high correlation observed between cement prices 
and the exchange rate, the latter having varied considerably over the time period.
I have also shown -  and illustrated empirically -  that in such a setting the 
identification of a standard pricing equation from the comparative statics of demand 
fails. I now turn to the test of conduct spelled out in Proposition 2.3 to cast 
fight on the pattern of behaviour in the Brazilian cement industry. Admittedly, 
this test provides only a sufficient statistic to reject Cournot conduct in favour of 
more collusive behaviour and the data requirements are large: one must observe 
both marginal cost and firm-level quantity data. But the value of the test resides 
in uncovering firm-level behaviour when market outcomes are constrained by the 
threat of entry. I show that the data rejects Cournot as a benchmark for conduct 
in the cement industry, in favour of market division. (In the following chapter 
I illustrate the rationality of such a strategy in an industry where firms meet in 
different markets.)
R ejecting C ournot behaviour in favour of collusion
Prior to stating the results of the test of Proposition 2.3 as it applies to the Brazilian 
cement industry, I provide a flavour of why the data leads to the rejection of 
Cournot behaviour by considering a specific example extracted from the data. This 
serves only as an example of a broader trend in the data. As shown subsequently, 
there are many instances in the data where firms undersupply local markets as 
compared to the supply decisions of a Cournot firm61. In other words, there are 
many instances where the marginal revenue of a firm in a given market were it 
adopting the Cournot conjecture -  taking its rivals’ output as given -  significantly 
exceeds the marginal cost in supplying that market.
A  case in  point Consider the two adjacent states of Alagoas (AL) and Sergipe 
(aSE), located in the northeast of Brazil (see Figure 2-6). These states are equally 
small both in terms of market size and geography. Up until 1996 each also had
61 As in the empirical literature on conduct, the Cournot assumption serves as a benchmark 
(e.g. Parker and Roller 1997).
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only one plant located within its borders: the firm Brennand operated the plant 
located in AL (respectively firm 1 and market A) and its rival Votorantim operated 
the plant located in SE  (respectively firm 2 and market B)62. Consider the year 
1996. While firm 1 commands an 83% share in market A, it does not supply to 
neighbouring market B, right next door to its plant located in market A. Equally 
striking, firm 2 commands an 89% share in market B, while attaining only a 7% 
share in the neighbouring market A, next door to its plant in market B. Thus while 
in market A firm 2’s share pales in comparison to firm l ’s share, in the neighbouring 
market B firm 2 dwarfs firm 1 (firm 1 in actual fact does not supply to market B!) 
Average consumer prices in markets A and B are almost identical, respectively RS 
9.47 (per bag) and R$ 9.46. As explained previously, I calculate firm l ’s marginal 
cost (including sales taxes and the reseller’s mark-up) in supplying markets A and 
B to be respectively R$ 5.20 and RS 5.47. As for firm 2, I calculate its cost in 
supplying markets A and B to be respectively RS 5.30 and RS 5.17.63 This is 
illustrated in the following picture and table, where I take the price elasticity of 
demand in equilibrium for both markets to be —0.5:64
Market A Market B
V /
\
Firm 1 Firm 2
E.g. M arket A: A L M arket B: SE
F irm  1: B rennand  F irm  2: V oto ra n tim
62In late 1996 a third firm, GJS, set up a plant close to Votorantim’s plant in SE. However, I 
abstract away from this in this illustration, by considering the year 1996.
63Note that the state-capital cities of AL (market A) and SE (market B) are located less than 
300 km apart. Nevertheless, the difference in Votorantim’s (say) cost of supplying AL and SE 
seems low: only R$ 0.13. The reason is that Brazil has an awkward sales tax system which may 
work against within-state shipments, as happens here, i.e. shipments from Votorantim’s plant in 
SE to resellers in SE are penalised compared to its shipments across the state border to resellers 
in AL. This mitigates the difference in average freight costs from Votorantim’s plant in SE: R$ 
0.32 to resellers in SE and R$ 0.77 to resellers in AL.
64The subsequent test takes the estimation of 77 in Section 2.4.2 into account. Also for simplicity, 
in this illustration I compute an average ip for the year (for each firm-market combination).
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(Year 1996) Price, p Share, ^ MR Cournot, p-\-2^-r V Q MC, c Can reject Cournot?
Local market I =  A {AL)
Firm /  =  1 (Bren) 9.47 0.83 9 .4 7 - |f  0.83 =  -6.25 5.20 No (v>L4 < 0)
Firm /  =  2 (Voto) 9.47 0.07 9 .4 7 -^ f  0.07 =  8.14 5.30 Yes (<p2A > 0)
Local market I =  B  (SE)
Firm /  =  1 (Bren) 9.46 0 9.46— 0 =  9.46 5.47 Yes {<plB > 0)
Firm /  =  2 (Voto) 9.46 0.89 9 .4 6 -^ 0 .8 9  =  -7.38 5.17 No (<P2B ^  0)
One is thus able to reject the hypothesis of firm 1 behaving in Cournot fashion 
towards market B in 1996, since (perceived) marginal revenue p 4- =  9.46
considerably exceeds marginal cost 5.47, i.e. (plB — 9.46 — 5.47 =  3.99, amounting 
to 42% of consumer price. Likewise, I reject Cournot behaviour for firm 2 towards 
market B in 1996: marginal revenue 8.14 considerably exceeds marginal cost 5.30, 
i.e. ip2A =  2.84, or 30% of consumer price. Firm l ’s (firm 2’s) supply decision 
toward market B (market A) corresponds to that of firm /  in the right panel of 
Figure 2-5 in the theoretical framework of Section 2.2.
Thus Cournot behaviour can in these instances be rejected in favour of more 
collusive conduct. A story where Votorantim tacitly agrees to give Brennand the 
upper hand in AL in exchange for the latter staying away from SE  would help ex­
plain the observed shipments. As noted previously, with a view to testing conduct, 
the marginal costs I construct in this study are conservative, i.e. they err on the 
high side. (This understates </?, working against the rejection of Cournot conduct.) 
In spite of this, the p  are not only positive but sizeable: of the order of 30 - 40% of 
consumer price! Interestingly, note that Brennand (firm 1) ships from its plant in 
AL (market A) to the states of PB, PE  and BA, located at further distances than 
SE (market B) and where prices are similar to those in SE.
I now compute the test statistic of Proposition 2.3 for each active firm-market- 
month combination, indexed as before by / ,  I and t respectively. A firm is active 
in a given month if it owns a plant which is active in that month; that is, firm /  is 
active iff Y^i Ylieoft Qut > 0 (recall that i indexes plant and O ft is the set of plants 
owned by firm /  in month t). For every month t in which a firm /  is active, there 
are 17 (/, Z,£) combinations, one for each of the 17 markets, irrespective of the
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markets to which firm /  actually ships in month t. Now at each month t take firm 
/ ’s marginal cost in serving market I, CfiU as the minimum among the marginal 
costs in serving market I from the plants that it owns, i.e. Cfit := mmicGft cnt. 
From the Cournot pricing condition (2.10), compute the test statistic
, Pit Qfit /0 1<Pm = P i t  + -—   Cfit (2.15)
7 Pit Pit
where fjlt is based on the demand estimates of Section 2.4.2. Recall that (pfit > 0 
is sufficient to reject the null hypothesis that firm /  is behaving in Cournot fashion 
towards market I in month t, in favour of more collusive behaviour; a Cournot 
firm perceiving marginal revenue to exceed marginal cost would expand output 
beyond the observed output (and, importantly, recall that this statistic allows 
for the constraining effect of imports). Notice that p, q and c are observed (or 
constructed: it is clear from (2.15) that the construction of c as an upper bound 
to the true marginal cost conservatively tilts the test statistic against rejection 
of Cournot), such that the randomness in (p stems from the randomness of the 
estimated price elasticity 7)zt.
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Total number of active firm-market-month combinations, (/, I, t) 37536
Number of (/, I, t) combinations for which:
The upper limit to the 95% confidence interval for %  is negative 24696 100%
cpflt is greater than zero 16806
<Pfit  is significantly g rea ter th an  zero a t th e  5% level 14849 60%
(pjlt is positive and exceeds 10% of consumer price 13197
(pjlt is positive and exceeds 20% of consum er price 8035 33%
(p f i t  is positive and exceeds 30% of consumer price 3258
<Pflt  is positive and exceeds 40% of consumer price 504
Total number of active firm-market-month combinations, (/, Z, t) 37536
Number of (/, Z, t) combinations for which: s.t. ip f U > 0.2p u
p f l t  is positive when i]lt is taken as —0.3 25335 12757
(pf i t  is positive when %  is taken as —0.5 27270 14237
(p f i t  is positive when %  is taken as —0.7 28665 15575
The table above summarises the results. There are 37536 active firm-market- 
month combinations (corresponding, therefore, to an average of 37536/17/156 «  14 
active firms across the country in any given month). Since I calculate the 95% 
confidence interval (C.I.) for (pfH from the 95% C.I. for the price elasticity 7jlt, I 
choose to drop 12840 observations for which the upper limit to the C.I. for iju is 
positive. In other words, I conservatively consider only the 24696 combinations for 
which the C.I. for the price elasticity lies in the interval (—oo, 0). I find that the 
null hypothesis of Cournot behaviour allowing for the constraining effect of imports, 
(pjlt < 0, can be rejected at the 5% level of significance in 14849 of these 24696 
combinations. Put differently, under the Cournot conjecture, one would expect 
firms to expand their supply to local markets in 14849/24696 ~  60% of monthly 
supply decisions vis-a-vis observed outputs -  these firms are choosing output to 
the left of their Cournot reaction functions. As in the earlier illustration, the test 
statistics (pjlt are not only positive but sizeable: the point estimate for (pjit exceeds 
20% of consumer price in 8035 supply decisions! To check robustness, the table also 
provides the number of supply decisions for which (pfH > 0 when (p is calculated
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using elasticities of —0.3, —0.5 or —0.7. The rejection of Cournot behaviour in 
favour of more collusive conduct is robust. It is clear from (2.15) and from the 
table that a market price elasticity of demand greater (in absolute value) than 
the estimated —0.5 on average reinforces this result. I further comment on the 
robustness of this conclusion in Chapter 3.
2.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I show that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat 
of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct will not be identified from 
the comparative statics of equilibrium. The well-established technique of relying 
on the jumping around (i.e. shifting and rotating) of the demand curve to distin­
guish empirically between the hypothesis of a high-cost competitive industry and 
the alternative of a low-cost oligopoly with market power fails in the event that the 
low-cost oligopoly is constrained by potential entry. Because the extent to which 
the no-entry constraint binds may be unobserved to the researcher, since in equilib­
rium entry is not observed, some studies of market power claiming to consistently 
estimate structural parameters of the data generating process may actually be un­
derestimating the degree of market power. A typical situation of such limit pricing 
is that where a domestic oligopoly faces a competitive fringe of foreign suppliers.
This result recommends caution to enthusiasts of the estimation of market power 
when cost data is lacking, and has important implications for antitrust practition­
ers, particularly in a world where trade barriers are being pulled down. This chapter 
provides an additional theoretical setting to a criticism advanced by Corts (1999) 
regarding the non-robust performance of static structural estimation in the absence 
of cost when applied to a dynamic model. In an imports-constrained setting, I show 
one way in which a researcher, equipped with cost and firm-level data, may delve 
deeper into the pattern of conduct in an industry where firms meet in different 
markets.
The Brazilian cement industry provides a clear-cut illustration. An elastically- 
supplied fringe of high-cost imports restrains domestic prices and the market price
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elasticities of demand are of the order of -0.5 in equilibrium. Despite this binding 
constraint, the behavioural model generating outcomes in the industry is identi­
fied from the observed data. While the estimation of a static pricing equation 
incorrectly points to competition, I show that conduct is more collusive than the 
Cournot benchmark, characterised by (tacit) market division. I provide examples 
of simple dynamic multimarket games which give rise to such equilibrium behav­
iour. The price limit set by the delivered cost of imports would seem to provide 
a natural focal price; market division would further enhance collusive pay-ofis by 
limiting cross-hauling.
A clear policy recommendation emanating from the illustration is the finding 
that producers possess substantial market power and that imports (in the form 
of cement or the intermediate product clinker) have an important role to play in 
curbing the ability of domestic producers to further raise prices above marginal cost. 
To the extent that investments may be made to reduce transaction (entry) costs of 
imports, one should not necessarily expect to observe an increased share of imports 
but certainly expect higher consumer welfare in the form of lower prices. Such a 
recommendation stands in direct contrast to recent policy experience, whereby 
the cement industry successfully managed to lobby the government into enacting 
“antidumping” measures against foreign producers who were attempting to make 
inroads into Brazil’s local markets.
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Chapter 3 
Conduct in the Brazilian Cem ent 
Industry: Verifying R obustness 
Further
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter I showed that the standard methodology for inferring the 
degree of market power exercised by firms in an industry -  in the sense of con­
sistently estimating the true price-cost margins -  fails in a general setting where 
the industry faces the threat of entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry 
prices1. Intuitively, the threat of entry dampens the responsiveness of prices to 
exogenous demand perturbations on which the standard comparative-statics tech­
nique rests, removing the source of price variation which allows conduct to be 
identified. I illustrated this theoretical result by reference to the Brazilian cement 
industry, where potential (high-cost) imports restrain market outcomes. That is, 
imports impose a price ceiling which binds at the equilibrium, such that no or few 
imports are observed. While the standard methodology yielded supply estimates 
that Eire indicative of domestic competition -  with estimated price-cost margins 
centred around zero -  the true price-cost margins are far from competitive: com­
1 As long as a non-trivial subset of the observations are constrained, this misspecification will 
lead the analyst to underestimate the degree of market power, finding more competition when 
there is less.
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putation of plant-to-market marginal cost pointed to actual margins amounting to 
50% of producer prices. I then went on to propose a test of conduct adapted to such 
settings where market outcomes are constrained. This test was illustrated again by 
reference to the Brazilian cement industry. Outcomes in the industry were found 
to be more collusive than the Cournot benchmark, and can be characterised by 
tacit market division. In addition to illustrating the proposed test of conduct, such 
an exercise reiterates the rejection of competitive domestic behaviour, as suggested 
by the standard methodology when the latent effect of entry is overlooked.
The present chapter’s recurring theme is robustness. It explores the robustness 
and validity of several different theoretical and estimation-related modelling aspects 
and findings which concern Chapter 2. I begin by considering, in light of the 
different local market structures observed in the Brazilian cement industry, simple 
dynamic multimarket games which in equilibrium give rise to the pattern of conduct 
identified previously. As seen, a story where firm 1 tacitly agrees to give firm 2 the 
upper hand in market B in exchange for the latter staying away from market A -  
with typically firm 1 (firm 2) being located slightly closer to market A (market B) 
than the rival firm -  helps to explain the observed shipments. Plants ship to local 
markets located at their doorstep, while restricting supply to adjacent markets, 
despite supplying to these latter markets being highly profitable under the static 
Cournot conjecture. My aim in providing examples of such dynamic games is to 
indicate the rationality of a strategy of market division in an industry where firms 
meet in different (geographic or product) markets. Recall that the price limit set by 
the delivered cost of imports may provide a natural focal price2. And by devising 
strategies which take multimarket contact into account, firms can achieve complete 
market division, limiting cross-hauling and maximising aggregate profit.
I then turn to the spatial competition literature in the quest to rationalise the 
very low estimated market price elasticities of demand in equilibrium -  of the order 
of -0.5 across Brazil’s local markets. The question posed previously is why does a 
producer, seeing such inelastic market demand, not cut output in an attempt to
2 This is consistent with the Eastman-Stykolt (1966) hypothesis -  recall footnote 22 of Chapter
2.
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raise prices, moving up along the demand curve to a point where demand is more 
elastic3? As explained in Chapter 2, two main possibilities arise to rationalise why 
a producer does not cut output. The first rationale is that there is competition 
among incumbents, such that if producer 1 cuts output in an attempt to raise 
prices, along comes rival producer 2 and undercuts his price. Thus a low market 
price elasticity of demand does not imply a low elasticity of demand faced by 
each individual producer. (Alternatively, one may think of, for example, a Cournot 
oligopoly with low concentration such that each individual firm internalises only 
a small proportion of the aggregate benefit of the large price rise that would be 
brought about by a small reduction in output; thus in equilibrium the price remains 
at a level consistent with aggregate demand being inelastic.) The second rationale 
is the one I accept in Chapter 2, that some dynamic story is appropriate, such 
as the threat of entry (imports) restraining pre-entry prices. One must emphasise 
that my claim that the domestic industry is constrained by the threat of foreign 
entry rests on the low market price elasticities of demand in equilibrium4. By this 
rationale, while market demand is inelastic at the equilibrium, the demand faced 
by incumbents (domestic producers) in aggregate is elastic -  cutting output in an 
attempt to raise prices above the ceiling c/ simply opens the door to imports5. A 
third possibility, however, arises in the literature on spatial competition, providing 
a potential substitute (or complement) to the accepted theoretical framework, that 
a competitive fringe of imports restrains the domestic industry’s outcomes. In the 
cement industry, transportation assumes a significant proportion of cost and firms’ 
offerings are spatially differentiated. Any plausible theory should satisfactorily
3 One may correctly point out that the demand curve for cement is very steep. (There are 
essentially two reasons for this. One is that with the exception of highway construction -  where 
highways may be paved either with concrete or with asphalt -  cement has no clear substitutes. 
The second reason is that, in spite of its importance, cement makes up only a moderate proportion 
of construction budgets.) Now, a steep demand curve still does not explain why the elasticity of 
demand is so low at the market equilibrium. Why is price (and the elasticity) not higher?
4While the finding that demand is inelastic in equilibrium is central to my claim that the 
domestic industry is constrained by the threat of imports, this claim is backed up by a wealth 
of interview and anecdotal evidence in addition to being consistent with stylised facts, such as 
prices being largely uniform along the coastline, increasing in the distance from the coast and 
highly correlated with the exchange rate. See Section 2.3.2.
5 As such, in the case of the Brazilian cement industry, market demand is inelastic at the price 
ceiling set by potential imports. However, in other cases it could well be that the threat of entry 
binds at a price level where market demand is elastic. In such cases it would arguably be more 
difficult to claim that the threat of entry has a binding effect on industry outcomes.
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reconcile the low market price elasticity of demand with the exercise of market 
power by firms. My motivation stems from the equilibrium in a well-known example 
of spatial competition, the Hotelling-type circular road model. In this model, 
inelastic market demand does not imply low price-cost margins (since inelastic 
market demand does not translate into inelastic demand for the firm). As I show, 
however, this result of positive price-cost margins even at local markets where 
spatially-differentiated firms’ market boundaries meet owes to a very special class 
of spatial pricing policy assumed in the model, that a firm is restricted to set only 
a “mill” price, with delivered prices to consumers who are distributed over space 
being equal to the sum of this mill price and the transportation cost. This is not 
the case in the Brazilian cement industry, where firms set prices at the local market 
level (and these are observed to be quite uniform over space, including those local 
markets where many firms meet). I conclude that models of spatial competition 
do not provide further insight over the theoretical framework proposed presently.
It is clear that an empirical researcher must also consider the possibility, -  given 
their central importance -  that the equilibrium demand elasticity estimates are 
inconsistent. Their low values, of the order of -0.5, could make one worry that they 
are indeed underestimates of the “true” elasticities. I thus proceed to performing 
further robustness checks of the demand estimation of Chapter 2. In addition to the 
estimation results under different sets of instruments presented in that chapter, here 
I consider: (i) estimating the state-level demand equations simultaneously, allowing 
the unobserved demand shocks across states to be correlated; (ii) using fixed effects 
instrumental-variables panel data estimation, specifying each state as a unit and 
calculating clustered standard errors (i.e. clustering the observations pertaining 
to a given state). Notice that, given the vastly larger number of observations 
(156 months x 17 states as opposed to 156 months in each state-level estimation 
of the preceding chapter), this specification increases efficiency at the expense of 
cross-unit restrictions; (iii) fitting alternative functional forms, such as semi-log- 
linear and linear, as opposed to the log-linear specification (2.12); (iv) reversing 
the dependent variable; (v) considering the possibility that instruments are weak; 
and (vi) considering a dynamic demand function. The overall conclusion arising 
from these checks is that the preceding chapter’s finding -  that demand is inelastic
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(of the order of -0.5) at the equilibrium in each local market -  is robust.
Finally, in the spirit of the trade literature, I resort to a gravity model in order 
to statistically analyse the flow of cement between plants, owned by the different 
cement producers, and local markets (identified with states). The trade literature 
has extensively used the gravity model to explain the flow of trade and investment 
between countries. Feenstra (2002) describes the gravity equation as “perform(ing) 
extremely well empirically” (p.491), while Evenett and Keller (2002) affirm that the 
equation constitutes “one of the most important results about trade flows” (p.282). 
Of greater interest than merely explaining the observed flows, or shipments, based 
on market size, plant location and plant ownership, lies the “detection” of outliers 
in the data. One example could be the absence of shipments from a given plant 
(and thus firm) to a given market where one would expect them to occur on account 
of the plant’s location and ownership alone. Barring strong price effects, one could 
speculatively attribute the presence of such outliers to firm behaviour, as well as 
institutional detail. It must be emphasised that this exercise is not structural, in 
that it does not follow from a model of shipments derived from a specification of 
demand and cost conditions, firm entry and behaviour -  this structural approach 
was pursued in Chapter 2. Here I perform a statistical benchmarking exercise. 
Rather than arbitrarily establishing the distance over which cement can profitably 
travel (say 500 km6) and from there analysing the pattern of shipments, the merit 
of this approach is that of letting the data pinpoint the firm-market pairs, if any, 
which do not conform to an “average” pattern.
To illustrate why this exercise is not structural, consider a hypothetical situation 
where firms collude by dividing markets such that each firm ships only to customers 
located in the vicinity of its plants7. All the gravity estimation would pick up is 
a very high coefficient in the “distance” variable, yet one is clearly not identifying 
distance effects from conduct. And in this hypothetical situation, it may well be
6The geographic area relevant to each plant’s supply decision (i.e. the plant’s “market”) is 
obviously endogenous -  it depends on demand and supply conditions. See footnote 3 in the 
Appendix to Chapter 2.
7One would think that the proximity of local markets from a plant (i.e. the plant’s shipment 
radius) may be a natural instrument for coordination, to the extent that each plant’s radius may 
be monitored by other firms.
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that there are no outliers to this “average” pattern, if there is “sufficient” symmetry 
in some sense. But this illustrates a point which, to the best of my knowledge, 
has not been made in the trade literature’s use of gravity models: that estimated 
distance effects may also be proxying for firms’ strategies of dividing (geographic) 
markets, as is the case in the Brazilian cement industry (if not at the supranational 
level, one could plausibly speculate; see, for example, Ghemawat and Thomas 
2004). This is yet another manifestation of the classic identification problem in 
supply: distinguishing firm costs from firm conduct. Head (2003), for example, lists 
alternative explanations that have been advanced in the literature to explain why 
distance is found to matter so much, such as transport costs, perishability, sourcing 
“synchronisation”, communication and transaction costs, and cultural differences. 
One would clearly wish to add industry behaviour to this fist, as the exercise 
applied to the cement industry makes clear. As shown in Chapter 2, transport 
costs defined in a broad sense go only a limited way in explaining the observed 
pattern of shipments.
Indeed, I find that the gravity equation fits Brazilian cement shipments very 
well. Interestingly, while the estimated elasticities of bilateral trade with respect 
to distance in the trade literature vary between -0.8 and -1.5% (see, for example, 
Loungani et al 2002), the distance elasticity in the case of Brazilian cement flows 
amounts to as much as -3%. Estimated state border effects are also very high, 
suggesting that state borders may be playing a non-negfigible role in the (tacit) 
coordination of firms’ strategies. As for the “detection” of outliers, this statistical 
exercise flags some odd situations in the data. Such is the case, for example, of 
the shipments by three of the four leading firms (Votorantim, Holcim and Lafarge 
-  see Figure 2-6) to the three largest local markets (Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais and 
Rio de Janeiro -  see Figure 2-14). The leading firm Votorantim commands a 50% 
market share approximately in the largest market SP, while commanding less than 
a 10% share of shipments to the second largest market MG, and a 20% share in 
the third largest market R J8. In contrast, both Holcim and Lafarge command 
shares of 25% each in MG and RJ, but account for less than 10% of shipments
8 Of note, Votorantim has plants both in MG and RJ  (recall Figure 2-6).
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to SP. These anomalies in the data -  in the sense that they do not conform to 
the “average” patterns of shipments, when one controls for distance (which is also 
proxying for conduct, as per the above discussion), plant location and ownership 
-  are clearly picked up by the gravity model. Actual shipments significantly differ 
from shipments predicted on the basis of plant location and ownership. There 
may well be institutional and/or historical reasons behind the existence of these 
outliers, yet Votorantim’s shying away from the large MG market is consistent 
with a market division or multimarket contact story a la Bernheim and Whinston 
(1990).
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 I provide simple dynamic 
multimarket games which in equilibrium give rise to market division. Section 3.3 
turns to the spatial competition literature. I then consider the robustness of the 
demand estimation of Chapter 2. Finally, Section 3.5 estimates a gravity model.
3.2 Collusion and market division
The cement industry is commonly used to illustrate industry characteristics that 
the literature on tacit collusion has deemed to enhance the likelihood of collu­
sion9: see Appendix C for a summary. Unsurprisingly, the cement industry has 
a long history of anticompetitive behaviour and antitrust litigation across several 
jurisdictions10. Tacit collusion in the Brazilian cement industry, orchestrated for 
instance via market division, is a concrete possibility in that the characteristics of 
the industry are consistent with the characteristics which are understood to make 
tacit collusion more likely. For the sake of illustration, I now turn to some simple 
collusive arrangements -  relevant to the case at hand -  which may be supported in 
equilibrium.
9As before, I refer to collusion in prices (or quantities), though I later comment on collusion 
in capacity investments.
10See, for example, Dumez and Jeunemaitre (2000). Ghemawat and Thomas (2004) cite the 
fines imposed by the European Court of First Instance in 1994 on 42 cement-related undertakings 
across Europe, in what has been one of the EU’s largest competition cases to date.
134
Illustra tion  1: two firms w ith  plants located in a  single local m arket
{A local market which comes to mind here is Rio Grande do Sul (RS), where two 
firms, Votorantim and Cimpor, operate plants, located very close to one another.)
Market
Firm 1 •
Firm 2 •
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, with symmetric marginal costs c facing a com­
petitive fringe of imports with marginal cost c/ such that c < cj < pM, where 
pM is the monopoly price as in the theoretical framework of Section 2.2. Recall 
that in such a setup the most collusive price, which maximises aggregate (domes­
tic) industry profit, is p — Cj, where the aggregate industry profit (per period) is 
II := (cj — c)p~1{cI) and p-1(.) denotes the demand function. As is standard in the 
literature on supergames, the most collusive price may be supported in equilibrium 
by each firm adopting, say, the following symmetric “grim” strategy in prices: set 
the collusive price p =  cj in each period unless the rival firm has set a different 
price in a previous period, in which case set the competitive price p =  c. Assume 
for now that, given the symmetry, both firms split the market equally (i.e. firm 
/ ’s share s/ =  | , /  =  l,2). Collusion will then be sustainable if each firm’s payoff 
from sticking to the collusive agreement exceeds its payoff from slightly undercut­
ting its rival and selling to the entire market in a single period; that is, collusion is 
sustainable if
where S is the per-period discount factor. This incentive constraint rearranges to 
S > i  yielding the standard folk theorem whereby for a sufficiently high discount 
factor the collusive price p — cj (or any other price p such that c < p < cf) may 
be supported in equilibrium.
Illustra tion  2: two firms and two neighbouring m arkets: firm  1 is located 
in m arket A and firm  2 is located in m arket B next door (Two local
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markets which come to mind here are the neighbouring states of Sergipe (SE) and 
Alagoas (AL), equally small in terms of market size and geography. As stated 
previously, until 1996 Votorantim operated the only plant in SE and Brennand 
operated the only plant in next-door AL. While in 1996 Votorantim commanded an 
89% share in SE, it attained only a 7% share in AL; on the other hand, Brennand 
commanded an 83% share in AL while not supplying to SE.)
Market A Market B
Firm l • •  Firm 2
Now assume that there axe transport costs t > 0 associated with serving the 
neighbouring market: while the marginal cost of serving a market in which one’s 
plant is located is c (e.g. firm 1 in market A), the marginal cost of serving the 
market next-door to one’s plant rises to d — c + t  (e.g. firm 1 in market B), where 
c < d < Ci (c/ as before). Demand is identical in each market, given as before by 
p-1(.). Denoting II := (c/ — c)p-1(cj) as before, let II' := (c/ — d)p~1(cj). (This 
corresponds to firm l ’s maximal profit in neighbouring market B were it to act as 
a monopolist in the supply of that market11. Clearly II > IT.) It is easy to see that 
the collusive arrangement that maximises aggregate industry profit in each market 
involves no wasteful cross-hauling and corresponds to complete market division, 
where each market is supplied only by the low-cost firm and prices in each market 
are p =  cj: firm 1 supplies quantity p-1(c/) to market A (i.e. shares Si^ =  1, 
S2A =  1 — $1 , 4  =  0) and firm 2 supplies quantity p-1(cj) to market B (i.e. S2b =  1> 
Sib =  1 — s2b =  0). But can this arrangement be supported in equilibrium?
Begin by considering a situation where firms devise strategies that treat each 
market separately, that is, cheating in a market does not trigger retaliation in other 
markets. Then for the most collusive price p =  cj (or any collusive price p above 
the competitive price, equal to the high-cost firm’s cost d, but lower than cj, i.e.
11 Realise that implicit in this statement is the regularity assumption that the monopoly price 
pM(c) := argmaxp(p — c)p~1{p) is an increasing function of marginal cost c. Thus pM(d) >  
pM(c) >  ci, where pM(c) >  c/ is as before, such that firm 1 acting as a domestic monopolist in 
the supply of neighbouring market B and facing the fringe of imports, would set p =  cj.
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d < p < cj) to be sustainable in a given market, the collusive arrangement must 
prescribe a strictly positive share to both firms in that market. In this situation, 
both firms must enjoy a non-trivial share of the collusive pie in each market, as 
can be seen by each firm’s incentive constraint (IC) in, say, market A12:
1 5s lAU-   > II +  n war-   low-cost firm l ’s IC in market A
1 —  6 1 —  6
(1 — sia) n / > n ' high-cost firm 2’s IC in market A
1 —  6
where Hwar := (d — c)p~1(d) denotes industry profit under retaliation (price war, 
when p = d), earned by the low-cost firm. (Notice that the minimum share to be 
prescribed to the high-cost firm is higher the lower is the discount factor: simply 
rewrite the high-cost firm’s IC as 1 — Sia > 1  — 5.) Hence if firms devise strategies 
that treat each market separately, complete market division ( s ^  =  S2b =  1) cannot 
be sustained in any collusive equilibrium, regardless of the discount factor.
More naturally, firms will devise strategies that take into account the multimar­
ket nature of their contact, since in each market A or B the same two firms 1 and 
2 can supply. By modifying each firm’s strategy to ensure retaliation is triggered 
(i.e. setting price equal to the competitive price d)  in both markets should any 
firm undercut the collusive price in any market in a previous period, the collusive 
arrangement that maximises aggregate industry profits across markets -  i.e. setting 
p = cj with complete market division -  can now be supported in equilibrium for 
a high enough discount factor. To see this, pool each firm’s incentive constraints 
across both markets; firm l ’s (say) IC is now
1 1 r
SiaKz F+ (l -  S2B) n '- ---- - >  n + n '- f  Hwar- - firm l ’s pooled IC (3.1)
1 —  6 1 —  0 1 —  0
Assuming that the collusive arrangement involves the low-cost firm in one market 
commanding the same share as the low-cost firm in the other market (i.e. Sia =
12Note that firm 1 and firm 2’s shipments are then respectively q\A — 5iaP- 1 (c/) and q2A =  
( 1 - S i a ) p _ 1 ( c / ) .
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52b =  s) (3.1) can be rearranged to yield firm / ’s ( /  =  1,2) incentive constraint:
(i-«)n + jr  
-  n + n' -  n war
The collusive arrangement can now involve complete market division, 5 =  1. In­
deed, for p =  c/, setting s =  1 in (3.2) minimises the discount factor threshold 
above which collusion is sustainable13:
s  -  n+n'- n<«“r
Thus for a high enough discount factor, the collusive scheme that maximises aggre­
gate industry profit in each market, setting p — ci in both markets and completely 
dividing markets, can now be supported in equilibrium. Intuitively, as Bernheim 
and Whinston (1990) have shown, through multimarket contact “slack enforcement 
power” may be shifted from the market where a given firm is located, enjoying low 
cost, high share and high profit, to the neighbouring market where that firm has 
high cost, low share and low profit14.
13Recall that II >  II7. Intuitively, when s =  1 the short-term gain from cheating (equal to 
(1 — s)U in the own market plus sIT in the neighbouring market) is lowest (and equal to II7). 
Two com m ents are in order. First, one can show that increasing the transportation cost t  may 
increase the discount factor threshold: though the deviant’s profits in the period of deviation 
fall since II7 falls, profits in each later period rise since i r uor rises, meaning that the long-term 
loss of collusive profits from retaliation may become lower. Thus collusion would seem less likely 
as t  rises, given that it makes the incentive-constraint more stringent (for s =  1). However, as 
mentioned in the footnotes to the table on industry characteristics in Appendix C, the profitability 
of collusion may be increasing in t, since the effect of eliminating wasteful cross-hauling, through 
market division, on profits may now be larger. Hence, a greater payoff from collusion through 
higher t, conditional on it being sustainable, would suggest that firms would have greater incentive 
to design and implement a collusive scheme (see Ivaldi et al 2003, footnote 48, on a similar idea). 
Second, when t  =  0, then c7 =  c, n 7 =  n  and n™ar =  0, implying that incentive constraints (3.2) 
and thus (3.3) collapse to the familiar <5 >  \  of Illustration 1.
14Notice that I have assumed Bertrand behaviour should collusion break down, but could just as 
well have assumed Cournot competition. In this case, the right-hand side of incentive constraint 
(3.1) would have to be modified as follows: (i) a deviant firm would now earn less than n  +  n 7 in 
the period of deviation (the other firm would still supply its collusive quantities in the period of 
deviation, and the deviant firm would set its output in each market based on its reaction function, 
as illustrated in Figure 2-5, thus expanding output in the neighbouring market where it has a low 
share), and (ii) upon retaliation either firm would also earn positive payoffs in its neighbouring 
market, where it incurs a higher cost (and, as Figure 2-5 makes clear, the Cournot equilibrium 
outcome would not necessarily be unique).
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Illu stra tion  3: th ree  firms and  two neighbouring m arkets: firms 1  and
2  have plants located in m arket A  and  m arket B nex t door, while firm
3 has a  p lant located  in m arket B only (Two local markets which come to 
mind here are the neighbouring states of Rio de Janeiro (TU) and Minas Gerais 
(M.G). Considering these two markets, four firms have plants located in both RJ 
and MG, while two firms have plants located in MG only. The extent to which 
these two latter firms cross-haul cement from their plants in MG to the RJ market 
is limited: in 1999 Camargo Correa commanded a 20% share in its home market 
MG but did not supply to the neighbouring RJ, while Soeicom had a 9% share in 
its home market MG and a (somewhat) lower 6 % share in neighbouring RJ.)
Market A Market B
Firm 1 • •  F irm l
Firm 2 • •  Firm 2
•  Firm 3
As before, assume that the cost of supplying a market from a plant located in 
that market is c but rises to d = c + t when supplying from a plant located in 
the neighbouring market. Demand p_1(.) is again identical in each market, recall 
pM{d) > pM{c) > ci and denote 11' and II as before. Now consider the following 
collusive agreement: (i) in market A each of firms 1  and 2  supplies a share sa of 
the market, with firm 3 accounting for the remaining (1 — 2sa) share, such that 
price is p =  c/; and (ii) in market B firm 3 supplies a share s# of the market, 
with firms 1  and 2  accounting for the remaining ( 1  — sb) / 2  each, again such that 
price is p =  cj . 1 5  The (pooled) incentive constraint for each of firms 1 and 2, that 
operate plants in both markets, becomes:
15In market A, firms 1 and 2 will then supply q\A =  q.2A =  saP_1(c/) and firm 3 will supply 
<73A =  (1 — 2s^)p-1 (c/). In market B, firm 3 will supply qzB — sbP_1(c/) and firms 1 and 2 will 
each supply q1B -  q2B =  \  (1 -  ss )p - 1 (c/)-
139
since a deviation triggers the competitive price p — c in both markets, which can 
be rearranged to
j. 3 — 2s a +  sb 
~ —
The incentive constraint for firm 3, with a plant in market B only, is
((i -  2^) n' + sBn) > n' + n
1 —  0
which is equivalent to
. ( 1  — Sg)n +  2 sAUf
n  +  i r
As in illustration 2, the collusive arrangement that maximises aggregate indus­
try profit across markets involves no wasteful cross-hauling, where each market is 
supplied only by the low-cost firms (i.e. 2 s^ =  1  such that firm 3 does not sup­
ply to market A) and prices in each market are p =  Cj. Plugging sA =  1/2 and, 
say, sb =  2/3 such that all three firms produce the same quantity, sustainability 
constraints (3.4) and (3.5) become 5 > |  and <5 > respectively.
Capacity and collusion Some remarks about the role of capacity in the Brazil­
ian cement industry. As noted in Section 2.3.3, capacity significantly exceeds pro­
duction, and this (low) capacity utilisation appears to be fairly symmetric across 
plants and firms, despite the asymmetric capacities across these plants and firms. 
Thus, for instance, plant 1 with a capacity of 2 mtpa may be running at a 65% ca­
pacity utilisation while plant 2 , owned by a rival firm, with a capacity of 1  mtpa may 
be operating at the same 65% capacity utilisation. This observation is consistent 
with a situation where all domestic producers adhere to the collusive arrangement, 
with no producer “free riding”. (This is reinforced by the fact that all producers are 
long-time members of the cement producers’ trade association (SNIC), an active 
lobbying outfit for the industry.) The corollary to this observation is that there 
appears to be no relevant fringe to the (tacit) cartel16. Further, evenly-distributed
16More recently, an entrant, Mizu, has successfully managed to establish a foothold in local 
markets in and around the state of Espirito Santo (ES), where it is based. Set up in 1998 by a large 
independent ready-mixed concrete firm, Mizu signed a long-term contract with a steel producer
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idle capacity across firms would serve the key purpose of disciplining the cartel: 
the threat of punishment would not be credible were capacity to be tight1 7  18.
3.3 M odels o f spatial com petition
The question which arises is how to reconcile such low market price elasticity of de­
mand with the presence of market power by firms. In Chapter 2 the low elasticities 
in equilibrium in each of the different local markets -  including those where the 
one-firm concentration ratio is as high as 80% -  coupled with the high observed 
price-cost margins were taken as evidence that the potential entry of imported 
cement restrains prices set by the domestic industry. While market demand in 
equilibrium is inelastic, the residual demand which the domestic industry faces at 
the price ceiling posed by high-cost imports is elastic. Attempts by the domestic 
industry, already enjoying a large price-cost margin, to raise prices above this price 
ceiling would only invite foreign entry.
I now turn to the spatial competition literature to check whether a plausible 
substitute or complement to this reasoning can be found. Again, any plausible 
theory should satisfactorily reconcile the low market demand elasticity with the 
exercise of market power (i.e. positive price-cost margins). My motivation owes to 
the equilibrium in a well-known example of spatial competition, the Hotelling-type 
circular road model. In this model, inelastic market demand does not imply low
(Companhia Siderurgica de Tubarao) to supply it with steel slag, which it grinds and mixes 
with ground clinker, imported from as far as Japan, producing slag cement. Mizfi’s (grinding- 
only) plant is located conveniently next door to the steelworks and to the port of Vitdria. In 
contrast to established cement producers, by 2003 Mizu was selling up to capacity (0.7 mtpa). It 
would appear that the established producers have accommodated Mizii’s entry, given its limited 
capacity and the irreversibility of its investment. (As noted in Appendix B, consumption and 
shipment figures compiled by the cement producers’ trade association, and used in this thesis, 
do not consider Mizu. The distortion nevertheless is small in view of Mizu’s (to date) limited 
capacity, limited geographic scope and recent entry.)
17A further strategic role may be that of helping deter entry, as studied in the literature (e.g. 
Dixit 1980).
18 A final comment regarding the possibility that producers collude in capacity investments, in 
addition to colluding in product market outcomes. Rather than restricting capacity and hence 
output, producers overinvest in capacity, as just discussed. Other characteristics of the cement 
industry, such as the lumpiness, infrequency, long life and irreversibility of investment, would 
further suggest that the scope for collusion in capacities is limited. See Ivaldi et al (2003) for a 
discussion.
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price-cost margins, since inelastic market demand does not translate into inelastic 
demand for the firm . 1 9
3.3.1 Price-setting firms in the circular road m odel
Consider the circular road model in its simplest form. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed along a unit circle, transport costs (incurred by the consumer) per unit 
of distance are given by t, and demand is uniform (each unit mass of consumers 
demands 1 unit from the firm with the lowest delivered price, given by the sum  
of the mill price and the transport cost). There are N  firms evenly spaced out, 
producing with zero marginal cost and each firm setting a mill price. Due to the 
simplifying assumption of uniform demand, it is clear that the market price elas­
ticity of demand is zero, rfnaTket =  0 . A firm with (mill) price p facing competition 
from its two neighbours, each setting a price p, will face an elasticity of demand 
given by2 0  p/irm(p,p; t) =  which is increasing (in absolute value) as trans­
19To elaborate on the motivation behind this enquiry into the literature on spatial competition, 
assume away the threat of entry and begin by considering the conventional firm pricing equation 
(2.13) of Chapter 2, which nests alternative models of conduct. It is conceivable that in an 
industry where transportation assumes a significant proportion of costs and firms’ offerings are 
spatially differentiated, supply relation (2.13) may correspond to an underparameterised model, 
where the spatial dimension is not appropriately captured. By this tentative argument, the special 
( “spaceless”) form of pricing equation (2.13) and of the behavioural models nested in it, such as 
the homogeneous-goods Cournot model, would be feeding a low market price elasticity of demand 
into too low a price elasticity of demand faced by the firm, and thus inducing the finding of too 
much competition.
A simple analogy will hopefully make this point clearer. Consider a (brand) differentiated goods 
industry where firms compete on prices (i.e. Bertrand conduct) and the true substitutability 
between products is high. A researcher attempts to fit a model of Bertrand competition imposing 
too low a degree of substitution between products (rather than jointly estimating this degree of 
substitution) and incorrectly rejects this model in favour of price-taking behaviour. The rejection 
of the true model of behaviour (differentiated Bertrand) in favour of more competition has been 
brought about by the imposition of too low a degree of substitutition between firms’ products 
(in the form of too low cross-price elasticities). The imposed low cross-price elasticity would be 
consistent with the firm raising the price of its product above marginal cost; in the absence of it 
doing so, the researcher incorrectly concludes that the firm is a price-taker.
Note that one can relate this analogy back to the framework of Chapter 2. By overlooking 
the threat of entry when this has a binding effect on pre-entry prices, a researcher is in effect 
imposing too low a degree of substitution (between the incumbents and the potential entrants). 
On assuming away the constraining effect of entry on incumbents, inelastic market demand feeds 
into inelastic demand facing incumbents. (In so doing, by a similar line of argument to the 
above, one could be led to reject, say, the hypothesis of Cournot competition in favour of more 
competition, if Cournot were the true model.)
20 The distance s from the firm under consideration, setting price p, to its marginal consumer 
on either side, is given by s — ^  The firm’s demand is thus q =  2s; the firm’s elasticity
of demand is then given by rj t^TTn =
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port costs t fall. In the symmetric equilibrium, prices (and price-cost margins) are 
given by p* = jj and the elasticity of demand faced by the firm is r f11™'* =  — 1  
(by construction of equilibrium: recall marginal cost is zero). Notice that inelastic 
demand at the market level does not translate into inelastic demand for the firm 
and each firm’s price-cost margin is strictly positive for t > 0 , and increasing in t, 
despite the market elasticity of demand being zero.
Notice that if the special uniform demand assumption in the example is re­
placed by a more realistic assumption whereby market demand is decreasing in 
price, the basic message remains unchanged. For example, assume instead that 
demand is linear in price: denoting s as the distance from the firm with the lowest 
delivered price, let demand over the interval [s, s +  ds] be given by f(p , s)ds, where 
f(p ,s)  =  1  — a{p +  ts) and p 4 - ts  is the lowest delivered price. It is easy to show 
that the market price elasticity of demand will now depend on the local market’s 
distance from the firm with the lowest delivered price. To illustrate, take N  = 4, 
t =  1 and a =  0.1. In the symmetric equilibrium, the market price elasticity of 
demand is —0.0253 at the market located at the firm’s doorstep (s =  0), rising (in 
absolute value) to —0.0386 for the firm’s marginal market (located at s =  ^ 7  =  |) .  
(Analytically, rfnavket'* =  ’ where p* is the equilibrium price). In equilib­
rium, the elasticity of demand faced by the firm is again =  — 1  and prices
(and price-cost margins) are again non-zero: p* =  0.246.
The circular road model above illustrates that in a context of spatial differ­
entiation a low market price elasticity of demand does not imply low price-cost 
margins. In the version considered, a strong assumption is that each firm is only 
allowed to set a (free on board) mill price pm , with the “delivered price schedule” 
Pd being given by the sum of this mill price and the travel cost from its plant 
to the local market located at a distance s, i.e. p& = pm  +  ts. One may object 
to this assumption on the grounds that in many industries firms are able to price 
discriminate and set a delivered price schedule with a slope2 1  other than t. If this
2 N otice that setting a slope greater than t  is only possible for the firm if consumer arbitrage is 
ruled out. The term “price discrimination” is employed as in the spatial literature: a slope strictly 
less than t  is described as price discrimination, in the sense that prices are being discriminated 
in favour of more distant buyers (also referred to as “freight absorption”).
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assumption is relaxed, allowing firms to set prices at each local market as opposed 
to setting only a mill price, competition is now harsher and equilibrium price-cost 
margins are now lower, but they are still positive. To see this, consider, for sim­
plicity, the case of uniform demand. As indicated in Figure 3-1, a firm’s delivered 
price to a local market (up to its marginal market) will in equilibrium be just 
short of the transport cost between that local market and the rival firm (recall that 
marginal cost is zero); its price-cost margin will then be jj at the market located 
on its doorstep, falling to 0  at the marginal market (delivered prices are indicated 
by the thick dashed fines in the figure). While the earlier assumption that each 
firm set only a mill price ensured a delivered price schedule with slope t (and a 
constant equilibrium price-cost margin of delivered prices are indicated by the 
thick smooth fines), allowing firms to price discriminate leads to a delivered price 
schedule of slope —t (and lower price-cost margins, which are decreasing in the 
distance from the firm) . 2 2
Discussion in light of th e  fram ework of C hap ter 2  The model above in 
its unrestricted version of spatial pricing policy -  where Bertrand firms set prices 
at each local market as opposed to setting only a mill price -  is already nested in 
the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 2. 2 3  (Thus the model is considered 
as a candidate model of behaviour generating outcomes in the industry, yet it is 
empirically rejected24.) As for the restricted version adopting the very special class 
of spatial pricing policy where each firm can set only a mill price, with delivered 
prices to consumers who are distributed over space being equal to the sum of
22 See Thisse and Vives (1988). They study a sequential game where spatial duopolists -  each 
firm located at one extremity of a line segment of markets -  first choose a spatial price policy 
(uniform FOB mill pricing or unrestricted price discrimination) and, in a second stage, set prices. 
Due to the prisoners’ dilemma character of the game, price discrimination emerges as the unique 
equilibrium, despite lower price-cost margins: "(I)t may well be that firms would make more 
profits by following a uniform price policy. This is so because spatial discriminatory pricing gives 
more flexibility to a firm to respond to its rival’s actions. But then firms may get trapped into a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma-type situation and end up with lower profits due to the intense competition 
unleashed. Contrary to general belief, uniform (FOB) pricing is therefore not evidence of a more 
competitive environment" (p. 124).
23 Recall, for example, the discussion of Bertrand competition among heterogeneous firms in 
Section 2.2.3; notice also that pricing equation (2.13) is specified at the local market level, con­
sidering the firm’s marginal cost of servicing the market, which clearly depends on the location 
of its plant.
24The features of the data fisted below recall some elements behind the rejection.
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firm ;firm i
< >
1 IN
Delivered prices when firms set only a mill price (constant 
price-cost margin indicated by smooth vertical arrow)
m M  H  Delivered prices when firms set prices at each local market
(varying price-cost margin indicated by dashed vertical arrow)
Figure 3-1: Circular road model with uniform demand and price-setting firms: 
uniform (FOB) mill pricing vs. price discrimination
this mill price and the transportation cost, this is clearly inadequate as a model 
explaining outcomes in the Brazilian cement industry. Some features of the data 
are worth recalling briefly: (i) Brazil’s cement firms set (delivered) prices at the 
local market level and are not locked into rigid mill pricing; (ii) prices are quite 
uniform across Brazil’s local (coastal) cement markets, including those markets 
where many firms meet; (iii) in any given local market, prices considerably exceed 
the marginal cost of even the least efficient producers serving the market; and (iv) 
more than one firm typically sells into any given local market2 5  (though market 
shares can be very different), in contrast to the prediction of the spatial competition 
model above with price-setting firms where at any given local market no more than 
one firm sells (unless the market is a marginal market). I conclude that no further 
insight is presently provided over the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter
2. Thus, one is back to requiring some dynamic story as the restraining effect of 
potential entry to reconcile inelastic market demand and the exercise of market
25 Often times a given reseller in a given local market will shelve multiple brands (owned by 
different cement firms).
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power.
3.3.2 Q uantity-setting firms in the circular road model
I briefly review the circular road model with firms setting quantities, as opposed to 
prices, in each local market. This is the model of Greenhut and Greenhut (1975)26. 
Similar to before, consumers are distributed along a line segment2 7  of length L. 
Demand at each “point” I is given by the inverse (“spaceless”) demand function 
P =  /. w w / > where p is the delivered price and q(l) is demand per unit distance (thus 
revenue in the interval [I, I +  dl\ is given by p{q{l))q{l)dl). Heterogeneous Cournot 
firms are placed at different points of the line segment. The authors are interested 
in obtaining the delivered price schedule along the fine segment, analysing how 
it changes (in level and slope) as the number and location of firms, or demand 
conditions, vary. The equilibrium at each point (local market I) is found by solving 
a set of pricing equations, one for each firm, as given by equation (2.13), with Op 
replaced by ^  (Cournot behaviour) and c(qi, q*,.) decomposed into a production
26McBride (1983) applies this model to the US cement industry in his analysis of vertical 
integration.
27The choice of a line segment, as opposed to a more “realistic” two-dimensional space is again 
due to analytical tractability, with no loss of generality.
^
marginal cost MCi and a transport cost T^ : 2 8  2 9
pl + PL?iL = MCi + Til (3.6)
riiQi
The market equilibrium condition can then be found by adding the pricing equation 
across all firms shipping to a given location (for which there is an interior solution) 
and dividing by this number of firms (denoted n):
n  77, n n
11 1=1 Z=1
For the sake of illustration, assume, as Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) do, de­
mand of the exponential form =  1  — (J )7, defined for all strictly positive values 
of demand q and parameters a, (3 and 7 . Consider first a situation where there are 
no homogeneous firms (constant marginal cost c) located at the left extremity of 
the line segment, point O (see the left-hand panel of Figure 3-2). In this case the 
equilibrium delivered price schedule can easily be shown to be (linear and) increas­
ing in distance from the plant, where an increase in the number of firms no leads 
to lower prices but a steeper schedule. (For simplicity, assume as before a constant 
unit transportation cost t.) For a finite number of firms, the slope of the delivered
28 Compared to equation (2.13), the econometric error has also been dropped, time subscripts 
have been omitted for simplicity, and the equality sign should be replaced by an inequality <  in 
the case of a corner solution.
29Notice further that while in Chapter 2 pricing equation (2.13), or similarly the Cournot test 
statistic (2.15), were taken to the data with local markets (on the demand side -  note footnote 3 in 
the Appendix to Chapter 2) defined at the state level, the present setup highlights the definition 
of local markets as separate infinitesimal markets distributed over a continuum in space.
How can one tentatively estimate demand curves at a more disaggregated (local) level (say, the 
level of municipality) when market demand data is observed only at the more aggregated state 
level? (Note that on average there are 200 municipalities in each state, totalling around 5600 for 
Brazil as a whole.) Begin by estimating a given state’s demand curve from state-specific data. 
This (inverse) demand curve is the result of horizontally aggregating the inverse demand curves 
for each municipality, or local market, located in that state. Now assume that the reservation 
price of the highest-valuation consumer in each municipality is the same across municipalities (i.e. 
the price intercept is the same). Assume also that as the market size of municipalities (given by 
their population sizes) varies, the demand curves change multiplicatively (i.e. they swivel around 
the price intercept). From state S ’s (inverse) demand curve given by, say, p =  a s  — fisQi one 0311 
back out municipality M ’s demand curve p =  c*a/ ~  ft m Qi where c*m =  c*s and (3M =  
denoting municipality M ’s population and Ys := J2m €s Fm being the total population of state 
S. It is easy to see that (at a given price) a low elasticity of demand at the state-level implies an 
equally low elasticity of demand at the municipality level.
The reason why this is not done in Chapter 2 is that on the supply side I observe plants’ 
shipments disaggregated no further than the state level.
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Figure 3-2: Exponential demand along line segment and Cournot firms: price 
discrimination in equilibrium
price schedule is less than i; in other words, price discrimination (in favour of more 
distant buyers) takes place in equilibrium. As drawn, no shipments take place to 
markets beyond point A  since the total marginal cost (production and transporta­
tion) exceeds the reservation price of the highest-valuation consumer (given by /?). 
Consider a second illustrative situation where to the first situation, til firms (exoge­
nously) enter at the right extremity of the line segment, point L  (see the right-hand 
panel; assume tll < no and that the costs of entrants are also c). Markets located 
between C (where delivered prices equal the total marginal cost of the entering 
firms) and D (found similarly) are now shared between the incumbents located at 
point O and the entrants located at point L; delivered prices in the subsegment 
CD fall compared to the pre-entry situation. Notice also that markets located in 
the subsegment DA  are no longer supplied by firms located at O, and delivered 
prices also fall30.
30Note that if increases to n o ,  P l  will fall to p o ,  the subsegment D A  supplied only by these 
firms located at L  will increase, and the subsegment C D  supplied by all firms will now be shorter 
and have uniform prices.
Finally, note that if O  and L were “sufficiently close” such that the delivered cost were every­
where lower than p o  (equal to p l , assuming n o  =  ^ l ) ,  prices would be uniform across all 
markets.
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Discussion in light of th e  fram ework of C hap ter 2 Clearly the solution to 
this model better fits the stylised facts of the Brazilian cement industry that were 
recalled in the earlier discussion of the circular road model with price-setting firm s  
(e.g. prices can be uniform across local markets -  see footnote 30 -  and cross- 
hauling takes places where the spatial markets of firms located at different points 
overlap, such as in subsegment CD). Yet what is relevant to the discussion here 
is that, as in the version with price-setting firms, this model with quantity-setting 
firms is already nested in the theoretical framework adopted in Chapter 2. To see 
this notice that, as mentioned above, pricing equation (3.6) corresponds to pricing 
equation (2.13) with Cournot behaviour (or is simply the unconstrained Cournot 
reaction function (2.7) of Section 2.2.3 defined at each local market). (Again, 
while the model is considered as a candidate for representing behaviour generating 
outcomes in the industry, it is empirically rejected -  see Section 2.4.4.) Once 
again, I conclude that no further insight is presently provided over the theoretical 
framework proposed in Chapter 2. Thus, in order to reconcile the low market price 
elasticities of demand with the exercise of market power in the industry, one is back 
to requiring some dynamic story such as the restraining effect of potential entry.
3.4 R obustness checks in the demand estim ation
The market price elasticities of demand coming out of the demand estimation in 
Chapter 2 are of the order of —0.5 for each local market. This is very low. Such 
low values could make one worry that they are actually underestimates of the 
“true” elasticities. I therefore perform several robustness checks, in addition to the 
specification tests of the preceding chapter. The overall conclusion arising from 
these checks is that the demand estimates are robust. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that the occurrence of any downward bias (toward zero) in the elasticity 
estimates would only reinforce the test-of-conduct results of Section 2.4.4, that 
Cournot behaviour can be rejected in favour of more collusive conduct.
E stim ating  dem and across sta tes sim ultaneously One would expect that 
unobserved demand shocks across states should be correlated. In this case, the
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residuals eft of the market-level equations would be correlated across markets 1. 
Estimating the 17 state-level demand equations simultaneously should thus yield 
similar estimated coefficients but somewhat lower standard errors: while one would 
hope that both 3SLS estimates and (equation-by-equation) 2SLS estimates are con­
sistent, the former procedure should improve efficiency over the latter31. Though 
omitted here, I indeed find 3SLS estimates to be similar to those obtained under 
2SLS, and the standard errors are smaller. To take an example, consider again 
the largest market, Sao Paulo (SP). Evaluating exogenous demand at the mean 
of the post-stabilisation phase, the price elasticity of demand is —0.366 (standard 
error 0.038). This compares to an elasticity of —0.333 (standard error 0.060) under 
2SLS (Figure 2-12). The average 3SLS-estimated intercept in the post-stabilisation 
phase is 7.61 (standard error 0.09), compared to 7.54 (standard error 0.14) under 
2SLS32.
Rather than specifying a demand function for each state, an alternative ap­
proach is to specify only one demand function for the population of states and to 
run fixed effects instrumental-variables panel data estimation, treating each state 
as a unit and calculating clustered standard errors (i.e. clustering the observations 
pertaining to a given state). Compared to specification (2.12), one would estimate, 
for example,
log qu =  a 1 +  a 2 Ytt +  a 3 logpZt 4- afYlt logpit +  Vi +  eft (3.7)
where a f and i// are the market-specific parameters. Notice that, given the vastly 
larger number of observations (156 months x 17 states as opposed to 156 months for 
each market-level regression) relative to parameters to be estimated, this specifica­
tion increases efficiency at the expense of cross-unit restrictions oc[ =  a? VZ, Vj ^  4. 
Estimation results -  not shown -  again point to very low market price elasticities 
of demand.
31 In 3SLS a GLS approach is used to account for the correlation structure in the residuals 
across the equations.
32 Across states, the (average) post-stabilisation price elasticity seems to be smaller under 3SLS: 
the previous mean value across states of —0.41 is now —0.36.
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Functional form  and reversion of dependent variable It could be that the 
elasticity estimates are inconsistent and/or biased (downwards) due to functional 
form misspecification. To investigate this possibility, I fit alternative functional 
forms, namely semi-log-linear and linear, as opposed to the log-linear specification 
(2.12), and obtain similarly low elasticity estimates. For example, I estimate the 
linear demand equation
Qit =  +  o$Yit +  o^pn +  ot^Yitpit +  eft (3*8)
Though again not shown, the fitted (linear) demand curves in 16 out of the 17 states 
rotate anticlockwise upon stabilisation: the coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative for these 16 states and significantly so at the 5% level in 13 of them33. The 
average price elasticity across states, computed for each state at the means for the 
two sub-samples, again almost doubles from —0.20 in the pre-stabilisation phase 
to —0.39 upon stabilisation, varying in the latter post-stabilisation phase from a 
minimum (in absolute) of —0.10 to a maximum of —0.67.
Thus when consumption (or its log) is taken as the dependent variable, market 
price elasticities of demand are estimated in each case at around -0.4 to -0.5. On 
the other hand, when prices are taken as the dependent variable, the elasticity is 
estimated to be higher, at around -0.7 to -0.8. However, the fit suffers significantly
33Recall that YijPOSt >  Y/)Pre across all states I and realise that with linear demand =  
af  +  afYit; thus the fitted demand curve rotates anticlockwise upon stabilisation iff af  <  0 , since 
the estimated |y  pott \ Yipre  Is then af(YijP03t — Yi>pre) <  0. The mean elasticity in
the pre-stabilisation period is computed at the means of the variables as (df 4- afYijPre) 
(similarly for the post-stabilisation period). That demand becomes more elastic as the general 
price level in the economy stabilises from a high rate of inflation makes for interesting reading. 
How can one interpret such a finding? Intuitively, as the rate of change of the prices of goods and 
services falls, prices become more meaningful to consumers, carrying greater signal as opposed to  
noise, making demand more sensitive to  variation in prices. Given the potential error associated 
with the measurement of prices in an inflationary environment, one must cautiously interpret 
the empirical finding that the price elasticity of demand for cement increased upon stabilisation; 
however, the estimate that it almost doubled on average across states seems to be a strong result. 
Much research has been conducted about the economic effects of general price stabilisation, but 
the hypothesis that stabilisation may lead to increased elasticity of demand has not been tested  
extensively in the empirical literature. Notice that such an anticlockwise demand rotation would, 
in the presence of market power on the part of producers, put downward pressure on prices in 
equilibrium. In the case at hand, cement prices did indeed fall concomitant with stabilisation, but 
I have argued earlier that, because of the binding imports constraint, this was due to a reduction 
in the marginal cost of imports (brought about by an appreciation of the local currency and the 
trade liberalising reforms of the early 1990s), rather than a change in the slope of market demand.
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Figure 3-3: Goodness of fit in the estimation of demand for the state of Minas 
Gerais (MG). Left panel: Fit of a 2SLS regression of log consumption on log 
exogenous demand, log price and an interaction variable, as in (2.12). Right panel: 
Fit of a 2SLS regression of log price on log exogenous demand, log consumption 
and an interaction variable.
and the choice of prices as the dependent variable appears to be forcing the esti- 
mation of a higher elasticity. Figure 3-3 plots the fit of repression (9. 19"! -  i p a
1991, leading to a large and immediate increase in prices, to identify the demand 
curve (I assume that demand conditions in this period were largely unchanged.) 
Estimated elasticities are again of the order of -0.2 to -0.3, in line with the estimates 
in Figure 2-14 for the pre-stabilisation phase.
Dynam ics Another possibility is that while in the “short-run” the elasticity 
amounts to around -0.5, the “long-run” elasticity is higher. Using an autore­
gressive distributed lag (ADL) demand specification, where prices are regressed 
on consumption, lagged consumption and lagged prices, Roller and Steen (2002) 
estimate a long-run elasticity of -1.47, compared to the short-run elasticity of -
0.46. The authors argue that “(t)his is in fine with intuition, as other materials 
like wood and metal can be substituted for cement in the long run” (p. 10). While 
intuitive, it is not clear why the difference between the short-run and the long-run 
elasticities should be this large, particularly in the Brazilian context, where cement 
is sold primarily to small-scale consumers who in reality do not have substitutes 
available and, if facing a shortfall, would rather tend to postpone their construc­
tion activities. (Note, for example, that the use of cement in highway construction, 
has to date been minimal, and large-scale buyers, who purchase cement in bulk as 
opposed to bags, account for only 20% of shipments. One can argue that dynamic 
effects of demand by Brazil’s small-scale consumers, to the extent that they matter 
at all, may be present in the direction of yielding a lower price elasticity of de­
mand in the long-term, the reverse of what Roller and Steen estimate for Norway.) 
Nor is it clear what is meant by “long-run” and which lags should be included 
in the ADL demand specification, particularly to the extent that observations in 
the present study are frequent (monthly rather than annual). Further, even if one 
could theoretically argue, and empirically demonstrate, that the long-run elasticity 
were significantly higher, it is not clear either why producers going about making 
their supply decisions should consider a long-term slope for the demand curve as 
opposed to a short-term one35.
35Despite these reservations, I have attempted to estimate an ADL specification a la Roller and 
Steen (2002), including 6 to 12 month lags, with no success.
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3.5 U sing a gravity m odel to  analyse the flow o f 
shipm ents
The trade literature has extensively used the gravity model to explain the flow of 
trade and investment between countries. In a typical gravity model, such bilateral 
flows -  indexed by the source country, the host country, and the time interval 
-  are regressed on some measure of the host country’s market size, the source 
country’s market size and the physical distance between the countries. Feenstra 
(2002) describes the gravity equation as “perform(ing) extremely well empirically” 
(p.491). Other explanatory variables may be added to the equation, such as the 
flow of communication between countries (Loungani et al 2002) or some proxy of 
border effects (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Feenstra 2002).
In this section I resort to a gravity-type equation in order to statistically analyse 
the flow of cement between plants, owned by the different cement producers, and 
markets (identified with states). Of greater interest than merely explaining the 
observed flows, or shipments, based on plant location and ownership, lies the “de­
tection” of outliers in the data. One example could be the absence of shipments 
from a given plant (and thus firm) to a given market where one would expect them 
to occur on account of the plant’s location and ownership alone. It is clear that 
this exercise is not structural, in that it does not follow from a model of shipments 
derived from a specification of demand and cost conditions, firm entry and be­
haviour36 -  this structural approach was pursued in Chapter 2; here I perform a 
statistical benchmarking exercise, in the spirit of the empirical trade literature37. 
Rather than arbitrarily establishing the distance over which cement can profitably 
travel (say 500 km) and from there analysing the pattern of shipments, the merit 
of this approach is that of letting the data pinpoint the firm-market pairs which do 
not conform to an “average” pattern38. By the above example, one may observe
36Nevertheless, the use of fixed effects is an (admittedly rough) attempt to control for such local 
demand and cost conditions, as explained below. The exercise conditions on entry (plant location 
and ownership). Behaviour, as well as institutional detail, should help explain the residual.
37Note, however, that a gravity equation can be derived from a monopolistic competition model 
with CES preferences (Redding and Venables 2004).
38 Recall from the introduction to this chapter that this “average” pattern of shipments is 
consistent with varying degrees of competition (i.e. alternative models of firm conduct). See also
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a firm shipping to a market located at a greater distance from its plant(s) than 
another market of similar size to which it hardly ships. The use of plant, firm 
and/or market fixed effects attempts to control for price effects, in a similar vein 
to that of the trade literature (e.g. Redding and Venables 2004). Indeed, such 
outliers may be a result of historical accident, such as a product quality incident 
in the past which tarnished the image of a given producer in a given local market. 
Yet the occurrence of outliers is also consistent with tacit or explicit geographic 
market division on the part of producers. Two qualifications need to be made at 
this point. First, such outliers may be picked up to the extent that data on flows 
is “sufficiently” disaggregated on the spatial dimension; in the situation at hand, 
the data available is broken out at the state level, i.e. I observe shipments for 
each plant-state pair as opposed to a (preferred) plant-municipality pair. Second, 
the location and ownership of plants is the outcome of a complex and long-term 
sequence of decisions. In this exercise, I condition on the spatial distribution and 
ownership of plants at each time interval. To the extent that historical accident, 
geographic market division and other unobserved institutional aspects (e.g. avail­
ability of limestone reserves, or constraints on the number of brands resellers can 
stock) influence the entry of plants and firms, as one expects they should, the 
observation and lack of observation of outliers must be interpreted with caution.
Given that for many firm-market pairs zero shipments are observed39,1 estimate 
the following tobit model:
Qfit =  Qjit Qfit — 7i +  7 2 dfit +  73«* +  74^fit +  tfit > 0 (3.9)
=  0 otherwise
where qfit denotes cement shipments from firm / ’s plants to market I in year t, 
dfit is some measure of the physical distance from firm / ’s plants to market I in 
year t, Yu is some measure (or a vector of measures) of the exogenous demand for 
cement in market I in year t, and I  fit is an indicator variable indicating whether 
firm /  owns a plant located in market I in year t. The inclusion of I  fit attempts to
footnote 47.
39RecalI from Figure 2-7 that the mean number of firms shipping to each state in 1999 is 5.7.
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capture within-state border effects, since states are identified with markets. The 
base measure for Yu is construction activity, as used in the estimation of demand. I 
use two alternative specifications for distance. d^lt is the average distance travelled 
from firm / ’s plants to market I, weighted by that firm’s observed shipments from 
its plants to that market each year (or, if zero shipments are observed, then it is the 
distance from the market of firm / ’ s closest plant). Given the somewhat endogenous 
nature of the shipment-weighted average distance djlt, in that unobserved shocks 
may impact both dflt and qju via their impact on the flow of cement, I alternatively 
use d2f lt\ this is the physical distance between market I and firm / ’s closest plant 
in year t, regardless of how much that plant actually ships40.
Figure 3-4 presents the results. Regressions depicted in columns (1) through 
(6) consider the logarithms of <?//*, dfit and Yu- Column (1) includes only distance 
dflt and market size Yit. (2) adds the firm-located-in-market dummy Ifit- All esti­
mated coefficients have the expected sign, and are significantly different from zero. 
(Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, unless otherwise noted, are displayed 
in parentheses.) Of note, the elasticity of shipments with respect to distance is very 
high: a 1% increase in a firm’s plants’ average distance to a market is associated 
with a 2.7 to 3.7% reduction in shipments. For the sake of comparison, estimates 
of the elasticity of bilateral trade flows with respect to distance in the international 
trade literature are typically in the order of -0.8 to -1.5% (Loungani et al 2002). 
By regression (2), within-state border effects appear very high: controlling for dis­
tance, having a plant located within the market (state), raises shipments by 6%. It 
could be that state borders are playing a role in the (tacit) coordination of firms’ 
strategies. However, the magnitude of this within-state border effect is not robust 
to the addition of market effects and firm effects. This is what regressions (3) to 
(5) show. Compared to (2), specification (3) adds market effects, (4) adds firm
40Formally, d jlt := min^c0/t (du), where O ft is the set of plants owned by firm /  in year t.
In both d1 and (P, distances to a given market are taken to be the distance to the corresponding 
state’s capital city -  each state in Brazil has a state capital, which almost invariably is its most 
populous city. While this is an approximation to the true distance to market -  a plant may 
certainly ship to municipalities other than the state capital, possibly located closer to it -  this 
avoids the need to arbitrarily pick the distribution of a plant’s shipments across municipalities 
within a state. Unfortunately, I do not observe the breakdown of a plant’s shipments across 
municipalities within a state.
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effects, and (5) adds market effects and firm effects. While the distance elasticity 
is robust to the addition of market effects and firm effects -  compare (5) with (2) 
-  the within-state border effect is now lower, though still significantly positive, as 
expected. However, notice that the addition of market effects considerably raises 
the market size elasticity. It is somewhat counterintuitive that a 1% increase in a 
market’s construction activity would be associated with a 7% increase in a firm’s 
shipments to that market. Rather, given that increases in market size tend to 
invite entry -  and recall from Chapter 2 that the number of firms shipping to a 
market is indeed increasing in its size -  one would expect the market size elasticity 
to be closer to 1 (and perhaps less than 1). The probable solution to this puzzling 
result is that the magnitude of the estimated market elasticity must be analysed 
jointly with the estimated market fixed effects (not shown): indeed the larger mar­
kets tend to have a large negative fixed effect (e.g. Sao Paulo state, with -8.5) as 
compared to the smaller states (e.g. Piarn state, with +9.4). The identification of 
the estimated market size elasticity of 7% in (5) thus appears to come from the 
variation of market size over time and not across states. It is possible that the 
observed increase in market size over the time period is correlated with changes to 
market structure. As discussed in Appendix C, over the time period such changes 
to market structure have typically consisted of a large firm acquiring a smaller firm 
with plants in local markets where the acquirer previously hardly shipped to. Upon 
such an acquisition (merger), two firm-market observations per market become one 
(merged-)firm-market observation, where the dependent variable shipments is now 
the sum of shipments from the merging firms’ plants. In a period of growing market 
size, the market size variable may be picking up the effect of such changes in market 
structure, which are not controlled for. Regression (5) was reestimated dropping 
the market size variable Y/t , allowing the (cross-sectional) variation in market size 
to be picked up by the market effects only (results are not shown). Importantly, 
the estimated distance elasticity, and the within-state border effect, do not vary. 
This result lends credence to the consistency of these estimates. Another robust­
ness check was conducted by assuming that plants acquired by firms over the time 
period had been owned by the acquirers throughout the time period, thus in a sense 
controlling for market structure changes. The estimated coefficient on market size
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is now lower (4.13 compared to 6.84 in (5)), but the estimates for distance and the 
within-state border effect remain largely unchanged.
Regression (6) replaces djlt by the alternative minimum-distance measure djlt, 
suggesting that the results are fairly robust to the measure of physical distance. The 
same regressions were then repeated, but using variables q/n, dfit and Yit linearly 
rather than their logarithmic transformations. Figure 3-4 displays estimates for 
regression (7), the linear counterpart to regression (5). A 100 km increase in 
distance is on average associated with a 31.5 kt (315.08 t/km  x 100 km) reduction 
in a firm’s shipments to a market41. Notice that Figure 3-4 also displays “clustered” 
standard errors for regressions (5) and (7) where a same firm’s shipments to a same 
market over time are treated as a cluster (i.e. clustering by firm and market). This 
allows for observations which are not independent within a cluster, corresponding to 
shipments in different years (though still requiring observations to be independent 
between clusters).
The fitted gravity equation can then be used to establish outliers in the data. 
Consider shipments by the eight largest firms to each of the six largest markets 
in 1999: Sao Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais (MG), Rio de Janeiro (R J ), Bahia (BA), 
Parand (PR) and Rio Grande do Sul (RS)42. Figure 3-5 compares actual shipments 
to shipments predicted by the linear specification (7) of the gravity model in the 
year 1999.43
41 Given the laxge variation in population density across the different “regions” of Brazil (North, 
Northeast, Southeast, South and Centrewest), regressions (5) and (7) -  variables in logs and in 
linear form respectively -  were modified allowing the coefficient on the distance variable to vary 
across regions. In the modified log-form specification (5’), estimated distance elasticities range 
from -3.2 for shipments to markets in the North and Northeast, to -1.9 for shipments to the 
Centrewest. However, equality of estimated distance elasticities across regions cannot be rejected 
in all but one pairwise test. I thus maintain specification (5) where the same distance elasticity 
applies for shipments to all markets in the country (estimated at -2.6, such that a 1% increase in 
average distance is associated with a 2.6% reduction in shipments). As for the modified linear form 
specification (7’), a 100 km increase in distance is associated with a statistically-different reduction 
in shipments to markets across regions: this varies from a 10-20 kt reduction in shipments to 
markets in the less-densely populated North, Northeast and Centrewest regions, to a 800-1100 kt 
reduction in shipments to markets in the relatively developed and densely populated Southeast 
and South.
42 These states are adjacent to one another and are located around the Southeast region of the 
country -  see Figure 2-6.
43This is done for selected firms -  the firms remaining following the acquisitions over the 90s. 
It is also interesting to plot actual shipments against predicted shipments for these firms in each
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Figure 
3-4: 
Gravity 
equation 
estim
ates
Log-linear Linear
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (5) w ith  
cluster, s.e .1
(7) (7) w ith  
cluster, s.e .1
Average distance -3.741 *** 
(0.132)
-2.701 *** 
(0.159)
-3.293 *** 
(0.181)
-2.089 *** 
(0.131)
-2.604 *** 
(0.142)
-2.604 *** 
(0.348)
-315.1
(36.2)
*** -315.1 
(85.2)
Market size 1.734 *** 1.547*** 9.741 *** 2.176 *** 6.848 *** 6.607 *** 6.848 *** 738.6 738.6
(0.146) (0.143) (1.504) (0 .1 2 2 ) (1.289) (1.310) (1.255) (235.8) (238.8)
Firm-located-in-market dummy 
Alternative: Minimum distance
6.295 *** 
(0.535)
4.276 *** 
(0.582)
3.281 *** 
(0.544)
1.490 *** 
(0.503)
1.098
(0.614)
-2.080
(0 .1 2 1 )
1.490
(1.247)
*++
353255
(21036)
353255
(51592)
Constant 14.216 *** 7.496 *** -31.426 *** 2.296 -18.617 *** -21.169 -18.617 *** -121876 -121876
(1.372) (1.452) (7.804) (2.343) (6.821) (6.902) (7.010) (82962) (115270)
Market fixed effects NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
Firm fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
N o. observations Uncensored 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187 1187
Total 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484 3484
Log likelihood -5299.0 -5256.3 -5114.9 -4909.4 -4751.3 -4793.8 -4751.3 -17321.1 -17321.1
Note: Cement flow as the dependent variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
(Two-tailed tests) *** Significantly different from zero) at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level
1 Firm-market pairs are defined as clusters; allowing for observations which are not independent within cluster (although they must be independent between clusters)
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Figure 3-5: Comparison of actual shipments to shipments predicted by the gravity 
model. In 1999, for the 6 largest markets, using the linear specification.
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There axe several instances where actual shipments axe significantly different 
from predicted shipments (at the 5% level). Take shipments to the state of MG, for 
example. On the basis of plant location and maxket size, the gravity model predicts 
that Votorantim’s shipments in 1999 should approximately fall within the 450-1350 
kt confidence interval. Yet they amount to a mere 402 kt, corresponding to an 8% 
volume share, despite MG being the second laxgest maxket and Votorantim owning 
a plant located in MG (in addition to five plants located in the neighbouring states 
of SP  and RJ)U. On the other hand, actual shipments by both Lafaxge (1,267 kt, 
or a 25% share) and Holcim (l,240kt, or a 24% share) are significantly higher than 
the gravity model would predict on the basis of plant location and maxket size 
(conditional on observed plant location). This pattern is somewhat similar in the 
neighbouring state of RJ, the third laxgest maxket. Votorantim, with two plants 
located within the state, ships an actual 796 kt (21% share) against a predicted 
(point estimate of) 917 kt (though the difference is not significant at the two-tailed 
5% level). Again, actual shipments by both Lafaxge (943 kt, or a 25% share) 
and Holcim (1,030 kt, or a 27% share) significantly exceed predicted shipments 
(respectively 488 kt and 644 kt). However, when it comes to the state of SP, the 
laxgest market, this pattern is inverted. Votorantim, with three plants located in 
that state, ships an amount vastly higher than that predicted by the gravity model: 
5,828 kt (corresponding to a 50% share) axe shipped as against a predicted interval 
between 560 kt and 2,670 kt. Actual shipments for both Lafaxge (555 kt, or a 5% 
share) and Holcim (1,068 kt, or a 9% share) fall short of their predicted shipments, 
though these differences axe not significant at the 5% level. Further relating to the 
large SP  maxket, shipments by Brennand (with a plant located in the south of the 
state of GO, almost adjacent to the state of SP) and Itambe (with a plant located 
in the state of PR, close to SP; firm 10 in Figure 2-6) fall fax short of that predicted 
by the gravity model.
One could argue that actual shipments differ from predicted levels owing to price
of the nine years 1991 to 1999, with the 45° diagonal depicting where actual shipments equal 
predicted shipments. These plots are not included for the sake of brevity but can be obtained 
from the author.
44Note further that, in stark contrast, Votorantim’s share in the neighbouring state of SP 
amounts to 50% (5,828 kt) -  see below. Of these 5,828 kt, Votorantim’s plant in MG contributes 
1,182 kt, while it ships only 340 kt within MG.
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effects, to a large extent not captured by the gravity model despite the inclusion 
of fixed effects. By this argument, for example, Itambe’s marginal cost in serving 
the SP market (from a plant located in PR) could be sufficiently high, or cement 
prices in SP could be sufficiently low, that it is not profitable for Itambe to increase 
shipments to SP. But as I show in Chapter 2, where I directly calculate costs based
on engineering estimates and factor prices, cement prices exceed marginal cost
and the hypothesis of Cournot behaviour is rejected45. By way of the example, 
there appears to be “something else” holding back Itambe’s shipments to SP as 
compared to an “average” pattern of shipments46. This could be, say, a quality 
incident in the past which tarnished its corporate image in the SP  market. More 
convincingly, however, Itambe’s shying away from the huge SP  market next door to 
it is consistent with a market division or a multimarket contact story a la Bernheim 
and Whinston (1990)47.
A similar benchmarking exercise can be applied by fitting the following alter­
native gravity-type model to (3.9):
Sfit =  s)lt if s)it =  7 i +  72d//t +  i zIfit +  ef it > 0 (3.10)
=  0 otherwise
45To provide a flavour of the test of conduct of the preceding chapter, if Itambe were to behave 
in Cournot fashion, it would raise shipments to SP. Assuming perfectly-competitive resellers, and 
considering (i) a market price elasticity of demand of -0.5, (ii) Itambe’s share of shipments in SP  
of only 0.06%, and (iii) consumer prices of approximately R$ 10 /  bag at the end of 1999, Itambe 
would increase shipments as long as its marginal cost (including the reseller’s margin) fell short 
of its perceived marginal revenue: 1 0+ 3^ 0 .06%  ~  10. Similar reasoning applies to Lafarge and 
Holcim’s shipments to SP, respectively with shares of 7% and 9%.
46 See the following footnote and the discussion of the identification problem of conduct and 
cost in the introduction to this chapter.
47 Clearly the gravity model is an imperfect statistical device for detecting market division. To 
illustrate, consider a hypothetical situation where producers were to divide markets in the extreme 
and, as a result, cement were hardly to travel. All that the gravity-equation estimates would 
suggest is that the elasticity of shipments with respect to distance would be very high, and this 
would be consistent with competitive behaviour. Nevertheless, to the extent that market division 
is “incomplete” and consumers and producers are unevenly distributed over space, estimates from 
the gravity equation may point at some interesting outliers, where cement travels less (or more) 
than the “average”.
Ideally a researcher would wish to observe a natural experiment in the degree of antitrust 
enforcement -  say, different regional markets subject to different degrees of enforcement, or a given 
region seeing an increase in the degree of enforcement over time -  and hope to learn something 
from (cross-sectional or times-series) changes to the distance elasticity. This is a possible avenue 
for future research.
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where s*flt := is firm / ’s share of shipments to market I in year t. The maxket
size variable Yu is dropped in this shipment-share version (3.10) as compared to 
specification (3.9); market effects and firm effects axe again included. Estimated 
coefficients (not shown) on both the distance variable and the within-state border 
effect have the expected sign and are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. A 100 km increase in the distance to a market is associated with a 2.6% 
reduction in the shipment share (clustered standaxd error of 0.25%). Controlling 
for distance, having a plant located within a market is associated with a 19.5% 
increase in shipment share (clustered standard error of 2.9%): this again suggests 
that state borders may be playing an important role in the (tacit) coordination of 
firms’ strategies.
Figure 3-6 compares actual shipments in 1996 against predicted shipments to 
markets located in the northeast region, ranging from the state of Maranhao (MA) 
to the state of Sergipe {SE). Three producers have been dominant in this region 
throughout the 1990s: Votorantim, GJS and Brennand. To illustrate, consider 
the relatively large maxket of Ceara (CE). Both Votorantim and GJS own a plant 
located within CE, with the latter firm owning a further two plants nearby (see 
Figure 2-6). Yet Votorantim has over three times GJS’s share of shipments in CE. 
While the shaxe-version of the gravity equation predicts a shaxe of 53%, Votorantim 
commands an actual 71% shaxe in 1996, with GJS accounting for an actual shaxe 
of only 22% against a predicted 46%48. Note further that Votorantim also ships to 
CE from its plant in the state of Paxaiba, PB, 700 km away. In contrast, Brennand, 
operating a plant in PB  next door to Votorantim’s plant in PB, hardly ships to 
CE. While Brennand’s actual shaxe of shipments to CE amounts to only 3%, the 
gravity equation predicts a much higher shaxe, of 13%. In PB, howevex, Brennand 
appears to enjoy a free hand: countering prediction, Brennand has an actual shaxe 
of shipments in PB that is double that of Votorantim, also located within the 
state. A story where Votorantim tacitly agrees to give Brennand the upper hand
48 Interestingly, in 1991 GJS hauled significant quantities of cement through CE from its plants 
located in the states of RN  and PE  in the east, bound for the state of PA in the west, approxi­
mately 2000 km away. Consumer prices in PA at the time were only slightly higher than those in 
CE, and GJS’s 20% share of shipments in CE already paled in comparison to Votorantim’s 76%. 
(In PA, by contrast, GJS’s shipment share of 77% dwarfed Votorantim’s 23% share.)
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in PB in exchange for the latter staying away from CE would help explain the 
observed flows. A similar situation occurs between Votorantim and Brennand in 
the small and adjacent states of Alagoas, AL (Brennand commands an 83% share 
and operates a plant within the state) and Sergipe, SE  (Votorantim commands an 
89% share and operates a plant within the state, though also shipping from as far 
as its plant in PB, 600 km away). Of note, prices in both AL and SE  are similar 
to that in other markets to which cement is shipped over greater distances49.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has explored the robustness and validity of different theoretical and 
estimation-related modelling aspects and findings which concern the preceding 
chapter. By providing examples of simple dynamic multimarket games where mar­
ket division can be supported in equilibrium, it indicates the rationality of the type 
of conduct in the Brazilian cement industry that was identified previously. On de­
vising strategies which take multimarket contact into account, firms can achieve 
complete market division, limiting cross-hauling and maximising aggregate profit. 
The chapter then reviews some seminal models from the spatial competition liter­
ature to validate the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. A variety of additional 
robustness and specification tests of the demand estimation of that chapter are 
then performed. Finally, a gravity model is estimated to analyse cement ship­
ments. While gravity equations have been extensively used in the trade literature 
to analyse the effect of distance, broadly defined, on cross-industry trade and in­
vestment flows, this chapter’s gravity exercise using a rich industry-specific dataset 
-  complemented by the structural estimation of the preceding chapter -  points to 
a potential identification problem in the trade literature’s use of gravity models: 
that estimated distance effects may also be proxying for firms’ strategies of dividing
49This example was provided as a “case in point” in Section 2.4.4. If Brennand behaved in 
Cournot fashion, its perceived marginal revenue in the state of SE, next door to its plant in AL, 
would be p  4- ^-g.0% =  p, where the price elasticity is —0.5 and its share of shipments is 0% 
(it does not ship to SE). As seen in Chapter 2, its marginal cost is lower than p, if only because 
its plant in AL ships to the states of PB, PE  and BA, located at further distances than SE and 
where prices are similar to those in SE. Thus the hypothesis of Cournot behaviour can be rejected 
in favour of more collusive conduct.
164
Figure 3-6: Comparison of actual shipments to shipments predicted by the gravity 
model. In 1996, for markets in the northeast (MA to SE), using the volume-share 
version of the linear specification.
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(geographic) markets.
A. A ppendix to  Chapter 1
A .l P roof o f Corollary 1.1 and other sufficient con­
ditions that rule out N ash-strategy sets (d), (e) 
and (f) as candidate equilibria, in the case of sym ­
m etry
I begin by proving Corollary 1.1. Consider the first part of the sufficient condition, 
namely that {9 \ > 0} C {9 \ $n{9) > 0} . It rules out sets (e) and (f) as
candidate equilibria. To see this, notice that if either set (e) or set (f) forms an 
equilibrium, necessary conditions from Proposition 1.2 are that > 0 and $ 7 7  < 0. 
Hence if whenever > 0 it happens that $>u >  0 , i.e. if $ //  > 0 | > 0, then
neither set (e) nor set (f) can form an equilibrium. (Recall that, from the symmetry 
property, =  <fv and $ 7 7  =  <fV/- is thus the surplus from any merger in 
isolation. $ // is thus the surplus from any merger conditional on the merger of 
the rival set of firms.) Now consider the second part of the sufficient condition, 
namely that {9 | $//(0) > 0} C {9 \ $ 7 7 7 (0 ) > 0} . It rules out set (d) as a candidate 
equilibrium. To see this, notice that if set (d) forms an equilibrium, necessary 
conditions are that $ 7 7  > 0 and <&ui < 0. Hence if whenever $ 7 7  > 0 it happens 
that $ ///  > 0, i.e. if $ 7 7 7  > 0 | $ 7 7  > 0, then set (d) cannot form an equilibrium. 
(Recall that, from the symmetry property, n M l ) S 3  =  n M2 )5 3  and DiGAti ^ . * 0  =
X^iGA12 t h a t  $777 H a71)S3 5^iGAti ^*>so njV72,s3 X^iGA12 ^ I I I
t h u s  A l i - f i r m s ’ o r  M . 2- f ir m s ’ d iffe r e n c e  in  p r o f it s  w h e n  t w o  m e r g e r s  a r e  u n d e r ta k e n  
o v er  n o  m e r g e r  b e in g  u n d e r ta k e n .)  Q.E.D.
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Inspection of Proposition 1.2 indicates other sufficient conditions that rule out 
Nash-strategy sets (d), (e) and/or (f) as candidate equilibria. I provide three.
1 . Set (d) is ruled out as an equilibrium if the sum of payoffs of independent 
firms in M.x (A42) is always lower under the fragmented maxket structure So 
(so) than under the more concentrated market structure Si (s2), where the 
rival set of firms has merged.
Proof. If set (d) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions from Propo­
sition 1 . 2  axe that $ // > 0  and < 0 , i.e. T\.m2,sz — Sie.M2  ^  0  
and IImi,s3  — YlieMi ^ , * 0  <  0. From the definition of symmetry, these two 
conditions can be combined into n *>s° =  X)ie.M2  n ^so > n Ml)s3  =
nM2 , S 3  ^  X]igai2  ^mi* Hence if ^2i£Mi *^>so ^2ieM2 ^Mo —
HizMr n <,«! =  n ^ 2  (note that this occurs iff $ 7/ < then set (d)
cannot form an equilibrium. Note that this condition and the second part 
of the sufficient condition of Corollary 1 . 1  are based on the same necessary 
conditions from Proposition 1.2; they axe not, however, equivalent. ■
2 . Set (e) is ruled out as an equilibrium if the payoff to merged firm Mi (M2) 
is always lower under maxket structuxe s 2  (si), where the rival set of firms 
has not merged, than under the more concentrated market structure S 3  ( S 3 ) ,  
where the two mergers have been undertaken.
Proof. If set (e) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions are that $ //  < 0 
and $jv  ^  0 ) i-6 . ^-m2,sz l^Ji€.M2  ^ * > s 2  ^  ^ and IImi,s2  —
0. Again, from the definition of symmetry, these are jointly equivalent to 
^M llS2 n M2,5l ^  X^ i€A/i2  ^ * » « 2  ■^> ^-M2,sz Umi^* Hence if
n Mi , S 2  =  n M2,Sl < IImx.ss =  ^M2 ,sz (note that this occurs iff < $ //) then 
set (e) cannot form an equilibrium. ■
3. Both set (e) and set (f) axe ruled out as equilibria if the surplus from merging 
in isolation, when positive, is always lower than when the rival set of firms 
also merges.
Proof. If either set (e) or set (f) forms an equilibrium, necessary conditions 
are that $ / > 0 and <E>j/ < 0. Hence if whenever $ / > 0 it happens that
1 6 8
* 1  < $ 7 7 , i.e. if $ / < <&n | $ 7  > 0 , then neither set (e) nor set (f) can 
form an equilibrium. (Recall that, from the symmetry property, $ 7  =  
and $ // =  $vi.  $ 7  is thus the surplus from any merger in isolation, i.e. 
when the rival set of firms does not merge. $ 7 7  is thus the surplus from any 
merger conditional on the merger of the rival set of firms.) Notice that when 
this condition is satisfied, then the first part of the sufficient condition of 
Corollary 1 . 1  is necessarily satisfied (but the reverse is not true). ■
In addition to satisfying the sufficient condition of Corollary 1 .1 , which alone 
already rules out sets (d), (e) and (f), it can be shown that the models of Examples 
1  and 2 also satisfy sufficient conditions 1-3 just stated. That is, for all admissible 
parameter values, it holds that (1 ) $ 7 7  < $ 1 1 1 , (2 ) $ iv  < $ 7 7 , and (3) whenever 
$ 7  > 0 it happens that $ 7  < $ 7 7 . For instance, consider the Perry and Porter 
(1985) model of Example 2 and sufficient conditions 1 and 2 just stated. For sets (d) 
and (e) respectively to be supported in equilibrium, for some parameter values firms 
would need to be better off under less concentrated market structures as against 
more concentrated ones: firm Mi would need to be better off under {Mi, 2 ,4} than 
under {Mi, M2 }, or firm 1  would need to be better off under {1 , 2 ,3,4} than under 
{M2 ,1,3}. This is not the case for any combination of parameters and hence sets 
(d) and (e) can be ruled out as candidate equilibria.
Another example, not mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, is afforded by De- 
neckere and Davidson (1985)’s model of symmetrically differentiated goods with 
Bertrand competition. It is straightforward to solve the simple sequential merger 
game with two merger stages for an industry initially with four homogeneous firms 
and, say, M \  =  {1,3} and M .2 — {2,4}. For the entire range of the substitutability 
parameter, it can be shown that $iv  < 0 < $ 7  < $ 7 7  < $ 7 7 7 . Therefore, not only 
is the sufficient condition of Corollary 1 . 1  satisfied, but the other sufficient condi­
tions 1-3 just stated also hold. As such, sets (d), (e) and (f) cannot be supported in 
equilibrium. Indeed, the Bertrand assumption ensures that only set (a) obtains in 
equilibrium, with mergers taking place from each node along the equilibrium path 
of the game and also from each node lying outside the equilibrium path. Again, 
this result hinges on the response of non-participating firms to a merger. As De-
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neckere and Davidson (1985) have shown, reaction schedules under competition in 
prices are typically upward-sloping, with non-participants to a merger reacting to 
the participants’ price increase by themselves raising prices. (See also Levy and 
Reitzes 1992.)
A .2 Cross-border mergers in a vertically-differentiated  
industry
A.2.1 Historical motivation: Derivation o f the autarky equi­
librium
In order to motivate the number of firms in each country (three) and their respective 
qualities (high quality ua for firms located in country A  and low quality ub for firms 
located in country B,  such that v =  > 1), the equilibrium to the autarkic (long­
term) entry and investment game is derived1. Recall the two-stage game played 
in each country: in a first stage, firms simultaneously make entry and quality 
investment decisions while, in a second stage, they engage in Cournot competition.
In the second (market) stage, given that n firms have entered in the first (entry 
and investment) stage with qualities u = (u^), j  = 1 ,..., n, the gross profit of firm 
i (recalling the price-to-quality ratio A) is
Ui — —* CjCi \UiXi
Firm i maximises IL taking the vector of qualities u from the earlier stage and Xj, 
j  7  ^ i, as given. The first order condition is Au\ +  UiXi^  — c =  0, where from (1.2) 
we have 4 -^ =  — — &Ui =  — ^ A2, or(£j=i u3xjr  1 s 5
c — Xui S  cS 1  . .
=  Sa =  X -  ^  (4 1 >dxi
xThe specification here closely resembles Motta (1992) and the derivation follows Sutton (1998, 
Appendix 15.1).
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Summing over j ,  we obtain Y^=i uj xj 2 j= i(il“)- Using expression (1.2),
I can solve for the price-to-quality ratio, A =  2 j= i(^r)- Substituting for A in
FOC (4.1), I solve for the output of firm (variety) i:
S  „  c l .  S  n - 1 n — 1
xi =  (i -  T —) =  ~  V i x U ------- (4-2)
* ^ Ui CUi Z-jj= 1 ( Uj ) 2.7=1 ( Uj )
Note that by labelling the firm offering the lowest quality as firm 1, a necessary 
and sufficient condition for all n firms to command positive sales in equilibrium is 
ui YTj=i(^r) > 71 ~  I2- I can further solve for the price and gross profit:
^  = Xu*= c^ z r i  E ( ^ )  (4-3)j=i J
n ,  =  ( p .  -  c)xi =  ( 1  ”  1. J _ . ) 2 'S ' ( 4 . 4 )
2^7=1
Note that price does not depend on market size and that profit is increasing in 
quality and does not depend on marginal cost at equilibrium.
I now turn to the entry and investment stage. Sutton (1991, c.3) proves that at 
the unique Nash equilibrium, firms choose the same quality level u. In this case, 
uiYTj=i(^r) =  n > and f°r every firm choosing to enter, output, price and gross 
profit collapse to:
X i  =  x =  —  n (4.5)
c n l
P i = P  =  c— 2 -  (4.6)
n  — 1
^  “  n  =  3  (4-7)n *
Recall from Section 1.3 that F(u) =  u3, u > 1. (The convexity of the fixed
cost function is chosen so that, in equilibrium, three firms find it profitable to enter
each country.) Net profit per firm is given by tt(n, u) =  II (n) — F(u) — ^  — u3. 
The industry equilibrium, where n firms enter with quality u, is characterised by 
two conditions (Motta 1992):
2 That is, the lowest quality offering with positive sales has a quality that exceeds the harmonic
mean of the qualities of all offerings multiplied by (the latter approximates 1 for large n).
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(I) (Free entry) 7r(n,u) > 0 (viability) and 7r(n +  1, u) < 0  (stability)
(II) (Optimal quality3)
By considering a deviant firm i offering quality Ui when all its rivals j  ^  i offer 
a common quality u , condition (II) becomes4:
diri dlii dFi _  2S(n  -  1)2 0 2  _  n
du• |ui=u“  du• du• |u,=u~  nn3 ow -  uU ( X |  Ur U«2 K J U t u
which can be rearranged to
Given u =  ii(ra) by condition (II), and that condition (I) can be expressed as
a / t t - t — 1 < n < J .',5:.}, condition (I) may then be rewritten as Y  [u(n+l)]J — Y  Mn)]*7 w  ^
3(n +  1)3 - l < n <  / 3n3
V 2n2 -  y 2(n -  l ) 2
The only possible solution to this inequality is n =  3 and this does not depend on 
S \
The autarky equilibrium is then given by equations (4.5) to (4.8), where n =
rti =  3 firms enter in each country I € {A , B}  and the common quality, price, firm
output and firm (gross and net) profits are given by:
2 3  f s i  3 2 Si , .
= aVT’ P l  =  2 c ' x, = q7’ (49)
TT f t  f t  /  \3 f t
111 =  9 ’ *  = = 8 1
Given the assumption ui > 1, I further assinne that Si > Quality is an in­
3 As in M otta (1992), I consider only internal solutions.
4From equation (4.4), when all firm i ’s rivals offer a common quality u, I obtain EU =  (1 — 
i 1. u, )2S. Then ^  jt t t ,  and by evaluating this expression at U i = u  the marginal
n  — 1 u  1 V fi —1 ' -u /
benefit for the deviant firm i of increasing quality when all firms choose a common quality u  is 
|«i=u= un 1^^  • The SOC is satisfied at the solution n =  3 (see below).
5 This “non-convergence” result is consistent w ith the finiteness property of many vertical 
product differentiation models. The symmetry of the quality chosen by firms at equilibrium is, 
however, less common in the literature and hinges on the symmetry of consumer preferences and 
the assumption of quantity as opposed to price competition (Shaked and Sutton 1983, Sutton 
1991, M otta 1992).
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creasing function of market size so in view of the assumption that Sa > SB{> y ) ,  
quality offered by firms in country A  is at least equal to that offered by their 
counterparts in country B: u a > ub (>1).
A .2.2 Reduced-form profit functions in game w ith  T merger 
stages and (initially) T independent firms in each country
Consider the sequential cross-border merger game spelled out at the beginning of 
Section 1.3 yet embed each country initially with T  independent firms, T  > 2, and 
extend the game to T  merger stages. (The setup in Section 1.3 refers to the case 
T  =  3. See below.) Thus, the firms located in country A  (producing with quality 
ua) are labelled 1,2,3, ...,T and the firms located in country B  (quality uB) are 
labelled T  -1- 1,T +  2,T  +  3, ...,2T. In the same vein, in the first stage firms 1 
and T  +  1 decide whether to merge (if formed, merged firm is labelled Mi), in the 
second stage firms 2 and T  +  2 decide whether to merge (if formed, merged firm 
is labelled M2), and so on, in sequence until stage T, where firms T  and 2T  are 
the last pair of firms to undertake a merger decision (if formed, merged firm is 
labelled M r). The game ends at stage T  +1, the market competition stage. Given 
the symmetry, the T  +  1 possible market structures coming out of the T  merger 
stages are labelled 7’o,ri,r2, ...,7’r  where, as in Section 1.3, the subscript denotes 
the number of cross-border mergers undertaken.
To solve for market competition equilibrium outcomes as a function of market 
structure, begin by considering market structure t**, where i =  1,2,3, ...,T  — 1,
i.e. both independent and merged (multinational) firms exist (I will return to the 
“comer” structures ro and tt shortly). Specifically, under market structure u  there 
are i multinational firms, T  — i independent A-country firms and T  — i independent 
B-country firms.
By the merger-technology assumption, a multinational firm produces at quality 
level max (ua, uq) =  ua not only in country A but also in country B. Clearly, 
given the unit trade cost t > 0, it will no longer trade between countries, meet­
ing the demand for its (high-quality) product in each country through domestic
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production6.
From the demand setup, in equilibrium consumer prices in country I G {A, B}  
are such that where plj denotes the price of the good produced
by firm j  and sold in country 1. (Recall that the subscripts m, a and b denote a 
multinational firm, an independent A-country firm and an independent B-country 
firm, respectively) This may be written in terms of the quality ratio v =  ^  > 1 :
Pm =  Pa = vPb 1 € {A B}  (4.10)
Thus, to illustrate, consumer prices in country B  are given by pB and p f , 
where high-quality goods (produced by multinational firms and independent A- 
country firms) command a price premium relative to low-quality goods (produced 
by independent R-country firms).
With no loss of generality (solely for the purpose of labelling firms), assume that 
the i multinational firms in market structure r* were formed in the first i merger
stages. Similar to equation (1.3), the inverse demand functions for a low-quality
product in country A  and country B  are, respectively:
A  _  ___________ ^ 4 _______________________
P b  ~  V  £ ^ Ml x f  +  V Z U + 1  x f  +  E ^ r + i+ i
jjB == _________________§£________________
vY^Mi ^  +  x ? +  Y i‘2T xBu Z-rj=Mi ^  u 2 - j j= i+ l  x 3 ^  Z-dj=T+i+l x 3
The first term in the denominator corresponding to each market is the quality-
adjusted sales of the i multinational firms in that market; the second and third
terms respectively refer to the quality-adjusted sales of the T  — i independent 7 4 -
country firms and the T  — i independent R-country firms in that market. The
6This would not necessarily be the case were a merger not to lead to a quality upgrade in the 
production facilities in country B. For a large enough quality ratio relative to the trade cost, it 
can be shown that a multinational firm would continue exporting high-quality product produced 
by its A-country plant to country B,  discontinuing production operations in country B. For 
example, when T  =  3 under market structure r\  (one multinational firm and two independent 
firms in each country), this would happen if v >  1 + 1. Otherwise, for v <  1 +  -c , the multinational 
firm would produce high-quality product in country A  for consumption in country A  and produce 
low-quality product in country B  for consumption in country B.
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inverse demand functions for high-quality product in both countries, plm =  pla, 
I 6  {A, B}, can then be obtained from equation (4.10).
Each firm’s optimisation problem can now be written. A merged multinational 
firm m, m  = Mi, M2 ,..., Mi, maximises profits by setting xA and x f  to solve
max v i x t  +  -  c(^m +  *m)*&>0,*£>0
taMng all other firms’ outputs as given. As in equation (1.2), writing the price- 
to-quality ratio in country A  as \ A = —=3 %--- 2 — —A v^r------------and the
v IZjJbii xj +v z2j=i+i xj +z_.j=T+i+i xj
price-to-quahty ratio in country B  as \ B = - —mi 5 —  r- g—B 2T the
V z2 j= M 1 Xj  2jj=i+l x j  + z2 j= T + i+ l  x j
optimisation problem for the multinational firm may be rewritten
Since Ajjr =  —v ^ ~ ,  I € {A , B }, the two FOCs are
=  F  (x~  (4 1 1 )
= F  i 1 ~ F v )  (4'12)
An independent A-country firm a, a =  i +  1, i +  2 , ..., T, located in country A,
sets x f and x f  to solve
.max p fx f  +  (pf -  t)xf  -  c(xf +  x f )
> 0
where sales in country B  are subject to the unit trade cost. This may be rewritten 
in terms of the price-to-quality ratios in each market:
max v(XAxA +  ABx f ) — cxA — (c +  t)x f
x^>0,x^>0
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Since ^~r = -vQJ?-, I € {A, B}, the two FOCs are
(4 1 3 )
Similarly, an independent 5-country firm 6, b — T  + i + 1,T  + i + 2, ...,2T, 
located in country B, solves
max (pf -  t)x f +  p f x f  -  c(xf +  x f ) 
stf>0,xf>0
or,
max A x f +  A x f  — (c +  t)x f — cxf
* £ > 0 ,a f> 0
Now I € {-A, 5}, and the two FOCs are
**= f* ( * _ + *0 (4i5)
x i  =  f i  (* ~ p c) (4-16)
Adding across all FOCs pertaining to market A  (i FOCs (4.11) for the multi­
national firms, T  — i FOCs (4.13) for the independent A-country firms and T  — i 
FOCs (4.15) for the independent 5-country firms), I obtain:
M i T  IT
Y  xt+v Y  xt+ Y
j = M i  j = i + 1 j = T + i + 1
and noting that the LHS is simply I can solve for XA:
’c ( T + { T - i ) v )  + ( T - i
X =
2T -  (i +  1) V v
Similarly adding across all FOCs pertaining to market B  (i FOCs (4.12), T  — i
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FOCs (4.14) and T  — i FOCs (4.16), XB can be obtained:
=  1 f c ( T + ( T - i ) v )  + ( T - i ) t '
2 T - ( i  + l ) \  v
Substituting for the price-to-quality ratios in FOCs (4.11) through (4.16), sales 
per firm in each market are obtained:
x i  =  ( 2  t  -  ( i + 1 )) : *  ~  1]l + {Tr ? tv
•V /l W  WM
x f  = (2T — (i + 1)) Sav
( c ( T + { T - i ) v )  + ( T - i ) t v y
c(T -  (T -  l)v) -  (T -  l)ti> 
( c ( r + ( T - i ) v )  +  ( r - i ) f t ; ) 2
b  / ( v t i  , ,  I c  c ( ( r - t ) u - ( T - i - l ) )  + (r-i)t
. f  -  p r  -  (i + 1» a c« r  ~  ~ (T ~ -  F  ~ D1
( c ( r  +  ( T - i ) v )  +  ( T - t ) t )  
i f  =  ( 2 T - ( j  +  l ) ) 5 Bu- c ( T _ ( T _ 1 ) , ; )  +  ( T - i ) t
(c(T +  (X -» )v ) +  ( X - i ) t ) '
Non-negativity constraints -  ensuring that despite trade costs t > 0 and qual­
ity asymmetries v > 1, all firms command positive sales in both countries -  can 
be summarised as two parameter restrictions. The “low-enough-quality-ratio” re­
striction follows from requiring that low-quality 5-country firms are still able to 
sell in their home country when imports are most competitive (t = 0): x f  > 0 
<=> v < which implies v < jr-^ when t = 0 (recall i  =  |) . The “low-
enough-trade-cost” restriction ensures that low-quality 5-country firms’ exports to 
country A are not priced out of the market: x f > 0 <=> t < T^ i ) y V• Denote by 
V  the set of parameter values (v, t) satisfying these two conditions7.
7Formally, space V  is defined as {(v,t) € fK2 | 1 <  v  <  and 0 <  t <  T^ - i ) 1J V}-
Alternatively, V  can be defined by the restrictions 0 <  t  <  and 1 <  v  <
The reason why the analysis in Section 1.3 is confined to V  is simplicity. Lifting these parameter 
restrictions adds little insight: extending the space of parameter values to {(v,t) € 9t2 | v >  1 
and t  >  0} would enlarge zone (a), the zone where mergers are always profitable, both along and 
off the equilibrium path of the game.
Proof of this claim is available from the author, but headway can be made by noting that, 
say, for the case considered in Section 1.3 (i.e. T  =  3): (i) independent 5-country firms do 
not command positive sales even in their home country, x£  =  x f  =  0, when v >  |  +  M  and 
t  >  0 under market structure ro, or when v >  |  +  t  and t  >  0 under r \ ,  or when v  >  |  +  \ i
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Prices are obtained noting that plb =  Az, and from equation (4.10), plm — Pla — 
v \ l, I € {A,B}.  Finally, evaluating the objective functions at these sales and 
prices, profits per firm in each market are obtained:
j r A  ...  / (r-Oiz-cr-i-D+cr-Ofoy  q  n f? _  ( ( T - i ) v - ( T - i - i ) + ( T - i ) i y  q  
m,ri  ^  T + ( T —i)v +(T —i)tv )  UA xxm ,n  ^  T + ( T - i ) v + ( T - i ) t  )  B
ttA = x A t tB _  /  (T-Q i>-(T-t-l)-(T-l)A 2 g
a»ri ^rnj i  AAa,ri  ^ T + ( T - i ) v + ( T - i ) t  )  B
t \A _  ( T - ( T - l ) v - ( T - l ) i v \ 2 o  j t B  ( T - ( T - l ) v + ( T - i ) i \ 2 q
b,n y T + ( T ~ i ) v + { T - i ) t v  J  ^ A \ T + ( T - i ) v + ( T - i ) t )  ° B
(4.17)
The reduced-form profit functions per firm are thus the sum of the profit com­
ponents in the two markets, e.g. for a multinational firm, n m>ri =  II^  r. +11^ .
While the derivation above was carried out for “intermediate” market struc­
tures where both independent and multinational firms exist, it similarly applies to 
structures ro (where there are no multinational firms) and tt (where there are no 
independent firms). It is easy to see that the reduced-form profit functions (4.17) 
-  as well as the outputs and prices derived above) -  also hold where applicable. In 
other words, n m>ri calculated from (4.17) holds for 2  =  1,2,3,..., T, while n a ri and 
Il6>ri hold for i = 0,1,2,..., T  — 1.
M arket com petition equilibrium  outcom es as a  function of m arket struc­
tu re  (case T  =  3)
The reduced-form profit functions used to compute the merger surplus functions 
(Definition 1.3) follow from plugging T =  3 in equations (4.17) for the general 
case considered above (T merger stages and initially T  independent firms in each 
country). The space of parameter values V  follows similarly from the space derived 
for the general case.
In view of Lemma 1.1, I reproduce the three merger surplus functions which
and t  >  0 under 7*2 ; (ii) trade is too expensive even for A-country firms, xB =  xA =  0, when
1 <  7; <  |  +  under ro, or when 1 <  v <   ^ + 1 under rl7 or when 1 <  v  <  2t under r2 - Note
that for |  -1- \ t  < v <  2t under r2 , only two (multinational) firms command positive sales in 
country B, unlike all other parameter combinations and market structures where the number of 
firms selling into each country is at least three.
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need to be signed in order to solve the three-merger-stage game in Section 1.3:
+
'2v — 1 +  2 t v \ 2 (3v — 2 +  3 tv)2 +  (3 — 2v — 2 tv)2
3 + 2v + 2 tv)  9 (l 4- v  + tv)2
f2 v - l  + 21\ 2 ( 3 v - 2 -  21)2 +  (3 -  2v +  3t )2
KS + 2v + 2 t )  9 (l -h v H- f)2
Sa +  
5b
+
v + tv \  2  (2v — 1 + 2 tv)2 +  (3 — 2v — 2 tv)2
.3 +  v + t v )  ( 3  +  2v + 2 tv)2
' v + i  \ 2  ( 2 v - l - 2 t ) 2+ ( 3 - 2 v  + 2t)‘
Sa +
3 + v + 1 (3 +  2v +  21)~
1  (v + tv)2 +  (3 — 2v — 2 tv) 
9 (3 + v + tv)2
1  (u — 2t) 2  +  (3 — 2 v + t )2
T  \  21
+
Sa +
(3-1-v  + t)
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 1.1
P a r t (i) This proof amounts to verifying that for all (u, t) € V:
• ^ n ( v , t )  > 0 whenever > 0,
• > 0 whenever ^n{v , t )  > 0.
This is done separately for the merger surplus emanating from each market: a 
second subscript is added to denote the market. Thus, for example, t) =
I l£ ri — n £ ro — n£ro denotes the terms in \£/(v,£) corresponding to market A , 
obtained from equations (4.17), for T  — 3, and reproduced at the end of A.2.2.
I begin with 4//^  (?;,£), and Consider a straight line
segment going from {v,t) =  (1,0) to any point on £ =  the boundary of V  
where the “low-enough-trade-cost” restriction binds (i.e. =  0). By writing this
line segment as t =  p(v — 1), where 0 < p < oo and 0 < p(v — 1) < changes
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in v and t along this line segment parameterised by p may be referred to simply 
as changes in v (for p =  0 the line segment lies on the u-axis; for p —> oo the line 
segment lies on the t-axis). I seek to uncover how the functions8 ^ i i ,a and 
^ h i ,a change as I increase v along line segment p (i.e. jointly increasing t such that 
t =  p(v — 1)) from the lower end v =  1 (i.e. (u, t) =  (1,0)) to the upper end defined 
implicitly by p(v — 1) =  (label this value v =  v; formally this label should 
carry the parameter p, omitted for simplicity). The following may be verified. At 
the lower end of the fine segment, when v = 1, all three functions are negative. 
Intuitively, merging firms’ surplus arising from any stand-alone cross-border merger 
(be this the first, the second or the third) is negative: since both v and t are low, 
non-participating firms respond to the merger by increasing output considerably. 
At the upper end of the fine segment, when v = v, all three functions are equal to 
zero. Intuitively, since = 0, there is no surplus to be enjoyed on sales in country 
A  from cross-border mergers when J5-country firms’ exports to country A  are (just) 
priced out of the market. Prior to any merger, there are three firms offering quality 
v commanding positive sales in country A; after a merger this is unchanged. Now, 
starting at v =  1 and increasing v along the fine segment, ^ i i ,a and ^ i i i ,a 
each increase continuously from negative values toward positive values, reaching a 
maximum, then decreasing continuously toward zero when v = v. Label the first 
value of v at which ^ i yA is zero as v'A, the first value of v at which ^n,A  is zero as 
v"A, and the first value of v at which ^ h i ,a is zero as vA (again the labels omit the 
reference to p for simplicity). One can verify that 0 < vA < vA < vA < v. Since 
this is true along any fine segment parameterised by p, 0 < p < oo, the following 
result holds:
{(u,t) € V  I 'S>I'A(v,t) > 0} C 6 V  I '$n,A{v,i) >  0}
C {(«, t) € V  | 'I '/zm K  i) > 0 } c ?  (4.18)
It may also be verified that, in addition to intersecting at v = u, ^n,A  and 
cross as they slope upwards at a point, labelled v"A ', which lies between 0 and vA. 
In other words, ^ u tA — ^ i ,a — 0 at v — v"A \  where 0 < v"A ' < vA. To the right of
8 For simplicity I drop the arguments of the functions.
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this point, for v"A ' < v < v, * u , A  — ®i,a > 0, whereas to its left, for 0 < v < v"A ', 
* 11,A ~  * I , A  < 0. Since 0 < v"A ' < vnA < v'A < v, the following (stronger) result 
holds:
{(v,t) € V  | CM) > 0} C {(M ) e V  | ^ n,A{v,t) -  ^ i ,a(M ) ^  °} (4-19)
It can further be verified that ^ h i ,a —^  i i ,a ^  0 for 0 < v < v (recall ^ i i i ,a = ^ i i ,a 
when v =  v) and thus
V (v, t) € V, V i i i ,a ( v , t) -  # IItA{v, t) > 0 (4.20)
Turning now to the merger surplus terms in market 5 , the same results come 
through, despite some differences in the corresponding functions which are detailed 
next. The values of the functions 4/^#, ^u ,b  and ^h i ,b  are no longer zero for all 
(v, t) along the border of V  for which the “low-enough-trade-cost” restriction binds. 
For these parameter values, unlike in country A , 5-country firms still command 
positive sales in their home country and hence there is surplus from merger to 
be made on sales in country B  (i.e. the functions axe strictly positive), with two 
exceptions. One is when imports are at their most competitive, (v, t) =  ( |,  0 ), and 
5-country firms command zero sales in their home country (as they do abroad), 
in which case ^ 7 ,5 , ^ii ,b  and ^ 7 7 7 , 5  again equal zero. The other situation along 
this border of V  where these functions equal zero occurs when (v, t) =  (1 , |) .  Here, 
quality is symmetric and markets are effectively autarkic: cross-border merger does 
not change the (effective) number of competitors in each market. Now, starting 
at v =  1  and increasing v along any line segment parameterised by p, ^ 7 ,5 , ^ 7 7 , 5  
and 1 a tB each increase continuously from negative values toward positive values; 
whether the functions increase monotonically or whether they reach a (positive) 
maximum before decreasing to a lower albeit positive value or zero when v — v 
depends on the line segment parameterised by p. Labelling the lower and possibly 
only value of v at which i tB {^ii,b, ^iii,b)  is zero as v'B (vB, vB respectively), 
one verifies that 0 < vB < vB < vB < v. Since this is true along any fine segment
1 8 1
parameterised by p, 0 < p < oo, a result analogous to (4.18) holds:
{(u,t) € V  | > 0} C € V  | >  0}
c { ( v , t ) € P | $ /j j lB( » , t ) > 0 } c ?  (4.21)
Similar to their country A  counterparts, ^ i i ,b and 4//^ cross as they slope upwards 
at a point, labelled v'B \  which hes between 0 and v"B. To the right of this point,
for v'£~' < v < v, ^ u ,b — V i ,b > 09, whereas to its left, for 0 < v < vnB \
^ i i ,b ~  ^ i ,b < 0' Since 0 < v'£~' < vB < vB < v, the following (stronger) result 
holds:
{(v,t) € V  | > 0} C {{v,t) e  V  | ^n,B(v,t) -  > 0} (4.22)
It can further be verified that ^ i h ,b — ^ i i ,b > 0 for 0 < v < v10 and thus
V (v,t) € V, ^m,B{v,t)  -  Vii,B{v,t) > 0 (4.23)
Finally, it can be verified that along all line segments parameterised by p, 0 < 
p < oo, v'£~' < v’A and v"A ' < v'B.
The results for both markets are now combined to conclude the proof. I wish to 
show that for (v, t) such that ^fi(v, t) = ^ i ,a (v, t) +  ^ /,b(v, t) > 0, then ^ //(v , t) =
(I also need to show that for (v, t) such that ^ //(v , t) =  
Vii,A{vit) +  ^ i i ,b (v^ )  ^  °> then ^ m (M ) = ^ i n A v i t )  +  ^j//.b(v,Q  > 0. This 
is postponed briefly.) For (v, t) such that 'F/ > 0 this may be due to either of three 
possibilities:
• ^ i ,a >  0 and ^ i ,b > 0. From (4.18), ^ i tA > 0 => ^ h ,a > 0, while from 
(4.21), > 0 ^ i i ,b > 0, Hence
{(v,t) € V  | ^ i (v , t )  > 0} C {(v,t) 6 V  | $ jj(v ,f) > 0} (4.24)
9$ i i , b  — $ i , b  >  0 for v'£~r <  v  <  v  when 0 <  p <  oo; i.e. only when p =  0 or p —► oo does 
Qii^b — $ i , b  =  0 when v  =  v.
10The previous footnote similarly applies: only when p =  0 or p —► oo does $ u i , b  — $ i i , b  =  0  
when v  =  v.
from which the first half of Lemma 1.1, part (i) follows.
• > 0, ^ 1 ,3  < 0 but 'bi^A +  ^ i,b > 0. Here, since a > 0 and ^ I<B < 0,
v must be greater than v'A but less than v'B, i.e. v'A < v < v’B. As verified
earlier, v'^'  < v'A, whence it follows that v'£~r < v and thus '&n,B ~ ^ i ,b > 0.
From (4.19), > 0 imphes that > 0. Since +  ^ i ,B > 0
it must be that +  ^ n , B > 0 and result (4.24) follows.
• ^ i ,a < 0, > 0 but ^ i tA +  ^ i ,b > 0. Here, since < 0 and ^ j tB > 0,
v must be greater than v'B but less than vA, i.e. v'B < v < vA. As verified
earher, v"A ' < vB, whence it follows that v"A ' < v and thus ^  n ,a — ^  i ,a > 0 .
Again, since ^ j tA +  ^ 1 ,3  > 0 it must be that ^ i ^ a  +  ^i i,b > 0 and result 
(4.24) follows.
I now show that for (v , t) such that =  ^n,A  +  ^ 1 1 ,b > 0, it must be that 
^ i n  =  ^  III,a +  ^ III,B > 0. The proof is a simplified version of the previous one, 
and follows from noting by (4.20) and (4.23) that V (v, t) G V,  ^ ui,a — ^ 1 1 ,a > 0 
and ^ m tB — ^ 1 1 ,b > 0. Thus the counterpart to result (4.24) for the second half 
of Lemma 1.1 is obtained:
{ ( v j )  € V  | Vii(v,i)  > 0} C {(v,£) G V  | V m i v J )  > 0} (4.25)
Summarising results (4.24) and (4.25),
{(«,t) € V  I >  0} C {(u.t) 6 V  I > 0} C {(v,t)  £ V  I «7//(v,t) > 0 } c V
(4.26)
from which Lemma 1.1, part (i) follows. Q.E.D.
P a rt (ii) Recall from Definition 1.3 that ^u{v,-£) > 0 is equivalent to n mj7.2 > 
n o,ri + n t jri. It can be verified that (for (v,t) € V) n a,ri +nf,>ri > n a>ro +  n^ ,, (be. 
non-participating independent firms gain from a first stand-alone merger). Hence 
if ^ / /  > 0, it follows that n m>r2 > n a>ro +  n^ ,,, which is equivalent to > 0.
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Similarly, \£//j > 0 is equivalent to Hm,r3 > n aiT.2 4- . It can be verified that
na,r2 + IIbtr2 > na,ri +  n&jri (i.e. non-participating independent firms gain from a 
second stand-alone merger). Hence if > 0, it follows that nm>r3 > na,ri+n<,,ri, 
which is equivalent to Wy > 0. From na?n +  Tlb}ri > na>ro -I- nb,ro, it follows from 
> 0 that nm,r3 > na,ro -1- n6,ro, which is equivalent to ty y i > 0. Q .E .D .
A .2.4 (Sketch of) Proof of Proposition 1.3
This proof follows largely from the proof of Lemma 1.1, noting the following defi­
nitions:
• Zone (a):= {(v,t) € V  | ^ i{v,t) > 0, > 0, > 0}
• Zone (cl):= {(v,t) € V  | i (v , t ) < 0, n{v,t) > 0, ^ m (v , i )  > 0}
• Zone (c2):= {{v,t) € V  \ < 0, 4>//(v,t) < 0, m {v , t )  > 0}
• Zone (h):= {(v,t) e V  \ Wi(v,t) < 0, n(v,t )  < 0, m (v , t )  < 0}
That the zones and the boundaries between them are as stated (and depicted
in Figure 1-6) follows additionally from verifying that:
• v, v'A, v"A, v'b, v"b and Vg are decreasing in p, the parameter of the straight 
fine segment, as this increases from 0 (fine segment lies on top of the v-axis) 
to oo (fine segment lies on top of the t-axis).
• v'b < vA < v'g < v"A for 0 < p < oo.
• v"B < v"A < v'g ^  V'A for 0 < p < p < oo (fine segment steep enough) and
0 < p < p < oo (fine segment flat enough), where p < p, while v'g < v'B < 
v "a <  v a  for P <  P <  P-
• v'A ' < v"B and v"B ' < vB so that ^ i i ,a > ^ i ,a and j )B > ^ /,b  for v'B <
v < vfA along any fine segment p.
These elements suffice to prove Proposition 1.3. Q .E .D .
184
A.2.5 Proof of results depicted in Figure 1-8
I consider the equilibrium in each of zones (a), (cl) and (c2) of parameter space V  
in turn, starting from a fixed cost G associated with implementing a cross-border 
merger equal to zero (equilibria as in Figure 1-5, in the absence of fixed costs). I 
analyse how these equilibria change as G increases from zero.
Notice that the fixed cost G of implementing a merger changes the conditions 
for any merger to be profitable: whereas in the absence of the fixed cost this was 
given by ^ ( v ,  t) > 0, for X  G {I, II ,  I I I ,  IV, V, VI},  where X  represents the 
relevant merger surplus function, the introduction of the fixed cost changes this 
condition to ^x{v,  t) — G > 0. (Refer to Definition 1.3. Recall that, for example, 
^v(v, t) reflects the profitability of a merger which if carried through would induce 
a change in market structure from r\ (one cross-border merger) to r3 (three cross- 
border mergers).
Note from the Proof of Lemma 1.1, part (ii) above11 that for all (v,t) G V,  
iv  ^  ^ i i  and ^ v i  ^  ^  ^ i i i -
I begin with (v,t) in zone (a). From the Proof of Lemma 1.1, part (i), in this 
zone > ^ i i  > > 0. For G < 'kj, the equilibrium (solved-out game tree)
replicates the equilibrium for zone (a) in the absence of fixed costs (Figure 1-5), 
where firms choose to merge from all nodes in the game tree. For \Fj < G < 
we have that \Fj — G < 0 and thus firms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge 
conditional on 14 and 25. By ^ // — G > o, 'Sfin > ii  and ^ i v  ^  ^i iy  firms 
continue choosing to merge from all other nodes in the game tree. For this range 
of values of G, the equilibrium then replicates the equilibrium for zone (cl) in the 
absence of fixed costs (Figure 1-5). For \F/j < G < ^ m ,  'F/j — G <  0 implies that 
firms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge conditional on either 14 and 25, or 14
r
and 25. Since \F/ — G < 0, firms 3 and 6 will still choose not to merge conditional 
on 14 and 25, and firms 2 and 5 will now choose not to merge conditional on 14. 
By 'bin — G ^  0, ^  ^ h i  and ^?vi ^  ^ hi  > firms continue choosing to merge
11 For ease of exposition, I again suppress the arguments ( v , i )  of the merger surplus functions. 
I also introduce the notation ij to depict the outcome where firms i and j  merge and ij as the 
complementary (no-merger) outcome.
from all other nodes in the game tree. For this range of values of G , the equilibrium 
then replicates the equilibrium for zone (c2) in the absence of fixed costs (Figure 
1-5). For G > ’F/jj, firms 3 and 6 will now choose not to merge conditional on 14 
and 25. Since \kjj — G < 0 , firms 3 and 6 will still choose not to merge conditional 
on either 14 and 25, or 14 and 25, and firms 2 and 5 will now choose not to merge 
conditional on 14. Since — G < 0, firms 3 and 6 will still choose not to merge 
conditional on 14 and 25, firms 2 and 5 will still choose not to merge conditional 
on 14, and firms 1 and 4 will now choose not to merge. For this range of values of 
(?, along the equilibrium path no mergers occur and the equilibrium then replicates 
the equilibrium for zone (h) in the absence of fixed costs (Figure 1-5).
The proofs of the equilibria for (u,t) in zones (cl) and (c2) follow from that 
of zone (a). In zone (cl), by definition, \P/ < 0 < 4/jj, and only the equilibria 
for zones (b), (c2) and (h) in the absence of fixed costs can be replicated as G 
increases from zero, as analysed for zone (a). In zone (c2), by definition, \I>/// > 0 
and # /, \£/j < 0, and only the equilibria for zones (c2) and (h) in the absence of 
fixed costs can be replicated as G increases from zero, as analysed for zone (a). 
Q.E.D.
A. 3 Cross-border mergers in the Perry and Porter 
(1985) m odel
A.3.1 Derivation of reduced-form profit functions
Coming out of the (two) merger stages, there are three possible market structures: 
(i) ro, where no cross-border is undertaken; (ii) r\, where one merger decision is 
favourable but the other is not; and (iii) r 2 , where both mergers take place. I now 
turn to each.
(i) Under r0, independent A-country firm 1 (say), owning capital stock k, sets
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outputs in both countries A  and B, respectively x f  and x f ,  to solve
max P A(X A)x f  +  (P B(X B) — t ) x  f  — C (x f  + x f , k )
where its exports to country B  axe subject to the unit trade cost t. (Recall that 
Pl(.) denotes the inverse demand function for the homogeneous good in country I, 
I € {A, B}, X 1 = x\, and C(x, k) denotes the firm’s cost function.) Given the
functional forms laid out in Section 1.4, the FOCs may be written:
a — X A -  x f  — (d +  ^ i x i +  x i )) =  0 (4-27)
a — X B — t — x f — (d +  j;ix i +  x i )) =  0 (4.28)
The FOCs for the other independent firms, namely A-country firm 2 and R-country 
firms 3 and 4, can be similarly written, adjusting for the trade cost being incurred 
by the latter two on their exports to country A. Solving the system of FOCs, and 
recalling e =  |  (the rate of change of marginal cost) and t =  ^  (the normalised 
trade cost), one obtains X A =  X B =  From FOCs (4.27) and (4.28),
it follows that \xA — x f \  =  t (firm i’s sales in its home market exceed its foreign- 
maxket sales by t, where i =  1,..., 4) and each firm’s foreign-market sales axe x f  =  
xA = ■Q ^ 5 ^ g 3+e^ - (As before, despite the slight abuse of notation, subscripts a, 
b and m  denote an independent A-country firm, an independent R-country firm 
and a multinational firm, respectively.) Clearly, for trade between countries to be 
feasible, the paxameter restriction t < must be satisfied (this condition along 
with e > 0 and t > 0 define space V). Equilibrium prices in both countries axe 
pA = pB = a{1+2e)+Ad+2t ' reduced-foxm profit function follows from evaluating 
each firm’s objective function:
n„,ro =  n Vo =  (2(1 +  e)(l  - 1) + 1 ( 2  +  e)(13 +  4 e )) -  gk
(ii) Under r\, each of the two independent firms a and b solves the same problem 
as in (i). The multinational firm m, formed from the merger of an independent 
A-country firm and an independent R-country firm, owns capital stock 2k and is
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twice as “large” as either of its independent rivals. Clearly, given the unit trade
cost t > 0 and the cost function C(xA + xB, 2k), it will no longer trade between
countries, supplying each country through domestic production; it solves
max PA(X A) x i  + P B( X B) x Z - C ( x £  + xB,2k)
x £ > 0 , x £ > 0
The FOCs become
a - X A - x i ~  (d + - ^ ( x £  +  x ® ))= 0  (4.29)
a ~ X B - x B - ( d  + - ^ { x A + x Z ) ) =  0 (4.30)
Solving the system of FOCs, one obtains sales in each country, X A — X s  =  
. The multinational firm’s sales in each country are xA = x B = 
^ + 7Z+2i*+,t • Independent firms’ home-market sales exceed foreign-market sales 
by t, i.e. \x f  — x f \  =  t, i € {a, &}, where foreign-market sales xB = xA = 
Equilibrium prices are pA = pB =
Finally, the reduced-form profit functions are given by:
n m,n =  (4 -f 7e +  2c2)2 ^  +  2^ ( 2 +  ^  +  2*^2 +  ^  +  ^ 2 +  ~  2^
na,ri — Hb,ri
_  (a — d)2
(4 +  7e +  2e2)2 X
x ^2(1 -+■ e)3 — 2t(l -t- e)2(2 -f- e) +  ?(10 -f- 32e -+■ 35e2 H—2 "^ "F —
(iii) Under 7 *2 , there are no shipments across countries, each multinational firm 
solving the same problem as in (ii) (FOCs given by (4.29) and (4.30)). Equilibrium 
sales in each country are X A =  X B — , while xA =  xB =  prices are
pA = pB = g(l±i)±2c?. The reduced-form profit function for each multinational firm
_ (a -  d f { 2 +  e) _
H m , r 2 -  ( 3  +  e ) 2
gk
1 8 8
By Proposition 1.2, the four merger surplus functions necessary to solve the 
game can then be computed:
= rim,ri na,ro n6>ro
_ (a — d)2(l — St — te) ^
(5 +  2e)2(4 + 7e + 2P)2 X
x (l6te5 4- 148te4 4* 508tie3 4* 4e3 -4- 4e2 4- 789tie2 4- 535te — 23e 4~ 122t— 14)
— nm,r2 na>ri nj>jri
(a — d)2(l — St — te)
(3 +  e)2(4 +  7e +  2e2)2 X
x (4te5 -I- 41te4 4~ 157te3 4~ e3 4- 2e2 4- 274te2 4~ 212te — 4e 4~ 60t — 4)
 ^m  — nm,r2 na,ro n5tT.0
(cl — d)2(l — 3t — te) (4te3 4- 33te3 4~ 89te 4- 5e 4~ 78t 4- 14)
(3 +  e)2(5 +  2e)2
$ i v  = na,ri
(a — d)2(l — 3t — te) (Ate3 4- 17te2 4- 19te — 3e 4- 6t — 2)
(4 4- 7e 4- 2e2)2
Note that the sign of each ^-function corresponds to the sign of the polynomial in
t and e in the last bracket in the numerator (since 1 — 3t — te > 0 in space V  and
1 — 3t — ie =  0 only along the boundary t =  ^ r ) .
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B. A ppendix to  Chapter 2
B .l D ata A ppendix
This appendix comments on the sources of data and how I treat the data. I also 
perform robustness checks on my direct computations of marginal cost.
Anonym ous acknowledgem ent I wish to express my gratitude to all the peo­
ple related to the cement industry whom I have interviewed during the course of 
this project. This project would not have been possible without their help, partic­
ularly in regard to the data collection and validation effort. I do not name them 
in order to preserve their confidentiality but hereby acknowledge them by citing 
their professional relationship with the cement supply chain: representatives for 
various state-level construction sector trade associations (SINDUSCONs); repre­
sentatives for the cement industry’s trade association (SNIC); representatives for 
the technical arm of the cement industry’s trade association (ABCP); sales repre­
sentatives, engineers and executives of cement producers; representatives of cement 
buyers (resellers, ready-mixed concrete firms, construction firms and producers of 
construction aggregates); representatives for equipment suppliers to the cement in­
dustry; representatives for factor suppliers to the cement industry; Confederation of 
National Industry (CNI); Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IGBE); 
officials of regulatory agencies; officials of government ministries; investment bank 
analysts; international traders in cement; academics.
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B.1.1 Sources and treatm ent of data
C em ent consum ption by s ta te  (i.e. dem and by local m arket) Monthly 
series by state, in 1000 tonnes of cement, are obtained from the annual reports 
(and other reports) of the Brazilian cement industry’s trade association, the Na­
tional Syndicate of the Cement Industry (SNIC). This body has played a leading 
role in the history of the Brazilian cement industry and represents almost the en­
tirety of the set of producers1. To compile consumption figures for a given state, 
SNIC aggregates reported shipments by its members to that state. Thus I observe 
shipments by cement producers to buyers broken out by destination state. Four 
possible sources of distortion, each deemed to be small, are: (i) Consumption fig­
ures do not include shipments by non-members to the association (namely Mizu 
and Davi: see footnote 1). The distortion is small given the limited capacity, lim­
ited geographic scope and recent entry dates attached to these non-members; (ii) 
Consumption figures do not include imports. Again the distortion is small in view 
of the limited penetration of imports (see Section 2.3.3); (iii) Consumption figures 
do not account for any cross-state shipping at the reseller level (i.e. shipments by 
resellers in state I shipping across to buyers further downstream located in state 
n 7  ^ /). In compiling consumption by state, a shipment by a cement producer to 
a buyer located in a given state counts towards consumption in that state. This 
distortion is considered small in that the high cost of transporting cement and the 
fact that the industry takes into account the possibility of trade arbitrage when 
setting commercial terms make the scope for cross-state shipping by resellers lim­
ited. Further, the bulkiness, fast turn and short shelf life of cement leads producers 
to reach far “down the trade”, via direct-from-plant deliveries and own distribution 
terminals: in spatial terms, reselling is largely a local business. In any case, ship­
ments by resellers into a state ought to approximately cancel shipments by resellers 
out of that state; and (iv) Variation in inventories downstream are not accounted
1Up until 2003 only two recent entrants were not members of the trade association: (i) Ci- 
mento Mizu, set up in 1998 by a large independent ready-mixed concrete firm, Polimix, and (ii) 
Cimento Davi, set up in 2001. Both concerns consist of relatively small-scale grinding operations 
(respectively 0.7 mtpa and 0.4 mtpa to date), importing clinker from as far as Asia and producing 
slag cement (both are located in close proximity to steel producers, from whom they purchase 
blast furnace slag, based respectively in the states of Espirito Santo, ES, and Minas Gerais, MG.) 
See footnote 16 of Chapter 3.
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for. Again the distortion is small given that the characteristics of cement (e.g. 
short shelf life) means inventory levels and their time-series variation is limited.
Flow of cem ent from  plants to  sta tes Annual shipments of cement from each 
plant to each state is obtained from SNIC, from the same database from which the 
monthly consumption series by state are extracted. Thus I observe, for each year 
T, an I  x L shipment matrix with element qux denoting the shipments from plant 
i to state (local market) I in year T. To obtain the flow of cement from plants to 
states on a monthly basis, I assume that the distribution of shipments to market 
I across sourcing plants is invariant over the 12 months in each year. Thus I take 
plant i ’s shipments to market I in month t € T  to be qut =  ■ qit where qitZsi 9ht
denotes the consumption in market (state) I in month t, as detailed above.
C em ent prices by s ta te  Current retail cement prices in units of local currency 
for the standard 50 kg bag are provided by the Brazilian office of national statistics, 
the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics (IGBE). This office is one of 
Brazil’s two main providers of economic statistics, charged with carrying out pop­
ulation censuses, compiling the national accounts and publishing price indices. In 
effect, the cement price series I use is collected to compute the latter. Monthly series 
by state are available on the median price for a sample of retail stores (commonly 
referred to as resellers) located in each state. (Producer prices are not observed; 
these are backed out from retail prices as explained below.) Owing to the high 
levels of inflation prevailing in the first one-quarter of the time period I consider2, 
particular attention has been paid to the conversion of current cement prices to 
constant prices (in December 1999 terms). While this is done using a General Price 
Index (GPI), I also convert cement prices using other (economy-wide) price indices, 
such as a Consumer Price Index (CPI) or a Wholesale Price Index (WPI), to check 
the robustness of the estimation results (these are, respectively, the “IGP-DI” , the 
“IPC-br” and the “IPA-DI” , all published by the Fundagao Getulio Vargas). Fur­
ther, where possible, I compare the constant price series I calculate for each state
2That is, the pre-stabilisation phase, or the 42 monthly observations between January 1991 
and June 1994, out of a total of 156 observations (up to December 2003).
192
with reports on cement prices to be found in trade publications or the press. For 
example, the constant cement price series I calculate indicate a sharp increase in 
real terms in 1992; this is confirmed by aggregate real cement price indices and 
accounts published in trade reports at the time. One must also point out that 
despite the high level of inflation in the first half of the 1990s, the economic en­
vironment was fax from chaotic; economic agents had learned how to cope with a 
chronic and fast-changing price level, and to anticipate it reasonably well in the 
short term. It is thus possible for the researcher to filter (upward and downward) 
variation in real prices from the much larger (upward) variation in nominal prices 
in the pre-stabilisation phase of the time period I cover.
Exogenous dem and variables Several alternative series of economic activity, 
either in the construction and building sector or aggregated across sectors of the 
economy, are available as proxies for the exogenous demand for cement. The 
favoured series, issued by the Brazilian office of statistics (IBGE), reports the real 
index of activity in the construction sector for each of the 27 states, on an annual 
basis. Importantly, this series follows from a volume decomposition of Value Added 
in the construction sector (from the National Accounts) and should thus be a good 
proxy for exogenous demand. I blow up the index series for each state using the 
relative size of the construction sector between states, also obtained from the Na­
tional Accounts; these can then be compared cross-sectionally (i.e. across states). 
Alternative quarterly series are available, which I use in checking the robustness of 
my estimation results.
Taking sta tes to  represen t local m arkets In terms of geography, the most 
disaggregated level at which demand-side data are observed is the state level. Data 
availability thus require that I take each state to represent a market (i.e. I do not 
observe data at the “SMSA” or city level)3. However, I believe that this is sound, as
3Notice that this is done only for the purpose of estimating demand. The availability of plant- 
to-state shipment data allows me to circumvent the tricky task of defining (geographic) markets 
in my treatment of supply: for any given plant, the geographic area which is relevant to its supply 
decision (i.e. that plant’s “market”) is endogenous -  depending on demand, cost and conduct -  
and these plant-specific areas overlap across plants.
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follows. As the econometrician, I observe the flow of cement from each plant directly 
to buyers (i.e. to resellers and to consumers) in any given state. As explained 
above, the scope for cross-state shipping by resellers is limited. Thus price and 
consumption observations -  obtained from different sources, as explained above -  
can reasonably be paired. A potential distortion arises from the possibility that the 
larger states may contain more than one local market with heterogeneous demand 
conditions, and that therefore identifying states with markets may hide important 
variation at a more local level where agents interact. To my defence, however, I 
discard the largest northern states, albeit for another reason as I explain in Section 
2.4.2. Further, in the data I observe that cement can travel over significantly large 
distances from plants located in a state to buyers located in another state. Several 
field interviews and price data obtained directly from a sample of producers suggest 
that the spatial variation of prices within a state is minimal: prices are mostly 
uniform within a state. Of note, several studies in the literature have taken US 
states (of sizes similar to and as diverse as their Brazilian counterparts) to represent 
markets, such as Sutton (1998), FTC (1966) and Newmark (1998).
Factor prices Factor prices are either observed in the form of current prices, in 
which case they are converted to constant prices as explained above, or already 
reported in the form of constant prices. Though alternative series proxying each 
factor price are available -  which I use as alternative instruments in the demand 
estimation or to check the robustness of the supply-side estimation -  the main 
series are:
• Fuel oil: country-wide delivered prices from refineries in units of local cur­
rency per kg (excluding sales taxes) are obtained, on a monthly basis, from 
the oil industry regulator, the National Agency for Oil. I add sales taxes 
to these prices according to legislation. (Owing to policy in the oil sector, 
price variation across regions during the time period of the study, has been 
minimal.)
• Diesel oil: country-wide delivered prices from refineries in units of local cur­
rency per litre are obtained, on a monthly basis, from the oil industry regu­
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lator, the National Agency for Oil.
• Coal: FOB prices of coal in local currency units per tonne are obtained, on an 
annual basis, averaged across mining firms, from the Ministry for Mining and 
Energy. Price lists are also obtained from a sample of mining firms. Of note, 
coal mines are located in the South of the country; freight to cement plants 
employing coal as kiln fuel (largely located in the South) is added accordingly 
(see comments on freight cost below).
• Electricity: state-level delivered prices to (high-voltage) industrial consumers 
in local currency units per MWh are obtained, on a monthly basis, from the 
electricity industry regulator, the National Agency for Electrical Energy.
• Labour: manufacturing-industry real wage indices in the 12 states with the 
largest industrial output, in addition to a country-wide index, are obtained, 
on a monthly basis, from the Confederation of National Industry.
P lan t characteristics Plant characteristics such as ownership, capacity (i.e. 
kiln pyroprocessing capacity and grinding capacity), number of kilns, age, tech­
nology (i.e. the type of equipment and process, whether dry or wet, whether a 
preheater is employed) and the fuel mix employed by kilns (largely either fuel oil, 
coal, or more recently pet coke or natural gas) is available from the Brazilian trade 
association4 and from different editions of the World Cement Directory, published 
by the European Cement Association (Cembureau) every three years, compiling 
information on cement producers across the world. Data is complemented by or 
confirmed against information from (i) industry publications, (ii) investment bank­
ing reports, (iii) the press, (iv) companies’ websites, (v) academic publications, 
and/or (vi) field interviews (see below). Of note, capacity and technology data 
may contain significant measurement error. The shortest distance by road from
4Plenty of other information is available, such as stock levels by plant, or the form shipments 
from each plant take, in terms of packaging (in bags or in bulk) or in terms of the means of 
transportation (by road, rail or water). Aggregating across all plants, between 1997 and 1999 
81% of shipments were in bags, and 91% of shipments were by road. The breakdown of shipments 
among different buyer channels is also available, with resellers accounting for 76% and ready-mixed 
concrete firms accounting for 11%, in this same period.
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each plant to the main metropolitan areas in each state is available from the Min­
istry of Transport.
Com puting p lant m arginal cost: an  upper bound  Using the fixed-coefficient 
nature of cement production technology, I can directly calculate marginal cost from 
observed factor prices, the observed plant characteristics and engineering estimates 
of the fixed coefficients. I employ the term “calculate” rather than “estimate” since 
obtaining marginal cost does not involve statistical inference; however, calculated 
marginal costs are indeed estimates -  in fact they are estimated upper bounds to 
the true marginal costs -  in the sense that there inevitably are unobserved plant 
characteristics, as I explain below. In view of the fixed-coefficient technology and 
my understanding of the industry, I model plant marginal cost as flat in quantity 
up to capacity. To the extent that marginal cost varies across kilns within the 
same plant complex, this will be an approximation to the true plant marginal cost 
which would then be a step function in quantity. (For example, if a plant consists 
of two kilns, labelled 1 and 2 in order of most efficient first, with kiln marginal 
costs denoted c\ and C2  > Ci, denoting other marginal cost by c, and denoting kiln 
capacities by Ki and K 2 , then marginal cost would be MC(q) =  c +  c\ if q < K \ 
or c -1- C2  if Ki < q <  K 2 .) Clearly, this will be of relevance only if plant capacity 
utilisation varies sufficiently over time that the marginal kiln in operation differs 
(e.g. a less efficient kiln is fired up and shut down for months at a time according 
to demand). I thus mitigate any distortion stemming from my approximation of 
plant marginal cost as being flat in quantity by taking capacity utilisation (see 
below) and the characteristics of the marginal kiln into account when computing 
marginal cost. (It should also be noted that in recent decades the trend for cement 
plants has been to favour large single-kiln production lines as against multiple small 
lines, in view of the economies of scale.) It is also worth clarifying the way a kiln 
works. A kiln, when in operation, must run at close to full capacity; it cannot be 
operated at any given moment at, say, 50% capacity. Further, firing up a kiln is 
costly so when in operation a kiln typically runs for at least several days or weeks. 
As for plant marginal costs, it is clear that these will vary across plants according 
to the technology, capacity and age of the equipment and the fuel employed by
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the kiln; these are accounted for to the best of my knowledge as I explain below5. 
Plant marginal costs fall into four main categories -  kiln fuel, electricity, mineral 
extraction royalties, and labour/packaging/other costs -  as follows:
1. Kiln fuel: This is the main component of plant marginal cost. Based on engi­
neering estimates, the heat content required to produce 1 kg of clinker using 
the dry process (see Section 2.3.1) will typically fall in the 650 - 850 kcal 
range (e.g. see World Cement, January 2000 issue). (The wet process con­
sumes over double this.) A kiln’s (thermal) energy efficiency will depend on 
the capacity, technology (including the specifications of preheating, cooling 
and waste heat recovery systems used) and age of the kiln. (The kiln’s brick 
lining has to be changed periodically, and the time since the last relining will 
also impact the energy efficiency of the kiln.) Interview-based evidence, how­
ever, indicates that the energy efficiency of kilns in operation in the Brazilian 
cement industry is (i) high relative to its global peers (including the US indus­
try), with producers having shifted to the dry process chiefly over the 1980s,
(ii) has continued to improve over the 1990s, and (iii) presents low variation 
across producers (with perhaps two exceptions, both with lower productiv­
ity). Based on observed plant characteristics and interviews, I classify the 
energy efficiency of each plant as “above average” , “average” and “below 
average”, assuming energy contents of 690, 730 and 800 kcal/kg of clinker 
respectively. (For example, with respect to kiln capacity, a kiln with capacity 
in excess of 1 mtpa will require a heat content approximately 6% below that
of a kiln with capacity of 0.25 mtpa, controlling for other characteristics.)6
To arrive at the marginal cost relating to kiln fuel, I consider two types of 
fuel -  fuel oil and coal -  for which I observe prices, as explained above. I 
then use the observed fuel mix for each plant and the properties of each fuel 
to obtain fuel cost. (For example, an average-efficiency kiln burning a certain
5 To this end I have met with engineers working in cement plants or working for the technical 
arm of the cement producers’ trade association (the Brazilian Association for Portland Cement, 
ABCP), as well as meeting executives of equipment suppliers to the cement industry.
6 In addition to the above, I use other sources of information such as a report compiled by the 
industry’s trade association in 1993 on plant productivity with respect to energy inputs (stating 
the amount of hydrocarbon equivalent burned by tonne of clinker produced by plant). Note 
further that I neglect time-series variation in plant-specific energy efficiency given that this has 
been low over the time period of the study.
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grade of fuel oil -  with “inferior calorific power” of 9750 kcal/kg of fuel oil -  
will require 730/9750 x 1000 =  75 kg of fuel oil per tonne of clinker.)
2. Electricity: While thermal energy is required to produce clinker in the kiln, 
electricity is used mostly for grinding raw material, solid kiln fuel (such as 
coal) and clinker -  a process known as comminution -  and to a lesser extent to 
operate conveyor belts and packaging lines. Considerations here axe similar 
to those made for kiln fuel. For example, in terms of technology, the more 
modem vertical roller mills tend to consume less power than the ball mill 
system. Again based on engineering estimates, the total plant electricity 
content required to produce 1 tonne of cement typically falls in the region of 
90 - 105 kWh.
3. Mineral extraction royalties: The marginal cost component arising from the 
extraction of raw material (limestone and clay), from a quarry usually located 
within the plant complex, follows from legislation. The “Financial Compen­
sation for the Extraction of Mineral Resources” (CFEM) requires that the 
cement producer collect 2% of its revenues from the sale of cement, net of 
sales taxes and freight, in the way of compensation to the government (see 
below for producer prices and sales taxes). Exceptions to this requirement, 
where negotiated between producers and the government, axe not observed 
(see comment below on unobservables).
4. Labour/packaging/other costs: As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, labour essen­
tially performs a supervisory role. One may argue that a certain proportion 
of a plant’s labour cost is fixed. The variable proportion of labour would 
correspond to quarrying personnel and possibly workers involved with the 
packaging and distribution centre operations. I refrain from discussion, given 
the relatively low cost of these plant operations and the fact any bias in 
the direction of overstating marginal cost reinforces the results of this study. 
Packaging costs will vary according to the proportion of a plant’s production 
that is shipped in bags (largely in the form of the standard 50 kg bag) as 
opposed to bulk shipments; recall that I observe this proportion. As such, 
based on information at hand, I take this component of marginal cost to
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amount to around 5% of net producer price.
A final comment relates to unobservables. Despite a researcher calculating 
marginal cost to the best of his ability from observables, there will always be an 
unobserved (to the researcher) component to productivity across plants. In view 
of this, in computing marginal cost I choose to “err on the side of conservatism”, 
in this case by overstating marginal cost. I claim the calculated marginal cost is 
thus an upper bound to the true marginal cost, thus leading to an understated 
price-cost margin. The reason behind this choice is that, when I turn to the testing 
of conduct in Section 2.4.4, such a bias reinforces the results of this study. There 
are several potential sources of bias (in the direction of overstating marginal cost). 
One source of unobserved plant heterogeneity may be the quantity discount enjoyed 
by Votorantim, the largest producer on a nationwide basis, in acquiring fuel oil, 
electricity or trucking services vis-a-vis the smaller producers. To the extent that 
producers manage to acquire factors on different terms (controlling for location), 
the marginal cost I compute may be overstated for the firms with greater bargaining 
power over suppliers. Another possibility is that producers substitute away from 
traditional kiln fuels such as fuel oil and coal in favour of cheaper alternatives7. 
Yet another bias stems from the formulation I use to compute the marginal cost 
of cement (see footnote 28 of Chapter 2). For simplicity I take 1 kg of cement 
to correspond to 1 kg of clinker. Now clinker is the most expensive input to the 
grinding process and even “pure” cement (referred to commonly as type I cement, 
or simply ordinary cement) is comprised of 96% clinker and 4% gypsum by weight. 
To the extent that different formulations of cement are produced, with a lower 
proportion of clinker (and a higher content of lower-cost additives, such as slag, 
pozzolane and/or filler), the bias in the direction of overstating marginal cost will 
be higher. For example, composite (type II) cement, with a clinker content in the 
region of 70 - 80%, accounted for 78% of the Brazilian industry’s total production
7 Indeed, since 2000 the use of pet coke (imported by some producers themselves from the 
Mexican Gulf) and natural gas (to the extent that a plant is located in proximity to a pipeline) 
is on the rise. A clinker kiln will in principle burn any material with a sufficiently high energy 
content, such as used rubber tyres, solvents and hazardous waste materials. The equipment 
supplier FLSmidth speculates that in the long term the cost of kiln fuel could fall to zero, or even 
turn negative, with cement producers being paid to dispose of waste materials.
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between 1999 and 2001. Finally, note that fixed cost heterogeneities across plants, 
stemming for example from decreasing unit capital costs as a function of capacity 
(i.e. economies of scale), are not relevant for the computation of marginal cost and 
the resulting price-cost margins.
C om puting p lan t-to -m arket freight cost This is the first component to ex­
plant marginal cost that I consider (the other two are the reseller mark-up and 
producers’ sales taxes). In the cement industry, as seen in Section 2.3.1, freight is a 
large component of cost. The vast majority of shipments from producers to buyers 
take place by road and are provided for by the producers. I do not observe the exact 
freight rates paid by cement producers. But fortunately I do observe a good proxy 
for the freight of cement. The transportation of agricultural goods such as soyabean 
and maize is reportedly a close substitute to the supply of cement freight, in view 
of product and market characteristics (Soares and Caixeta Filho 1996)8. I use a 
database containing approximately 30,000 observations on freight prices for some 
agricultural goods collected over the period 1997 to 2003 for thousands of different 
routes across Brazil9. Figure 5-1 summarises the results of some auxiliary reduced- 
form regressions. These should be seen as hedonic regressions with the purpose of 
predicting the price of freight. Given that I do not observe quantities demanded 
and supplied in the market for freight, I cannot estimate a structural model of 
the market for freight. (Nor do I think this is necessary in view of my objective, 
which is to predict the freight cost of cement from plant i to local market I based 
on observed data.) Freight prices (once converted to constant prices as explained
8 For example, an interview with a cement industry executive revealed that during the soyabean 
harvesting season (March through May) the producer he works for encourages large resellers to 
themselves pick orders up at the plant, for fear of relying too heavily on the scarce supply of 
outside truckers observed during these months. This farther suggests that freight of cement and 
freight of soyabean are close substitutes, and therefore that their prices should be similar. Most 
cement producers outsource trucking services, mostly to independent truckers who are registered 
in their databases and simply turn up at the door and are hired on the spot (or are hired through 
cooperatives or middlemen). According to this executive, the cement industry is the top industrial 
contractor of trucking services in the country.
9I am indebted to Professor Jose Vicente Caixeta Filho of ESALQ, at the University of Sao 
Paulo, for providing an extract of the SIFRECA freight database. Data p e r t a in in g  to soyabean, 
maize and (the mineral) limestone was kindly made available.
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earlier10) are regressed on exogenous variables such as the distance of the route, the 
squared distance, a shipment-to-port dummy (to capture exports), transportation­
mode dummies (by water or by rail, as opposed to by road), seasonal dummies or 
monthly dummies (to capture the harvesting cycle), the price of diesel oil (the main 
cost component for freight), a packaging dummy (shipment of bagged produce as 
opposed to bulk) and product-type dummies (e.g. powdered soyabean), in addition 
to interaction variables. It is clear from the R 2 of the OLS regressions that the fit is 
very high; the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are low. Freight prices (in 
R$ per tonne) are increasing in distance (and concave, though slightly so over the 
relevant range). Consider the results for specification (II). At the sample means 
of the variables (735 km for distance and R$ 0.422 per litre for the price of diesel 
oil), the predicted price of freight for a tonne of soyabean shipped in bulk by road 
to a destination other than a port and in the month of April amounts to 3.358 + 
0.0405 x 735-5.44 x 10"7 x 7352 +  6.519 x 0.422 =3.358+29.768-0.294+2.751=R$ 
35.56 (with a standard error of R$ 0.21). Shipping to a port (possibly as a result 
of longer waiting times to unload) adds 1.813 +  0.00041 x 735=R$ 2.12 (s.e. R$ 
0.15), and when this shipping to a port takes place during the harvest season freight 
prices are predicted to increase by a further R$ 2.30 (s.e. R$ 0.32). Shipping by 
waterway costs 14.269 +  0.00498 x 735=R$ 17.93 (s.e. R$ 0.25) less than by road, 
while shipping by railway costs 2.349 +  0.01538 x 735=R$ 13.66 (s.e. R$ 0.28) less 
than by road. Shipping in bags as opposed to in bulk raises the price of freight by 
R$ 0.25 though this estimate is not significantly different from zero. Compared to 
April, the peak month of the harvesting season, shipments in any other month of 
the year are cheaper (all coefficients on monthly dummies and their interactions 
with distance are negative). Shipments in January, the month in which prices 
are lowest, are R$ 4.87 (s.e. R$ 0.25) lower compared to April. Note that the 
variation in diesel oil prices over the period is R$ 0.38, accounting thus for a R$ 
2.49 (s.e. 0.17) variation in freight prices (this is admittedly low, owing possibly to 
correlation between diesel oil prices and other variables). I choose to predict the 
plant-to-market freight cost for cement based on specification (II), on account of
10Freight prices, in units of local currency per tonne of produce shipped, are thus in December 
1999 terms.
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observables such as distance from the plant to the market, means of transport and 
the price of diesel oil.
(I)
coef s.e.
(H)
coef s.e.
m
coef s.e.
N o . obs. 27974 27974 30367
R2 0.894 0.899 0.904
Intercept 1.423 *** (0.244) 3.358 *** (0361) 5.413 *** (0.447)
Distance o f route 0.0387 w (0.0005) 0.0405 *** (0.0007) 0.0433 *** (0.0008)
Distance o f route squared -8.12E-07 *** (2.49E-07) -5.44E-07 ** (2.56E-0 7) -9.62E-07 (2.38E-07)
Port destination dum m y 2.135 *** (0.166) 1.813 *** (0.267) 1.720 (0.238)
Water transport d um m y -17.405 w (0.212) -14.269 *** (1.094) -11.516 (1.246)
Rail transport d um m y -12.410 *** (0.343) -2.349 *** (0.571) -3.149 *•* (0.540)
H arvest season  d um m y 2.341 *** (0.118)
Port during harvest dum m y 2.802 *** (0.311) 2.295 *** (0318) 2.248 (0.277)
Price o f d iesel o il 6.815 *** (0.441) 6.519 *** (0.443)
Shipm ent in  bags dum m y 0.249 (0.204) 0.489 ** (0.201)
P ow dered soya dum m y 1.510 *** (0.134) 1.749 *** (0.127)
M aize dum m y -0.755 *** (0.096) -0.976 *** (0.097)
Lim estone dum m y -2.136 *•* (0.151) -1.819 *** (0.140)
M onthly dum m ies Included  (except April) Included  (except April)
Year dum m ies Included  (except 1997)
Distance interacted with:
Port dum m y 0.00041 (0.00031) 0.00062 ** (0.00028)
Water transport du m m y -0.00498 *** (0.00164) -0.00859 *** (0.00184)
Rail transport d u m m y -0.01538 *** (0.00088) -0.01317 (0.00084)
M onthly d um m ies Included (except April) Included  (except April)
Year dum m ies Included  (except 1997)
N o te ;  H e t e r o s k e d a s t i t i ty - r o b u s t  s ta n d a r d  erro rs
*** S ig n i f i c a n t ly  d if f e r e n t  f r o m  z e r o )  a t  th e  1% le v e l;  ** S ig n if ic a n t  a t  th e  5%  le v e l ;  * S ig n if ic a n t  a t  t h e  10%  le v e l  
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  i s  F r e ig h t  P r ic e  in  u n it s  o f  lo c a l  c u r r e n c y  (a t  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 9  p r ic e s )  p e r  t o n n e  o f  p r o d u c e  s h ip p e d
Figure 5-1: Auxiliary OLS regressions for plant-to-market freight cost
Backing ou t net p roducer prices from  re ta il prices The other components 
to ex-plant marginal cost, apart from plant-to-consumer freight, are the reseller 
(retailer) mark-up and producers’ sales taxes. Recall that the lion’s share of the 
Brazilian cement business consists of producers shipping bagged cement to resellers, 
who then sell directly to the end user (a small-scale consumer); I only observe the 
prices set by these resellers, not the prices set by producers. However, I back out 
producer prices as follows. Based on several field interviews11,1 model the reseller
11 These interviews include cement producers’ field representatives and sales executives, buyers 
of cement and representatives of the construction sector’s trade associations across a sample of 
local markets. Information provided in these interviews was also consistent with a report on the
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as competitive. I thus avoid the issue of double marginalisation. A reseller’s cost 
consists largely of (i) two forms of sales tax (“PIS” and “COFINS”, not to be 
confused with the sales taxes collected by the producer), which are proportional to 
the retail price (varying from 2.65 to 3.65% over the time period), and (ii) labour 
costs (for unloading the truck, storage handling and stocking shelves). While sales 
tax will be perfectly correlated with cement prices, this is not the case for labour 
costs. In any case, based again on the field interviews, I assume that resellers 
apply a fixed proportional mark-up over the producer price (namely in the region 
of 13%) and can then back out producer prices from observed retail prices. To 
the extent that (i) labour costs vary across markets, or (ii) some resellers evade 
taxes, or (iii) some resellers occasionally choose to price cement as a “loss leader” 
to lure consumers into their stores, the reseller mark-up may vary across resellers. 
This variation, however, should be small (and the bias, again, is in the direction of 
overstating marginal cost). Further, price discrimination by producers on the basis 
of customer size (i.e. quantity discounts) is very limited across resellers12. A 5- 
10% discount may be offered to large buyers who buy in bulk (ready-mix concrete 
firms and large construction firms) yet again this corresponds to a small share 
of the business compared to that flowing through resellers. Among the robustness 
checks I perform, I compare observed producer prices that I was fortunate to obtain 
from a subset of producers to the backed-out producer prices. Finally, to calculate 
producers’ sales taxes and thus arrive at net producer prices, I consider federal and 
state-level tax legislation. Despite the awkwardness of Brazil’s sales tax system (one 
needs to compute five different sales taxes, namely “ICMS-normal” , “ICMS-ST”, 
“IPI”, in addition to the producer’s own collection of “PIS” and “COFINS”; note 
further that tax rates vary according to the origin and destination of the shipment) 
the total sales tax collected by a producer upon selling to a buyer is conveniently 
proportional to the (net or gross) price set. Despite sales taxes on cement (and on
supply chain prepared by a consulting firm for the cement industry trade association (Booz Allen 
& Hamilton 1990).
12 As mentioned earlier, in view of the bulkiness, fast turn and short shelf life of cement, produc­
ers reach far “down the trade”, via direct-from-plant deliveries and own distribution terminals. 
They resort to distributors for a m in o r  share of their business. Even a relatively small retailer 
(reseller) will be able to place an order directly with the producer; recall that a 15 ton (25 ton) 
truckload corresponds to only 300 (500) bags.
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other products in general) being high (e.g. towards the end of the time period of 
study, sales taxes owed by a producer located in the state of Sao Paulo selling to 
a buyer located in the same state amounted to 28% of the gross producer price), 
sales tax evasion on the part of producers is considered to be minimal. However, 
to the extent that producers manage to negotiate reductions in their tax liabilities 
with state governments eager to attract investments -  negotiations which I do not 
observe -  the marginal cost I calculate will again be overstated (see the earlier 
paragraph on unobservables).
A glance a t m argins Figure 5-2 displays the by-market evolution of consumer 
prices, marginal costs and price-cost margins since July 1994 for nationwide leading 
firm Votorantim (Figure 5-2 is the by-state counterpart to Figure 2-11 in Section 
2.3.3, where these series are aggregated across the 25 states where Votorantim is 
present).
C apacity  u tilisation  As mentioned above, among other plant characteristics I 
observe capacity. As is usually the case with capacity figures, these are admittedly 
prone to considerable measurement error. Nevertheless, I proceed to analysing the 
evolution of plant capacity utilisation, including the three years post stabilisation 
of steep consumption growth (1995 to 1997). Throughout the time period, capacity 
outstrips production (including the growth years, although the slack is lower13), 
with capacity utilisation hovering around an average 65%. As discussed in Section 
3.2, capacity seems to play a strategic role in the industry. Of particular inter­
est, capacity utilisation appears to be similar across firms and plants, with firms’ 
capacity utilisation rates being correlated over time, as firms’ market shares are 
fairly stable, with some exceptions. This finding further supports my modelling 
of marginal cost as being flat in quantity (up to capacity). To the extent that
13 Note therefore that the post-stabilisation boom in demand did not catch the cement industry 
unprepared in terms of capacity. Other industries with tighter capacity facing the same boom 
in demand saw either entry (such as imports) or an increase in prices, which clearly was not 
the experience of the cement industry (recall that imports were largely kept at bay and, not 
unrelatedly as I argue in this thesis, prices fell).
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argin on Votorantim's sales by state
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_________
5 producer are less than Rk 10
as capacity utilisation rises, older, smaller and energy-inefficient kilns may be put 
back into use, marginal costs may rise as capacity becomes tight.
B .1.2 Robustness checks on direct measures of marginal cost
In addition to checking my calculation of the reseller’s mark-up on a subset of the 
data where I do observe producer prices -  thus enabling these to be compared to 
the producer prices I back out from observed consumer prices, as explained above 
-  I perform two other robustness checks of the constructed marginal costs. The 
first check is centred on the Portugal-based multinational Cimpor, which in 1997 
bought its way into Brazil and in 1999 became the third largest firm in the country 
upon acquiring Brennand. This firm is of particular interest in that it is listed on 
the Lisbon stock exchange and chooses to report its financial results broken out by 
country of operation (and fine of business). I can thus use their reported results for 
Brazil as a robustness check for my calculated price-cost margins. The evolution 
of the calculated price-cost margin, as a percentage of net producer sales (i.e. net 
of sales taxes), is graphed in Figure 5-3. This evolution is compared to Cimpor’s 
reported EBITDA (earnings before income tax and depreciation allowance, also 
known as operating cash flow) as a percentage of net sales, over the period 1998 
to 2003. (I can further check my estimates of resellers’ mark-ups and sales taxes 
by comparing my calculated net producer sales, backed out from observed con­
sumer prices, to their reported net sales.) The time series fit between constructed 
and reported figures is good. For example, I estimate Cimpor’s average price-cost 
margins as a percentage of net producer sales rising from around 47% in 2000 to 
56% in 2002. Cimpor reports a similar rise in this period, from 44% to 55%.14 If 
anything, my calculated price-cost margins are slightly higher than the EBITDA 
figures Cimpor reports. This is to be expected, for while my cost estimates in­
clude only (constant) marginal cost, Cimpor’s EBITDA figures are net of other 
costs such as plant overhead and sales and administrative expenses. Indeed, my
14 Comparing operating cash flow (EBITDA) margins across the 9 countries (in Iberia, Africa 
and South America) where Cimpor is active, Brazil’s cement operations are the most profitable: 
a 55.5% EBITDA margin in Brazil compared to an average 39.2% across all countries.
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price-cost margins appear to be conservative (on the low side), as expected from 
the discussion above regarding the directional bias in the construction of marginal 
cost owing to unobservables (in the way of overstating marginal cost).
Price-cost margin for firm Cimpor aggregated across Brazil
o - 
in
o  o  
o  -  o
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month
c o n s ta n t  R $  x  1 0 0 0  % n e t  p r o d u c e r  s a l e s
Figure 5-3: Evolution of the average price-cost margin for firm Cimpor. In con­
stant Reals x 1000 per month (at December 1999 values) and as a percentage of 
net producer sales. Aggregated across all states.
The second additional robustness check is based on accounting data of the 
cement industry surveyed annually by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) as part of their Annual Industry Survey (PIA) series. Figure 5-4 
depicts the average accounting gross margin (defined as producers’ Net Sales minus 
Cost of Goods Sold) as a percentage of net sales for a sample of establishments over 
the 1990s; the number of establishments varies between 33 and 55 and only aggre­
gate data is published. The accounting gross margin is high, hovering around 50%. 
Note that the accounting definition of Cost of Goods Sold does not include freight 
expenses but does includes accounting depreciation, so the accounting gross margin 
cannot be immediately compared to my constructed price-cost margin (which does 
consider freight but not depreciation). Further, I do not know the identity of the 
surveyed establishments. However, the magnitude of both series appears to be con­
sistent. Of perhaps greater importance, the variation in the surveyed accounting 
gross margin is consistent with the observed fall in prices beginning in 1992 and
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the rise in prices commencing in 1997. (Notice the capital-intensive nature of the 
industry: on average payroll -  corresponding not only to plant but also to sales and 
administrative employees -  accounts for less than 10% of a producer’s net sales.)
Accounting gross margins in the cement industry
100%
80%
 ^ Payroll 
N et Sales
Cost o f Goods Sold1 -
N et Sales
60%
40%
20%
0%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Figure 5-4: Accounting gross margins in the cement industry, from surveys con­
ducted by the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics
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C. A ppendix to  Chapter 3
C .l Characteristics of the cem ent industry and 
their relation to  th e literature on collusion
The table below, based on Ivaldi et al (2003), lists industry characteristics that 
are understood to facilitate collusion, summarising the extent to which they char­
acterise the cement industry1. The purpose of this section is to show that tacit 
collusion in the Brazilian cement industry, orchestrated for instance via market 
division, is a concrete possibility in that the characteristics of the industry are con­
sistent with those characteristics that the literature suggests make tacit collusion 
more likely.
XA discussion of each characteristic and how it relates to the cement industry is beyond the 
present scope. The purpose of the table is to convey a simple message with which most academics 
and analysts would agree, stated loosely as follows: cement is an archetypal example of an industry 
whose characteristics make it more collusion-prone than less.
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Characteristics facilitating collusion Characterise the cement industry?
Few competitors (in a given local market) Yes
Entry barriers Yes
Frequent interaction among firms Yes
Market transparency (1) Yes
Growing demand Yes in some local markets
Mild business cycles (intensity and length) Yes in some local markets
Low innovation Yes
Homogeneous product (low differentiation) Yes
Low cost asymmetry (2) Yes in some local markets
Low capacity asymmetry No
Evenly-distributed idle capacity Yes in some local markets
Multimarket contact (3) Yes
Low price elasticity of demand in equilibrium (4) Yes
Absence of countervailing buyer power Yes
Structural finks between firms (e.g. cross-ownership) Yes in some cases
Small competitors on the fringe Yes
Absence of network effects or learning effects Yes
Notes to the table: (1) Market transparency. Of note is the (potential) monitoring 
role played by the cement producers’ trade association in compiling and sharing data 
on firm-level quantities, prices and/or capacity utilisation. (2) Low cost asymmetry. 
Scherer et al (1975) report very low economies from multiplant operation in the cement 
industry. (3) Multimarket contact. It is worth reflecting on the changes to market 
structure across time. As mentioned earlier, of the 19 producers operating in Brazil in 
1991, the industry had consolidated to 12 firms by 1999. Yet this came about not in the 
form of increased concentration at the local market level, but largely in the form of firms 
making acquisitions in markets where they did not previously operate. Thus despite 
the changes to asset ownership, the number of firms shipping to any given market has 
not changed significantly. It is rather multimarket contact which has increased, in the 
sense that the number of local markets in which any two producers meet has gone up 
considerably over the decade. See Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and the discussion in
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Section 3.2. (4) Low price elasticity. Ivaldi et al (2003) argue that rather than enhancing 
the sustainability of collusion, in the sense of increasing the range of discount factors at 
which a collusive equilibrium can be supported, the effect of inelastic demand may be 
to increase the profitability of collusion by raising the optimal collusive price. A similar 
point may be made regarding market division, by which firms concentrate shipments to 
those markets where their plants are located and reduce cross-hauling to neighbouring 
markets (i.e. to other firms’ backyards). To the extent that under competition one 
may observe cross-hauling (e.g. under Cournot competition), the effect of high transport 
costs, as is the case for cement, may then be to raise the profitability of a collusive 
agreement that prescribes large shares in a given local market to those firms with plants 
located in that market. While the effect of inelastic demand works via demand (higher 
collusive prices increasing the profitability from collusion), the effect of high transport 
cost operates via cost (the reduction of cross-hauling increasing the profit ability from 
collusion). See Section 3.2.
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